501.BC Armaments/7–1147
Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)1
I have not discussed with you for a good while the problems we are facing as a member of the Conventional Armaments Commission.
The Plan of Work of the Commission has been adopted and approved by the Security Council, although the Soviet Delegate, after the vote in the Security Council, declared that in the Commission, his Government’s representative would be guided by the general line indicated in the Soviet Plan of Work.2
We are now faced with the discussion of General Principles, safeguards, and following these, the formulation of a practical program of disarmament. As matters stand now we are in a most unsatisfactory position to engage in debate upon the program ahead. My instructions from the Secretary of State are that we must not take a negative position in the disarmament program, and yet because of the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy, our hands are tied, and no position but a negative one is available.
I and my advisers agree that we must have a practical program for disarmament, behind which we can rally our friends on the Commission. Otherwise we will have to oppose piecemeal any program brought forward by the Soviets or the French and be put in the position of opposing the only programs for disarmament which are before the Commission.
We have developed, as you know, an interim proposal for eventual disarmament on a progressive basis,3 which has been in principle approved by a number of well informed people who know what we are up against in dealing with the Soviets in our Commission. But the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so far make it impossible to go forward with our plan.
The Army and Navy take the position that until the peace treaties have been signed, the United Nations armed forces set up, and the atomic bomb question settled satisfactorily, including also settlement [Page 561] of methods of handling other mass destruction weapons, there shall be no discussion of a definite program of disarmament and that they will not give out any information as to their armament or armed forces or submit to any verification or inspection procedures, no matter how restricted.
Under such conditions, it is of course obvious that no plan can be proposed by the United States Delegation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to forget that all of these matters will be discussed under someone else’s plan and that we cannot prevent such discussions. The various delegates and millions of people throughout the world want a plan, and if we have none to offer and possibly end up with nothing but a most disastrous Soviet plan, we are going to be entirely on the defensive, and a trimmed down Soviet plan will be much worse in all respects than any plan that we would propose.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff advisers don’t seem to realize that every part of our plan as it progresses will be submitted to them for approval of such details as the terms of the questionnaire, the question of safeguards, verification and, inspection, etc. In General Osborn’s opinion, they have nothing to worry about anyway because the Russians will never accept our plan with its safeguard features.
It is of course apparent to everyone in the United Nations and on the street that the present international atmosphere is not such that lends itself to a discussion of a program of disarmament. Several delegates have mentioned this, and in talking to Cadogan yesterday, he said that from a common sense standpoint, it would be better to adjourn further meetings of our Commission until after the General Assembly meetings in the fall, in the hope that developments will occur which would permit us to resume on a basis that makes sense.
Unless we are to be permitted to set up a program of our own, it would be far better to arrange in some manner for an adjournment than to be placed in a negative position of being opposed to the only disarmament programs before the Commission. This is just the position Russia desires us to be in, and they will make the most of it. Why not be forthright and truthful and say out loud what everybody is saying and everyone knows is a fact, that talk of disarmament under present international conditions is a farce. Such a statement properly arranged for might clear the atmosphere in a very desirable manner.
In this connection, I am talking only about adjournment until controversial matters are settled to the point the disarmament discussion can be resumed in an atmosphere of cooperation, good will and greater security than now exists. Unless we can work out shortly some solution to our difficulties, I am afraid we are in for a bad time in our Commission in trying to carry out the ideas of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are attempting to revise our plan and as soon as we can get this done, I expect to again discuss it with the Secretaries in Washing [Page 562] ton of the Army and Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have not given up hope of getting their approval.
- Bard transmitted copies of this memorandum to Lovett and Rusk (501.BC Armaments/7–1147).↩
- At its 152nd Meeting, July 8, the Security Council debated and adopted the Plan of Work approved by the Commission on Conventional Armaments on June 18 (for text, see Doc. RAC D–13/5, June 19, p. 525). For the relevant portion of the record of the 152nd Meeting of the Security Council, including statements by the United States and Soviet representatives, and the text of the Soviet Plan of Work, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 55, pp. 1218–1229.↩
- See Doc. RAC D–9/1a, July 16, p. 562.↩