Office of the Historian

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, September 11, 1947, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, September 11, 1947, 10:30 a.m.
top secret
  • Present
    • state
      • Secretary Marshall
      • Under Secretary Lovett
      • Assistant Secretary Armour
      • Mr. Bohlen1
      • Mr. Kennan2
      • Mr. Rusk3
      • Mr. Gullion
      • Mr. McWilliams
      • Mr. Moseley (SWNCC) Secretary
    • war
      • Secretary Royall4
      • Brig. General Schuyler
      • Colonel Hamilton
      • Colonel Munson
    • navy
      • Secretary Forrestal
      • Under Secretary Sullivan
      • Rear Admiral Wooldridge

I. U.S. Position Toward Atomic Energy Control

decision

a.
It was the sense of the discussion that the question of financial aid to European countries should not be linked to procurement of raw materials for the U.S. atomic energy programs.
b.
It was also the sense of the discussion that the United States take no initiative at this juncture in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Security Council, or in the General Assembly to terminate negotiation looking toward international control of atomic energy. We should, however, review our whole position in view of the situation arising out of failure to reach agreement in the UNAEC thus far, particularly with respect to our defense plans and our atomic energy relationship with Great Britain and Canada.

implementing action

None.

discussion

Secretary Forrestal said that he wished to raise the question whether we considered ourselves bound by the terms of the alleged Churchill-Roosevelt agreement on the atomic bomb.

[Page 839]

Mr. Gullion said that we have never taken a categorical position whether we are still bound by these agreements, although we do admit their validity. He said that the question of the extent to which the agreement is still valid in the postwar period is something to be decided in connection with the projected discussions with the British and the Canadians. He added that it must be recognized that the operation of our atomic energy program relies largely on cooperation with Great Britain and Canada, The pattern for some aspects of this cooperation particularly in procurement was set in war-time agreements, and we are continuing that cooperation without prejudice to the question of the continuity of the agreements. On the other hand the exchange of information apparently envisaged in the agreements was largely held up on our decision. Certain provisions of the McMahon Act might be held to preclude furnishing such information.

Secretary Marshall said that one factor we must face is that we are deficient in our supply of essential raw material for atomic energy production. He said that the question has been raised of tying in our aid to various countries with our needs for this essential raw material. Mr. Kennan said that the project of aid to Europe must fall or stand on its own merits and this program should not be connected with the problem of our atomic material shortages. He added that we would be subject to the severest criticism if it should become known that we were bargaining relief aid for rights to atomic materials. Secretary Royall said that he agreed that we should not mix these two matters together.

Secretary Marshall referred to the discussion at the last meeting of the Committee regarding our future position toward international atomic energy control.5 He said that it appeared certain that we should not break off negotiations in the UN Atomic Energy Commission until we have considered and decided upon our position following a break-off. He said that before we decide upon any future course of action we undoubtedly should have some quiet and informal talks with the Canadians and the British on the present situation. He then read the various recommendations set forth in the State Department Policy Planning Committee paper.6 Mr. Kennan pointed out that the line of action proposed by this paper was based on the present Government policy which is based upon the principles of the Baruch plan.

Secretary Royall said that he could not accept the fact that our policy should be based upon the Baruch plan and he believed that we should reconsider our entire position including the abandonment of the Baruch plan.

Secretary Forrestal asked what we would do if the Soviets agreed [Page 840] to the plan thus far developed. Secretary Marshall replied that we would have to accept this adherence, that we were committed to it—but he pointed out that our measure of confidence in the Soviets’ good faith would be reflected in the discussions which would take place on staging the transition from national (US) control to international control. We would, of course, reexamine our position very carefully with reference to the entire international picture before agreeing on any time table for the transition.

  1. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State.↩
  2. George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.↩
  3. Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.↩
  4. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of War from July, 1947.↩
  5. For the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Three on September 8, see p. 628.↩
  6. PPS 7, August 21, p. 602. In regard to the establishment and operations of the Policy Planning Staff, see the editorial note on p. 733.↩