501.BC
Armaments/12–947
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State
confidential
[Washington,] December 9, 1947.
Subject: Safeguards Essential to the Regulation and
Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces—Proposed U.S.
Position
Discussion
In the near future, the Working Committee of the United Nations Commission
for Conventional Armaments will probably be ready to act on Item 3 of its
Plan of Work which calls for “consideration of practical and effective
safeguards … to protect complying states against the hazards of violations
and evasions.”1 At that time the United States representative, Mr. Ralph A.
Bard, should be prepared to state our views. The Executive Committee on
Regulation of Armaments has prepared the outline of a proposed United States
position on this subject (Tab A).2
As envisaged by the Executive Committee, the system would be
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established by international convention and
would depend for its success upon three safeguards: reporting on
conventional armaments and armed forces, verification of these reports by
international inspection, and remedial action in the case of violation of
the convention. Administration of the convention would be in the hands of an
international agency composed of a governing board, an inspection corps, and
a secretariat. States signing the convention would be obliged to submit
periodic reports which would be subject to verification by inspection teams
drawn from the inspection corps by the governing body of the agency.
Signatory states would also be under the obligation of allowing authorized
representatives of the agency to enter, move freely within, and depart from
territory under their jurisdiction. Reports would be published by the agency
and would be furnished to the Security Council and the signatory states.
Instances of non-compliance and violation would not be defined in the
convention but would be within authority of the agency to determine. Action
in such instances would be primarily the responsibility of the Security
Council. Failure of the Council to act would relieve states of their
obligations under the treaty and would permit them such freedom of action as
is consistent with the Charter.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the proposed U.S. position be approved (Tab B).3
Concurrences
(Approval by the Secretary of Defense of the proposed position is being
recommended by the service Members of RAC)
[Annex]
United States Position on Practical and Effective
Safeguards Essential to the General
Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces
4
RAC D–18/2d
[Washington,] November 25, 1947.
Item III of the Plan of Work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments
provides for: “Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by
means of an international system of control operating through special
organs (and by other means) to protect complying
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states against the hazards of violations and
evasions.” The following outline should provide the basis for the United
States position when Item III is discussed by the Commission:
I. The Objective of Safeguards.
A. To protect complying states against the hazards of violations and
evasions.
II. The Nature of Safeguards.
A. The system of safeguards should be so devised that its operations will
be effective, technically feasible and practicable, and will:
- (a)
- Detect promptly the occurrence of violations;
- (b)
- Minimize interference with and impose minimum burdens on the
economic and industrial life of the participating states.
III. The Basic Elements Constituting
Safeguards.
- A.
- Accurate and regular reports by all participating states of such
information related to conventional armaments and armed forces as
may be required by the treaty.
- B.
- Verification of the above mentioned reports by thorough
international inspection procedures.
- C.
- Remedial action in the case of violation of the treaty.
IV. The International Agency
Responsible for Safeguards.
- A.
- An international agency should be established within the framework
of the United Nations, deriving its powers and status from the
treaty under which it is established, to supervise and administer
the agreed system of safeguards in connection with the regulation
and reduction of conventional armaments.
- B.
- The international agency should consist of a governing board, an
inspection corps and secretariat.
- C.
- The governing board should be composed of representatives from
each of the states which are members of the Security Council, the
non-permanent membership changing in conformity with elections to
and retirement from the Security Council.
- D.
- The inspection corps should be composed of members drawn from
panels nominated by each participating state. The size and
composition of the inspecting teams drawn from this corps and
utilized in particular instances should be determined by the
governing board.
- E.
- Such secretariat as may be needed should be selected by the
governing board.
- F.
- The decisions made by the international agency should not require
unanimity.
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V. Rights and Duties of the
Agency.
- A.
- Receiving from each participating state the reports specified in
the treaty.
- B.
- Verification of this information through direct
inspections.
- C.
- Review and interpretation of data derived from reports and
inspections.
- D.
- Preparation and publication of periodic and special reports to
organs of the United Nations and to the participating states.
- E.
- The inspection and verification process as applied to each state
should be made by nationals of states other than the states being
inspected. However, the state being inspected should be obliged to
appoint a liaison officer to assist and accompany the inspection
group representing the international agency.
- F.
- Individual members and national composition of the inspection
teams should be varied periodically.
- G.
- The international agency and its representatives should have no
authority to issue directions to participating states except as may
be provided in the treaty under which it is established.
- H.
- Inspection and verification should be conducted on a regular basis
with reasonable advance notice which should be set forth in the
treaty. However, special inspections may take place under such
circumstances as may be specified in the treaty.
- I.
- Certification to the Security Council and to participating states
of violations or evasions.
VI. Rights and Duties of Participating
States.
- A.
- Each participating state should afford duly accredited
representatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress to and
egress from, and movement within its territories; should aid and
assist them in the performance of their duties, should provide
access to the activities subject to inspection, and should arrange
for the full cooperation of national or local authorities or private
individuals.
- B.
- The treaty should set forth the nature and scope of the inspection
and verification processes to be followed by the international
agency in order that all participating states may be aware of their
rights and obligations.
VII. Action To Be Taken Upon the
Determination of a Violation.
- A.
- The international agency should be responsible for the
certification to the Security Council and to all participating
states of such acts of omission and commission as the agency shall
determine to be violations of the treaty.
- B.
- Such certification may be accompanied by such recommendations in
respect of any violations cited as the international agency may deem
appropriate.
- C.
- Action in respect of any violation should be primarily the
responsibility of the Security Council. The treaty should provide
that, since the purpose of the system of safeguards is to protect
complying states against the hazards of violations, failure by the
Security Council to correct violations or otherwise enforce the
treaty should relieve participating states from their obligations
thereunder and permit them such freedom of unilateral or collective
action as is consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.
