867.20/9–2947
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)
top secret
[Washington,] September 29, 1947.
| Participants: |
Donald Maclean, First Secretary, British Embassy |
|
Mr. Jernegan (GTI) |
Mr. Maclean called at his request to discuss the Turkish Government’s
query regarding the advisability of reducing the size of the Turkish
Army from 485,000 men to about 330,000 men. He handed me the attached
copy of an aide-mémoire, which he said had been
delivered informally to General Schuyler of the Plans and Operations
Division of the Army Department by Brigadier Price, Secretary of the
British Joint Staff Mission, on September 27. Mr. Maclean said that the
aide-mémoire was, strictly speaking, a
communication from the British military authorities to the American but
that it embodied substantially the views of the Foreign Office as
previously communicated to the British Embassy here. Consequently, he
thought it could be regarded as representing the joint views of the
British civil and military branches. General Morgan, Chief of the
British Joint Staff Mission, was going to see General Collins, Deputy to
General Eisenhower, to discuss the aide-mémoire.
I gave Mr. Maclean a paraphrase of the draft telegram prepared in GTI, explaining that we were still in
process of getting clearance on this and that it must be regarded simply
as an indication of the Department’s thinking on a working level. I said
it would still have to be cleared by the higher officers of the
Department and by the Department of the Army.
I pointed out that the reasoning and views set forth in the British aide-mémoire and our own preliminary draft were
substantially identical. The only difference of any importance seemed to
be that the British Government wished to give the Turks positive advice
to the effect that they should effect the proposed reduction in their
army, whereas we wished merely to give the Turks our estimate of the
situation without calling it advice in so many words, and leave it to
the Turkish Government to make up its mind. Mr. Maclean agreed and felt
that even this difference was more apparent than real. He said he would
inform London of our views as expressed in the draft, making it clear
that this was not yet a final decision by the Department.
Mr. Maclean agreed to my suggestion that we should continue the process
of clearing our draft within the Department and with the Department of
the Army. If any substantial changes were made or if it were approved
substantially as it now stands, we would inform the British Embassy.
[Page 351]
[Annex]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
2
top secret
Aide-Mémoire
The Turkish Government are seeking British and American advice on
whether or not to replace the 150,000 men of their 1925 class who
are due to be demobilised in November this year. The Turks are
deferring this decision, which is urgently needed, in the hope of
receiving prompt and definite advice and they will be most
discouraged if this is not forthcoming.
2. The Foreign Office has agreed with the State Department that this
question should now be discussed informally between the military
advisers of our two Governments, after which the political/economic
aspects will be considered.
3. From the British point of view the following arguments are
considered to be conclusive in favour of advising the Turks to
reduce their forces by not calling up the new class:
- (a)
- Short of war, the Soviet leaders probably appreciate that
a most effective means of exerting pressure on Turkey is by
the promotion of economic difficulties within the country.
It is, therefore, in the Soviet Union’s interest to force
the economic burden of sustained mobilisation on Turkey, and
to continue the nerve war which results in Turkey keeping
forces in readiness;
- (b)
- Russian pressure upon Turkey has been, and will continue
to be, conditioned by their estimate of the probable action
of other powers, and not by the size of Turkey’s armed
forces. It follows that Russian intentions towards Turkey
will not be affected by a reduction in the strength of the
Turkish armed forces, provided the present British and
American policy is maintained. Moreover, there have been
continuous and progressive reductions in the Russian Forces
in the Balkans and this process will presumably be
accelerated as a result of ratification of the peace
treaties.
4. It has been suggested that such a reduction would have an adverse
effect on Greek morale. It is our opinion that this effect will be
negligible if linked to the promised American aid and announced as a
measure designed to increase the efficiency of the Turkish Army. It
has also been suggested that the reduction might encourage bandit
activities in Greece and present an opportunity for starting them in
Turkey. The assistance afforded by the Balkan satellites to bandits
in Greece is conditioned by political considerations and is unlikely
to be affected by the strength of the Turkish forces. The Balkan
satellites have no objectives in Turkish Thrace which should cause
them to start trouble there.
[Page 352]
5. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the Turkish forces
can now be justifiably reduced and at the same time reorganised. It
is hoped that the United States, who have now taken over the primary
responsibility for assistance to Turkey, will agree that the advice
given by both countries in reply to the Turkish enquiry should be to
reduce their forces by not replacing the 1925 class.
