Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/79

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

confidential

[washington,] August 29, 1947.

General Disarmament Including Atomic Weapons

the problem

The questions of the international control of atomic energy, and the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces are not on the agenda of the General Assembly. However, in view of the past actions and proposals of the Soviet Union the possibility should not be precluded that the USSR might again attempt to associate atomic weapons with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. In that event, this Government should be prepared to state its position on this problem.

recommendations

The United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of the relationship of the international control of atomic energy and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. If a debate on this subject develops, however, this Government should reaffirm its basic position which is that the two problems must be kept separate.

(a) The United Nations has already separated the two problems by the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, and the Security Council Resolution of February 13, 1947.

(b) The following reasons for the above action further illustrates the necessity for continued separation.

1. The urgency of the problem of atomic energy.

2. The uniqueness of the problem of atomic energy.

3. The greater importance of the problem of atomic energy as distinguished from conventional armaments.

4. The objective of “elimination” from national armaments of atomic weapons as distinguished from “regulation” and “reduction” of conventional armaments.

5. The greater complexity of the problem of atomic energy.

6. The necessity to keep the issues of atomic energy clear cut and not involved and entangled in discussing less important issues of conventional armaments.

discussion

1. The United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of the relationship of atomic weapons to the regulation of conventional armaments in the General Assembly. If the issue is brought forth by another delegation, this Government should reaffirm the position it has taken many times in the past year that the work of the two Commissions namely, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments must be separate and continue to be separate.

2. This Government’s Representative should argue that the two problems should be kept separate on the following grounds:

(a) The General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, which established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and set forth its terms of reference, clearly assigned the problem of atomic weapons to that body. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, concerning the general principles in reference to the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces again emphasized the separation of the two problems. While the Resolution calls for expediting consideration, both of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, and of a general system of control to include both the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, it also contains the provision that nothing in the Resolution “shall alter or limit” the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Security Council Resolution of February 13, 1947, establishing the Commission for Conventional Armaments and setting forth its terms of reference states that “those matters which fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission as determined by the General Assembly Resolutions of January 24, 1946, and December 14, 1946, shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission hereby established.”

(b) Aside from previous decisions taken by organs of the United Nations providing for the separation of atomic energy and conventional armaments, the more important reasons for keeping the work of the two Commissions separate are found in the nature of the two problems:

1. This Government has argued and continues to emphasize that the most urgent problem facing the United Nations is that of the international control of atomic energy. The urgency of the problem and, therefore, the special attention which must be given to the problem was stressed by this Government in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada in the Three Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy November 15, 1946. In proposing a United Nations Commission to engage this problem, the Declaration stated that “the Commission should be instructed to proceed with the utmost dispatch…”. The General Assembly Resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission also emphasized the same necessity for a speedy solution of the problem and urged that “the Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch”.

The urgency of this problem has not only been reflected in official pronouncements and Resolutions but is a part of the nature of the problem of atomic energy. If there is no international control of atomic energy, this Government considers that the near future will bring forth the possibility of world wide competition for atomic weapons. Such a competitive struggle with the possibility of utilization in warfare would deny to all peoples of the world the security that they desire, and fear and suspicion would dominate the United Nations. In the opinion of this Government, therefore, the terrifying possibilities in uncontrolled atomic energy competition among states requires that the problem of international control of atomic energy must have top and first priority over all other weapons.

2. The uniqueness of atomic energy is related to the very nature of nuclear fission and requires a special awareness of the scientific and technological implications of the problem. Thus, the international control of atomic energy as envisaged by the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission and as particularly emphasized by this Government requires a limitation on the present actions and rights of participating states. For example, this Government considers that there can be no international control of atomic energy, unless there is an international authority which will be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security. While there might be wide inspection powers, both in atomic energy and the regulation of conventional armaments, atomic energy control has a separate and unique status in terms of managerial and ownership responsibilities of a highly specialized nature. Thus, both the understanding of the problem of atomic energy and the proposed solution of the problem rests on unique grounds which are unrelated to the regulation of conventional armaments.

3. The importance of the problem of the international control of atomic energy is underlined by the urgent necessity to find a solution. Despite the urgency of the problem, however, one cannot deny that the proportions of the problem, particularly if the problem is not solved, transcends the problem of conventional armaments. The destructive power of atomic weapons and the possibility that further research in the military aspects of atomic energy will produce even more terrifying results both in scope and destructive force makes conventional weapons small in importance. Thus this Government considers that another reason for keeping the two problems separate is that the importance of the problem of atomic energy justifies one organ of the United Nations devoting its full time to examining proposals and providing recommendations for the international control of atomic energy.

4. Another reason for keeping the two problems separate is related to the different objectives in reference to atomic energy and conventional armaments. The objective of the international control of atomic energy is to “eliminate from national armaments atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. The objective in reference to conventional armaments relates to “the regulation and reduction” of conventional armaments. These two different objectives require distinct and separate approaches to their solution both on technical grounds and political grounds. The technical problem of “elimination” is quite different from the technical problem of “regulation” and “reduction”. The political implications of an international authority having title or managing an operation are quite different from an international commission which might be authorized to “inspect” certain national armaments. Thus, the solution to the objective of “elimination” is related to the unique nature of the problem of atomic energy which is completely different from the nature of the problem of conventional armaments. This Government considers, therefore, that the different objectives provide further justification for keeping the work and solution of the problem of atomic energy distinct and separate from that of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

5. The complexity of the problem of atomic energy is well known. The world is aware of the fact that the problem is comparatively new and men competent to understand the complexities of the problem are few. The deliberations and the discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission have set forth the complexities related to the international control of atomic energy. Thus, the understanding of the problem and the knowledge to set forth an adequate solution requires not only political understanding but technical understanding of a highly specialized type not required in the problem of conventional armaments. This Government does not deny that an adequate and effective solution of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments will be characterized by complexities of great magnitude. However, the complexities of conventional armaments as they relate indirectly and directly to possible regulation and reduction are fairly well known to many states and literally thousands of technicians in all states, Thus, the complexities of the problem of atomic energy are quite different and greater in scope than the complexities of the problem of conventional armaments which again provides a justification for keeping the two problems separate.

6. This Government considers that one of the most important reasons for keeping the problem of atomic energy separate from that of conventional armaments in attempting a solution is to make sure that the issues in both Commissions are at all times clear to the world. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has attempted to associate atomic weapons with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. This Government has vigorously opposed this move not only upon the grounds stated above but on the grounds that a joining of the two proposals would slow the ultimate solution of atomic energy which should have the highest priority and would cloud the issues. Such a move would also provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to propose the elimination of atomic weapons on a basis related to conventional armaments resulting in no security for participating states against the hazards of violation.

It might be argued that this Government could derive a tactical advantage in the General Assembly by accepting the Soviet challenge to join the two problems, if such a challenge is made. Such an argument would have to be based on the idea that this Government really does not care if there is one Commission or if there are two Commissions as long as the result provided an adequate and effective system of international atomic energy control and an adequate system for the general regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. However, as long as it is clear that the USSR in proposing the association of atomic weapons with conventional armaments has as an objective the embarrassment of this Government and a system of international control which would be meaningless and a fraud, this Government should insist upon the separation of the two problems. Stating the issue in another way it would be entirely appropriate for this Government to accept the Soviet challenge if it were clear that the result of joining the two problems, as might be evidenced by Soviet actions and attitudes, would produce an effective and adequate international system for both atomic energy and conventional armaments. The preponderance of evidence, however, indicates no willingness on the part of the Soviet Union either to understand or accept the basic principles underlining an effective system for the international control of atomic energy. Bearing this in mind it would be extremely dangerous for this Government to risk what is now a clear record of Soviet negativism by placing any faith in an alternative approach which the past year would overwhelmingly indicate would result in failure. It is considered that any tactical “victory” such as the acceptance of a Soviet challenge would be ephemeral. Thus, it is of enormous importance particularly from the standpoint of the record and world opinion that the issues particularly on atomic energy be preserved as they now stand with a majority favoring an effective international control and the Soviet Union in a minority and with a clear record of non-participation, blocking and criticism.

1. Circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D–27/1 on September 5 (Department of State Disarmament Files).