867.20/10–447: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey
582. From a review of Embtel 751, Sept 29, Wilson’s Oct 2 from Bern and urtel 769, Oct 4,1 Turk Govt’s plans for demobilization still appear somewhat confused. It might assist them in reaching definite decision if you were to convey following message which has been cleared with appropriate officials Dept of Army. Communication should be personal and oral to either Sadak or Saka2 (re latter’s approach to Wilson Aug 16, Embtel 655).
- 1.
- Our estimate of international situation is that while it is obviously bad, there is no immediate danger of war. We do not believe USSR wants war. Soviet policy appears to be directed toward achievement of its aims through subversive activities of communist parties in various foreign countries and such other political, economic and psychological weapons as it finds available. First objective is obviously creation in strategic areas of state of chaos which Russians and their satellites can utilize to establish regimes subservient to them. So long as they find this policy promises results, and at least until they have made greater progress in their internal rehabilitation, we believe Russians will avoid armed clash.
- 2.
- We do not believe that partial demobilization of sort Turks are considering would have any material effect on Russian attitude or course of action in area. However, if Turks should decide to carry out demobilization plans, it would seem to us highly desirable that they be presented in such way as to make move appear part of reorganization of army having as one of its effects and advantages reduction in number of men under arms. It might be given out that because of receipt of new American equipment effective strength of army would actually be increased despite smaller size. It could be emphasized in addition that release of manpower for productive work and reduction of military expenses would build up economic strength of country, thus defeating hope of those who would like to see Turkey weakened [Page 365] internally. Turks should of course be careful to prevent any impression that demobilization implied change in foreign policy or lessening of determination to maintain their sovereignty, independence and integrity.
Explain that foregoing is not intended as advice, since we consider Turks must make own decision, but is merely reflection our thinking which Turks may take into consideration or not as they choose.
For your background info Army considers that planned Turk reduction in force prior to time aid program becomes effective would definitely weaken Turk capacity to resist attack but concurs our feeling that attack unlikely and acknowledges that advantages of reducing military burden may outweigh purely military considerations.
Question has been actively discussed with Brit Emb here. London will instruct Kelly3 to make separate approach to Turks expressing forthright view that balance of advantage on side of reduction. Not a joint Anglo-US approach.
Turk military situation has been reviewed by Gen Morgan of Brit Joint Staff Mission and high US Army officers.4
Sent Ankara 582; rptd Moscow as 1829, and London as 4379.
- Not printed.↩
- Hasan Saka bad become Turkish Prime Minister the previous month, with Necmettin Sadak as Foreign Minister.↩
- Sir David V. Kelly, British Ambassador in Turkey.↩
- According to telegram 795, October 14, from Ankara, Chargé Bursley had that morning given the information contained in telegram 582 to the Turkish Foreign Minister. The latter said that the thinking of the Turkish Government was very much along the same lines (867.20/10–1447).↩