740.0011 EW (Peace)/8–1847: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
2665. Soviet delaying tactics regarding ratification of Italian and Balkan peace treaties seem to reflect Soviet estimate that ratification would bring little if any advantage to Kremlin whereas a number of things may be achieved by further postponing entry into force of these treaties.
1. Advantage which Italian treaty designed to bring Russians, withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from Italy, is for time being nullified by lack of progress in finding Governor for Trieste and establishment of FTT Government.1 On other hand, continued delay in face of self-evident western interest in early ratification may bring with it [Page 560] eventual possibility of selling ratification for some new concessions from Western powers in accordance with well-known Soviet proclivity for selling its favors twice. In meantime, maintenance of present precarious political balance would seem desirable from Kremlin viewpoint.
Significant consequences of treaty ratification to Kremlin operations would appear to be obligations (1) to terminate [armistice?] regimes in Finland and ex-enemy Balkan states and (2) to withdraw troops from Bulgaria. The important current preparations for forthcoming Hungarian elections and transitional character of that Government as well as yet uncompleted liquidation of opposition elements in Rumania and Bulgaria are excellent reasons why Kremlin should be reluctant to relinquish rights and direct controls of the several armistice commissions until anti-Soviet forces definitively eliminated and firmly-based Stalinist regimes are squarely in the saddle. Despite continued presence of Soviet occupation troops in Hungary and Rumania following entry into force of treaties, Kremlin contact with its ex-enemy satellites will presumably be mainly through diplomatic and party channels and will require therefore fully integrated satellite administrations if it is to approximate effectiveness of present armistice military controls.
Greece continues to be a main object in Kremlin planning and desirability from its point of view of maintaining Soviet combat units in Bulgaria is self-evident. Even though treaty provides for Soviet forces in Rumania, within easy supporting distance of any point in Balkans, physical presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria is more effective backing for any Bulgarian aggression against western Thrace, while at same time assuring Bulgarian internal stability and maintaining Soviet pressure on Turkey. Furthermore, in event of American decision to accept possible Greek invitation to despatch troops to Greece to aid in cleaning up local “guerrillas”, Kremlin would no doubt prefer to have combat units already deployed in Bulgaria ready to meet any contingency rather than have to send new units to Bulgaria at “invitation” of Bulgarian Government.
In sum as seen from Moscow, there are no apparent reasons why Kremlin should want to ratify treaties at this time, and numerous reasons suggest themselves why it should continue to present negative course.
Repeated to London as 308.
Department pass to Paris as Moscow’s 309 and Rome as 72.
- For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 51 ff.↩