Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

860C.00/11–1547: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Griffis) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   urgent

Warsaw, November 15, 1947—3 p. m.

1873. For the President, the Secretary, and Under Secretary Lovett.² Upon the conclusion this week of 6 months service as Ambassador to Poland, I present the following brief résumé.

During the period, Polish-American relations have shown an almost continuous deterioration, beginning with the refusal of the Polish Government to send a delegation to the Paris Conference, continuing through the elimination of Poland from official American Government relief, followed by the elimination of grain allocations and the development of the American Policy in Germany, all accompanied by a continually rising tempo of attacks on the US from the mouths of leading ministers and the Polish press, substantially all completely of the USSR pattern.

During this period the following conclusions, very few of them new, have been reached:

1. The present Polish Government has a strong and complete control of the nation exerted through its bureaucracy, its secret police, and the presence of a Russian Army.

2. Having achieved this control, the government is now beginning to realize that it has sufficient strength to engage in open attack on and infiltration of the youth, the Catholic Church, and the small remaining Jewish population. There will not be much fight anywhere except the probably losing battle which will be waged by the Church.

3. With the flight of Mikolajczyk, the last vestage of legal organized opposition has disappeared.

4. The press of Poland is substantially 100% controlled and it is completely impossible for any American statements of policy or otherwise to obtain publication except in the dictated and slanted phrases of the Propaganda Ministry.

5. While the great majority of the people is opposed to the government, its propaganda, through constant reiteration, is having a definite and strong effect. The necessity of living and the belief that no change in the present government is possible except as a result of force applied to the Soviet Union have inevitably resulted in a feeling of resignation on the part of the people and a tacit, though sullen, acceptance of the present regime.

6. While we have always had and still have a tremendous reservoir of good will in Poland, this reservoir is being constantly reduced as a result of the really effective use which the government is making of recent statements of American policy, particularly, of course, those having to do with the future of Germany.

7. In general, the government is doing a really excellent job of economic control, development and organization throughout the nation.

8. There is no immediate or far distant possibility whatever, under present conditions, of any change in the present form of government or in this government’s complete subservience to the USSR.

9. The mass of the people are gainfully employed with a slowly increasing standard of living, are amply fed, and are, I believe, working harder than any other people in Europe.

10. The resettlement of the western lands has so far been pretty much of a failure.

11. The proposed consolidation of the Communists and the Socialists, with a possible later inclusion of the Peasant Party, may or may not take place but whether it does or not is relatively unimportant, owing to the fact that most of the Socialist control is ideologically Communistic, wearing a Socialist mask for the sake of holding its position.

12. Excepting through the use of coal, there is little possibility of any substantial export from Poland for some years and its imports, under trade agreement, without outside credits will be small.

13. Under all the circumstances, it is difficult to see any justification for the maintenance of an Embassy or Consular Service here excepting for (a) the use of the Embassy merely as a symbol of indestructible American friendship for the Polish people and as a listening post; (b) the maintenance of a Consular service for the protection of bona fide American citizens and interests. Most so-called Americans here represent a legalistic fringe.

14. The USIS in Poland should either be discontinued completely or expanded many times. At present its operations are so limited as to appear almost ridiculous when compared with the high-powered propaganda service maintained by the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the British.

My policy here for the period, aside from expressing American ideas as forcibly as possible and in words of one syllable to the Polish Government, has been to keep the peace, prevent dangerous incidents, develop the most efficient political reporting, and improve the almost intolerable living conditions of the staff. Resulting from fear and the instructions of the Polish Government as to the fraternization of Poles with Americans, we have little contact with the Polish people and our contact with the Polish Government is confined to formalities. The curtain on our freedoms and operations here is slowly descending and offensive incidents are beginning to occur.

Griffis

1. In telegram 990, November 18, to Warsaw, not printed, the Secretary of State replied to this message in part as follows:

   “Have read urtel Nov 15 with great interest. It was particularly helpful receive your analysis Pol situation immediately before opening meeting in London.” (860C.00/11–1547)

   The reference is to the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 15–Deeember 12.

2. In a subsequent telegram, Ambassador Griffis requested that this message be circulated to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Secretary of Commerce Harriman, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg.