USUN Files
The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)
Dear Jim: I found your letter of July 11 upon my return to New York on July 7, and will undertake to answer it as briefly as possible, although I want to talk again with you and Admiral Sherman before a final decision is made.
Your conclusions of course are sound from the standpoint of the armed forces considering their responsibilities and also perfectly proper, if it were not for the fact that sticking arbitrarily to these principles will bring us into conflict with other nations on the basis which will make it very difficult for us to maintain leadership in the disarmament program. We could hold out and in the end veto any program which was set up which did not agree with these ideas. However, we would be constantly in a negative position, and one thing that Secretary Marshall has impressed upon me is that we must not occupy a negative position and must supply leadership for the other smaller countries involved.
If we do not have a constructive program of our own, we will be in a negative position of opposing disarmament programs, which will undoubtedly be in the case of Russia entirely antagonistic to our ideas and probably to some degree in the case of the French program. We will then be in a position of blocking a program of disarmament. That is just where Russia wants to place us, and they will make the most of it. For many years, they have put out the propaganda that the world does not expect any disarmament program from the capitalistic nations, and that they will never get one.
[Page 558]The program which I have in mind, which has been accepted in principle by most of the members of the Military Staff here, is one based upon progressive disarmament as the United Nations becomes a strong functioning organization—as the United Nations armed force comes into being and is effective as the peace treaties are signed—the atomic weapons program concluded, etc. etc.
We feel here that we must have a program where we can show leadership. We feel that the net result of having such a program will be very much more favorable, even though it is not exactly what we want, than the results will be if we have to take a program proposed by some other country which in the end will be probably very unsatisfactory and which we might have to veto. Various delegations and millions of people through the world and in this country are greatly interested in the disarmament program, and our Commission is going to work on some program, and it would be much better if the majority of the delegates approved our program than it would be if we have to fight against someone else’s program.
I don’t think the military in Washington quite understand that as the steps in our program are developed, they will be consulted, and these steps will be carried out in accordance with their wishes, so far as is possible. In other words, we would not take steps unless they are satisfactory to us. For instance, when we ask the nations of the world to fill out a questionnaire showing their armed forces and armaments in the initial stages, this could be so limited that it would really not be embarrassing at all to us—somewhat the same information as President Truman has already given on our armed forces and perhaps approximately the same information that Life magazine has given as to our Navy. Such matters are in our hands for decision and will only be decided after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
As to verification procedures and inspection, these too could be limited very drastically in the initial stages. Don’t forget that it will be many months before we will reach the position of asking for such information and setting up the verification and inspection units, if ever. The point is, however, that it is agreed by all of the military here that Ave must have a program to work on, one that holds hope for eventual substantial disarmament, but one which progresses very slowly, only as all the conditions you enumerate have taken place.
In talking to General Osborn yesterday, he agreed that from his experience in the Atomic Energy Commission, it was absolutely necessary that we have a program. He also said that he thought this progressive plan that I have been talking about is just what we need, indicating also that it would never progress too far too soon to our [Page 559] embarrassment, because the Russians in his opinion would under no condition accept the verification and inspection program.
We are trying through the State Department and with the help of the Army and Navy to set up this embryo program in some final form that may be acceptable, and when we get it in better shape, I will want to talk to you and Admiral Sherman again.2
With best regards,
Sincerely yours,