USUN Files
Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
I should like to report to you the developments in the Conventional Armaments Commission since my last memorandum of July 11th.1 As you will recall a plan of work based on a U.S. draft was finally accepted both by the Commission and by the Security Council. Following the acceptance of the plan by the Security Council, the Soviet representative indicated that he would be guided in the future by the general line expressed in his own plan of work which had been rejected.
In recent discussions in Washington, I have endeavored to place before the representatives of the Armed Forces and the State Department the necessity for the development of a positive plan of action in respect to our activities in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. As I see it, we have three alternatives:
- a.
- To present a positive program which can be supported by our own public and by our friends in the Commission.
- b.
- To continue to take part in negotiations without putting forward any specific proposals of our own.
- c.
- To recognize that continued negotiations in the existing atmosphere cannot be successful and to propose an indefinite recess.
The interim proposal for an international system of reporting and verification which I discussed with you a few weeks ago has been further developed and has been submitted to the military services and to the State Department. On my last visit to Washington I discussed the plan with Admiral Leahy and found his reaction quite favorable.
I have been advised informally that the Foreign Office is pressing the [Page 589] U.K. Delegation here to put forward at an early date a proposal for a similar system of reporting and verification, but which would be applied to armed forces alone. I pointed out to the U.K. Delegation that such a proposal would invite amendments to include not only armaments but other provisions which we might find unacceptable. If negotiations were to continue, such an interim proposal would almost certainly be introduced by at least one other delegation. Regardless of whether or not we were prepared to submit our own proposal, we would be forced to take a definite position either for or against.
The entire matter was presented last week to Under Secretary Lovett at a meeting of military and State Department representatives. Both our interim proposal and the alternate course of recessing were discussed thoroughly. At the close of the meeting, Mr. Lovett directed that our interim plan be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an opinion in respect to its military implications. He also directed that Dean Rusk’s office thoroughly study the two alternate courses suggested. I have hopes that a decision will be reached shortly.
If we are to call for a recess in negotiations on the ground that present discussions are futile and that the atmosphere of cooperation necessary for success is entirely lacking, it may be desirable to first discuss the first two points in the Commission’s plan of work. As you will recall, the first point involves the definition of the armaments and armed forces falling within the jurisdiction of the CCA and the second provides for the development of the general principles of disarmament. Under this point, we propose to put forward for decision a set of general principles which will include, as prerequisites for the implementation of any disarmament program, the establishment of the international security force, the completion of the German and Japanese Treaties, and agreement on atomic energy.
I am enclosing a draft of a statement to be given in the Commission should the decision be made to propose an indefinite recess.2