868.00/9–1247: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

secret

1579. In order hear views and recommendations Colonel Miller who just returned from extended tour Thrace (Embtel 1571, September 101), Ambassador called meeting Wednesday evening attended by British Ambassador and American Ambassador as well as military attachés, Embassy officials and Governor Cochran and Colonel Lehner for AMAG.

Colonel Miller painted black picture of conditions in Thrace. He told of ebb tide of civilian and military morale, broken communications, burned villages, crops only partially harvested, failure of relief supplies to arrive, lethargy and despair on part of population and complete lack of offensive action on part of GNA. Train he was on was stopped 15 times because of mines or other rebel actions. He seems convinced that unless steps of most immediate and energetic nature taken before winter sets in, Thrace may virtually be “written off”. Specifically he proposed: (1) that arms be given the peasants in area; (2) that the Greek army then take the offensive and (3) that 20 to 25 American Army officers carefully trained and chosen for this kind of operation be flown at once to Greece to see that point 2 is properly carried out. Short of some such measures, in his opinion, Thrace cannot be saved.

Long discussion took place re advisability of arming peasants in infested areas, unavailability of arms, need of Greek army for additional forces, refusal of British Government to allow British officers to enter combat areas and obstacles in way of complying with Miller’s suggestion re American military advisers. Since views not yet crystallized further conversations will be held with British and AMAG. Colonel Miller and Ambassador will be able give Department and War more complete details upon arrival in US.

Colonel Miller’s report on Thrace confirms views set forth in Embtel 1426, August 21 re dangerous situation in Greece and underlines [Page 337] opinion expressed that our planning in Greece should promptly transcend present arrangements unless we are to fall into error of too little and too late.

Keeley
  1. Not printed.