Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.20/7–2947

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Witman of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] July 29, 1947.

Participants:	M. Constantine Tsaldaris, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece.
	M. Economou-Gouras, Counselor of Greek Embassy.
	Mr. Villard, NEA
	Mr. W. Witman, 2nd Secretary, Embassy, Athens.

M. Tsaldaris referred to his conversations in the Department on July 9 and to a letter which he had addressed to the Secretary regarding the question of increasing the size of the Greek Army, and stated that he had received advice from Athens that Governor Griswold and General Liyesay had turned down the request of the Greek General Staff.

M. Gouras read the substance of a telegram he said was received two days ago, which mentioned a letter dated July 23, 1947 from Governor Griswold to the Greek General Staff stating that on account of financial restrictions it would not be possible to authorize a Greek army of more than 120,000 men, plus a provisional increase of 20,000 men as replacements.¹

M. Tsaldaris said that the Prime Minister will see Ambassador MacVeagh and inform him that such insistence on not increasing the army would bring the Government to an impasse. 45,000 additional men were needed. Otherwise there can be no solution. Greek Government believes that the present army is not enough to deal with the situation. To finish quickly with the bandits, further steps are necessary. M. Tsaldaris would therefore like to have a broader discussion with us for the development in principle of a program of 3, 4, 5 or 6 months. If we agree that the matter must be settled quickly, even at the cost of increasing the Army, we must also discuss the means of paying for such necessary expenses, and how the reconstruction program would be affected. Former Secretary Byrnes had indicated to him in Paris last year that perhaps the Greek Army could be strengthened by supplying material. Now it was a question for the Mission to decide whether material alone would be sufficient, or whether additional men were required. M. Tsaldaris believes both are necessary. He also mentioned the possibility of stretching the available money by supplying US surplus equipment, either on a gift or even “lend-lease” basis.

The British, he continued, had expended more than $150,000,000 to date in aid to the Greek Army. If Gov. Griswold’s hands are bound by this limit, he cannot do otherwise, unless equipment is borrowed so as to have a margin. Two kinds of army are needed, one for sealing the frontier, and the other a sort of Home Guard for occupying cleared areas of the country so that the peasants could return to their villages without fear. There are now 50,000–60,000 armed civilians outside the Army, which M. Tsaldaris would like to disband for the Government cannot control them.

Finally, M. Tsaldaris remarked that he considered the matter of the program and means to be more a political than a military problem.

Mr. Villard in reply stated that he was sure that the General Staff’s request had been examined with attention by Gov. Griswold and related with other Greek needs. Any money used to increase the Army must of course be withdrawn from other reconstruction credits. We assume that the Mission is in the best position to determine what is needed, and whether the answer to the military question lay in modernization or more men, or both. We agree as to the primary importance of restoring order and tranquility, at the same time sealing the northern borders. For the latter, we must exhaust the possibility of action through UN. As for the former, the $150,000,000 program is not inflexible, but will be applied as the Mission decides best. The purpose of sending Gov. Griswold to Greece was to study the situation first hand. We recognize that there can be no economic reconstruction till there is peace. We therefore are just as concerned with putting down the guerrillas, and we wish to find the method of putting an end to the fighting as soon as possible.

1. Governor Griswold advised the Department in telegram AMAG 21 (1198), July 23; 6 p. m., from Athens, of his decisions that “No increase will be permitted in permanent strength of army above 120,000 officer[s] and enlisted men or temporary allowances for 20,000 additional members for three months period.” (868.00/7–2348)