Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

501.BC Armaments/9–1047

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

confidential

New York, September 10, 1947.

Dear Bob: During the past ten days, our Commission has been making definite progress, contrary to our expectation that we would not do much of anything during September or through the General Assembly. We have completed point #1 of our Plan of Work¹ and have started on point #2. We are covered satisfactorily on our instructions on point #2 and point #3. We are completely at sea on point #4, which has to do with the program for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

Several months ago, following our instructions from General Marshall to the effect that we must develop a program of leadership and not be placed in a negative position, I developed a plan for our delegation to submit under item 4,² and asked the State Department to either approve this plan or develop something more satisfactory to take its place. Nothing has happened as yet that I know of, and we are apt before long to be put in the negative position of approving or opposing a plan submitted by some other nation, although it is obvious that the smaller nations are looking to us for leadership on this main item of our Plan of Work.

As I understand it, our plan has been for a long time in the hands of the Strategic Committee³ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I believe they have just recently made their recommendation to the Joint Chiefs.⁴ I am informally advised that this recommendation opposes our plan. I was convinced all the way along that the Strategic Committee would oppose our plan, because they opposed the original conventional armaments program when it was agreed to by the United States.

I believe their main objection is that they do not wish to give any information whatever about armaments or armed forces until the treaties have been signed, the atomic energy program completed, and the armed force set up of the United Nations arranged for.

A month ago at the time I met with you in Washington I talked to Admiral Leahy, explained our plan in detail, and obtained his approval and assurance that he would back it up at the time of the JCS meeting. I also talked to Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz together. Mr. Forrestal said that he had no objections whatever to the innocuous information that was asked for as part of our plan, as it was available and could be obtained in a few hours by any high school boy.

Admiral Nimitz had not heard of the plan or had the opportunity to study it up to that time. I am convinced that if this plan could be properly explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it was to Admiral Leahy, they would not oppose it, as it is by long odds, in my opinion, the lesser of the two evils confronting us.

The British have a very loose open-end plan providing for reporting on armed forces personnel only. They have been instructed to introduce it in connection with item 2, and may do so on Friday.⁵ Their program will permit and encourage every delegation to ask for all types of information, with the result that it may be very much more embarrassing to our armed forces than the innocuous information requested in our plan. On top of this, we will probably have a Russian plan, and you can imagine the program which will be outlined by them.

It has been my purpose to try and get a majority of our Commission to approve of our plan before submitting it, with the understanding that there should be no changes and that this would be as far as we would be willing to go under present existing conditions. If this could be accomplished, we should have created a vehicle for conventional disarmament which would go forward by stages and be implemented as the United Nations develops, as treaties are signed, the armed force set up and atomic energy program matured.

In the meantime, nothing in the program of an embarrassing nature to our armed forces would develop, as far as conventional armaments is concerned.

I feel that I must call this matter to your attention for if we are to take the lead and not be placed in a negative position, we must have a program. I have done everything in my power to develop such a program, and I must say it has been approved by practically everybody who has seen it, with the exception of some of the military, although in the initial stages when I took it up with the heads of our Military Staff Committee here in New York, it was generally approved by them in principle, and a strong letter of recommendation was written by General Joseph T. McNarney to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.⁶

I had hoped that we could delay the decision by the JCS until Admiral Leahy returned to Washington about September 20th, but I have been informed that the Admiral may be retired and be replaced by someone else as soon as he returns, and if we delay until September 20th, it may be too late.⁷

The only further suggestion is that I shall be glad to come to Washington to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their request to consider this subject, or if it is preferable, to meet with the Secretaries when they have received the recommendations of the JCS.

Awaiting your further suggestions,⁸ I remain with kind regards, Sincerely yours,

Ralph A. Bard

1. For the text of the Plan of Work, see RAC D—3/5, June 19, p. 525.

   At its 10th Meeting, July 16, the CCA had established a Working Committee of the whole with the Plan of Work as its terms of reference. The Working Committee first met on August 20 at which time the United States Delegation offered a proposal defining weapons of mass destruction to determine the jurisdiction of the Commission. This proposal, as amended in the course of discussion, was adopted by the Working Committee at its 4th Meeting, September 9, despite opposition by the Soviet Union by a vote of 7 to 2 with two abstentions. The resolution read as follows: “The Working Committee resolves to advise the Security Council

   • “(1) that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above;
   • “(2) that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition.” (IO Files)

   The CCA began consideration of item 2 of the Plan of Work, “general principles,” on September 9.

2. For the text of the July 16 draft proposal for an armaments regulation program, prepared in the Office of the United States Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments, see p. 562.
3. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
4. For the evaluation of the Bard Plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Forrestal’s letter to Marshall, October 10, p. 679.
5. September 12.
6. The letter under reference was presumably that of June 12, 1947, from Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, United States Air Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, to Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, not printed (USUN Files).
7. In a letter of September 18, not printed, Bard reviewed the problem for Admiral Leahy and expressed the hope that the Admiral would be present when the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it (USUN Files). Admiral Leahy remained as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy until March, 1949.
8. Replying by letter on September 12, not printed, Lovett stated that he saw real merit in Bard’s plan. He suggested that Bard contact Secretary of Defense Forrestal to arrange a personal hearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (501.BC Armaments/9–1047) Bard informed Lovett on September 15 that Forrestal wished to defer such a meeting until after September 20 (501.BC Armaments/9–1547).