501.BC
Atomic/11–1447
It was agreed that if conversations on Staffing and Organization were carried
on in the informal sub-committee of Committee 2, we would limit ourselves
pretty strictly to the subject matter of 3 (a) in the
subject list on Page 7 of the Second Report;
namely, Organization
[Page 695]
and
Structure. Subject 3(b), Relations to Other Organs of
the United Nations, would be omitted so as to avoid at this point discussion
on such subjects as the veto, and these matters would be referred to in
later sections.
On this basis the United States Delegation is in agreement with the action
proposed by the other delegations consulted, and as indicated in the
attached memorandum, and recommends it to the State Department for their
approval.
[Enclosure]
Report of Conversations With Major Delegates to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission
1. Decision as to introduction of atomic energy in
debates of present session of the General Assembly.
It is the feeling of the American Delegation, concurred in by other major
delegations, that there would be no value in debating atomic energy in
the present session of the General Assembly. There is neither time for a
full discussion, nor is the emotional atmosphere right for an unbiased
and technical discussion. Such a debate should therefore be avoided if
possible.
If the Soviet precipitates a debate in the form of a speech by Vishinsky,
which may include a reintroduction as a Soviet resolution of paragraph 4
in their previous war-mongering resolution,1 a reply
of course will be necessary. It would be desirable that the first
replies should be made by other than the United States, particularly by
Canada, France and the United Kingdom, leaving the American reply to
follow. All replies should be brief and as unemotional as possible and
deal lucidly with the facts at issue. If the Soviet reintroduce their
resolution it is considered desirable that an amendment be introduced
immediately, such that the resolution as amended would include the
entire terms of reference of the General Assembly of January 24,
1946.
2. Basic considerations in formulating future
plans.
It is the general opinion that at the present time there is no likelihood
of the Soviet entering in good faith into an acceptable agreement for
the control of atomic energy. It is believed that the Soviet will not be
ready to consider such a step unless and until (a) Europe is restored to sufficient strength to put up serious
resistance to a Soviet invasion,
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(b) the Soviet become convinced that the
United States will not suffer an economic breakdown in the next
depression.
We are therefore all agreed that it would be unwise to go forward with
specific proposals on the balance of the subjects which would need to be
included in a treaty (other than staffing and organization), namely,
financing, strategic balance, sanctions and stages. These subjects are
more political than those previously covered and should be considered
under the conditions existing at such time as the Soviet Union desires
to enter into a treaty. The subjects on which specific proposals have
been developed to date, as embodied in the Second Report, are, in
general, technical subjects having to do with the functions and control
powers of the international agency, and therefore are essentially
nonpolitical. Having reached unanimity on these technical subjects, it
is highly desirable that this unanimity should not be destroyed, and
that the First and Second Reports be kept intact for use if and when the
Soviet are ready to come in. From this general background, it is felt
that these are the objectives which it is desired to achieve:
-
a.
- To develop the widest public appreciation of the Second Report
of the Commission.
-
b.
- To maintain the initiative in the Atomic Energy Commission at
least to the extent of protecting the First and Second Reports
of the Commission, and to keep a united front.
-
c.
- To prevent the Soviet from taking over the initiative by
focusing attention on new proposals incompatible with the
previous work of the Commission, or by such a maladroit
cessation of activity on our part as would give the appearance
of lack of sincerity as to our adherence to the Commission’s
Reports.
-
d.
- To continue the Atomic Energy Commission in being against the
possibility of Soviet agreement at some future time.
-
e.
- To make it absolutely certain that the United States is not
withdrawing its “offer” and is not suspected of proposing to
withdraw its “offer.”
3. The alternative procedures which may be followed to
achieve the desired objectives.
The group has considered that the next few months might be taken up by
any one of the following:
-
a.
- The development of consideration of specific proposals on
staffing and organization.
-
b.
- The discussion of biological warfare and other weapons of mass
destruction.
-
c.
- The discussion with the Soviet Union on their reasons for
refusing to accept the Second Report of the Commission,
particularly the paper on inspection. This would give the best
opportunity for developing public appreciation of the Second
Report.
If proposals (a) and (b)
were selected they would probably be followed by proposal (c) in order that a final conclusion could be
reached and a third report made to the Security Council submitting the
dead
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lock to them. Against the
advantage in courses (a) and (b) taken above, there are some serious objections, which are
as follows:
On the proposal to discuss staffing and organization, there is the danger
that this paper would become quite controversial and that we might not
be able to get the same full agreement as was obtained on other papers.
If it should involve the discussion of the relations of the control
agency with other agencies of the United Nations, of the veto, of
sanctions, and by-passing the Security Council, the Soviet would be
given new ammunition for their propaganda. However, these matters might
be deferred to later papers. The solution which has been suggested by
Canada has been that we should go along on staffing and organization in
informal conversations of Committee 2 and if we find there is going to
be serious disagreement, withdraw at that point, and not include the
subject in any further report.
The difficulty with respect to the consideration of biological warfare
and other means of mass destruction is that the Poles, who suggested
such a program,—probably at the instigation of the Soviets,—have in mind
that there is no means of controlling these things and that the only
solution would be a convention prohibiting their use, and that having
developed this course it would then be easy to propose that atomic
warfare be similarly prohibited, pending agreement on controls. There is
also the disadvantage that no governments working on biological warfare
would be anxious to give up their real or assumed secrets. The Soviets
would probably look on this as a fishing expedition and then complain
bitterly if any other governments refused to send their best expert
witnesses to the Commission.
4. Final steps and reference to the Security
Council.
It is obvious to all the delegations we have talked to that at some point
the Commission will have to recognize that it can go no further with its
work in the face of Soviet intransigence, and so report to the Security
Council and General Assembly. We are therefore concerned with the
following questions:
-
a.
- When will the appropriate time arrive?
-
b.
- Should such a report be designed to precipitate a considerable
public debate in the Security Council or in the General
Assembly?
-
c.
- Should such a report ask for a definite mandate from the
General Assembly to proceed along the lines of the Second Report
and the general principles laid down in the First Report, or
some other proposed action?
The decision as to when to report this impasse to the Security Council
and what recommendations should accompany such a report may perhaps be
left to sometime in the future. The general feeling is that it is too
early to take such action now.
At a further meeting on November 14th of delegates (Canada, U.K., France,
U.S.), at which this paper was discussed and approved, the
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United Kingdom delegate
brought up the matter of further discussing the Soviet proposals, and
the following actions were recommended:
- 1.
- A meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission should be called
about December 15th while the French have the chair.
- 2.
- Committee 1 should be assigned the work of further
consideration of the Russian proposals of June 11th in the light
of the replies to the U.K. questions.
- 3.
- Committee 2 should undertake work on Staffing and Organization
in informal sessions.
It was the feeling that this work would take some months and would
result, probably, in a Report to the Security Council which would state
that the Commission was unable to reconcile its differences with the
Soviets and could go no further for the present.
