Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/10–947: Telegram

Governor Dwight P. Griswold to the Secretary of State

top secret

Athens, October 9, 1947—7 a. m.

Amag 334. Following is my considered judgment on question sending US Army officers Greece soonest to furnish operational advice Greek Army as recommended Amag 222:¹

1. Best assurance maintenance international peace this area is prompt defeat Greek bandits, reestablishment internal security, prevention economic collapse and concentrated effort rehabilitate Greece. Despite assistance, arms and asylum by northern neighbors bandits still entirely Greek and bandit warfare still domestic problem. Continuance bandit pressure and success however increases danger international complications such as overt support proposed “independent” Macedonia or Bulgarian seizure Thrace. Defeat of bandits will terminate international danger unless Soviet determined on aggressive policy any event.

2. Satisfied Greek Army capable defeating bandits but US operational advice essential expedite offensive and secure speedy termination bandit activity. Each day’s delay prolongs danger and jeopardizes result.

3. I am convinced all phases of military and economic assistance to Greece must be coordinated under single head and spokesman as contemplated by Congress in enacting Greek aid bill.

Defeat of Communism not solely a question of military action as demonstrated Germany, France and elsewhere. In Greece military and economic fronts are of equal importance. Failure on either front will result Communism. Essential to success Truman Doctrine that American military and economic aid continue to be fully coordinated as at present even if, as urged, present scope military aid extended to include operational advice. Strength present procedure illustrated recent and succeeding conferences with Sophoulis (Amag 293²) at which united military and economic approach presented by myself, Livesay and Clay on necessity balancing budget and meeting drachma expenses required for Army and national guard within balanced budget. Slight and unimportant differences viewpoints Ambassador and myself during recent Government crisis illustrate risks involved in divided and co-equal American authority foreign country even where fields of authority overlap only slightly. Dangers arising from lack of unified control would be multiplied many times if furnishing military operational advice were separated from furnishing military logistic advice. If this should be done I believe it would be necessary in order secure proper coordination to place both AMAG and agency furnishing operational advice directly under Ambassador who should then be given full responsibility and direction all American aid to Greece. American experience in Germany with McNarney-Clay setup³ illustrated dangers from lack necessary coordination which can be achieved only through single head. With sovereign and independent Greek Government in picture difficulties experienced Germany would be intensified here, with persistent effort by Greeks to play military and economic missions against each other. British Ambassador has informed me of difficulties British experienced with five independent British missions Greece and admitted lack of single head important cause relative failure British. This confirmed by both British and US members Currency Committee.

4. What has been proposed is furnishing operational advice only. This falls directly within Greece-Turkey aid statute which authorizes use military advisers to assist Greek Army without restriction as to type of advice and provides single chief to administer entire program. I am familiar Secretary Patterson’s statements before Congressional committee that military advisory functions would be limited to matters of supply and that he believed number US officers involved would not exceed forty. I believe Department would have little difficulty, however, convincing Congressional leaders of necessity expanding scope activities to maximum within statutory authority in light developing situation and its increasing seriousness (bandits now estimated 18,400. Compare Amag 222). Republican and Democratic Congressmen visiting Greece have all agreed necessity such operational advice and many took for granted AMAG already properly furnishing such advice.

5. Furnishing operational advice within framework American aid program logical and practical though not moral extension present aid in light conditions which have developed. Such extension would inject no new political element in domestic or international scene. Operational advisory work would be only one small, though temporarily very important, phase broad military and economic aid approved by Congress to implement Truman Doctrine for survival Greece as free and independent nation. Furnishing operational advice considered outside Greek aid program would be fraught with political dangers because such aid would then be considered as going beyond intention Greek aid statute and might reasonably be construed both at home and abroad as war-like gesture possibly preliminary combat operations. It might cause adverse effect our policies UN by giving appearance new unilateral US action and it would clearly give unnecessary handle for Soviet propaganda.

6. I am not asking and would oppose use of even single American officer or soldier against Greek bandits, certainly while warfare continues domestic problem. I urge only furnishing operational advice as logical development under present circumstances to furnishing supplies and logistic aid. Such advice would not and should not be prelude to or aspect of American combat. If US ever compelled resort combat in Greece all phases American military aid should be transferred from AMAG to War Department. Unless however, such situation develops I am convinced all phases of military and economic assistance should be handled under Greek aid statute. Living allowances additional officers required for operational advice can be absorbed through allocation to program expense of living allowances of Army supply and operational personnel directly engaged program work. Such allocation has precedent in Corps of Engineers and additional personnel proposed public health and agricultural programs.

7. After further study consider that suggestion included Amag 222 that operational advisors might be attached office MA provided actually under Livesay as head of USAGG, though perhaps feasible, would not prove satisfactory arrangement. For reasons set forth this telegram, convinced suggestion of separate military mission would be prime serious error.

8. Subject this telegram discussed with McGhee who wholeheartedly endorsed views expressed herein. General Livesay also in full accord. Telegram repeated to Ambassador and General Chamberlin. General preparing separate report to War Department (Embassy’s telegram 1688, October 1). Ambassador in agreement majority my views but prefers defer comment on others until completion Chamberlin survey and return Washington.

Griswold

1. Dated September 15, p. 337.
2. Dated September 30, p. 355.
3. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney was Commander in Chief of United States Forces in Europe and United States Military Governor for Germany, and Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay was Deputy Military Governor for Germany, both officers holding these positions until March 1947.