Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

501.BC Atomic/6–1747

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] June 17, 1947.

Subject: Clarification of Gromyko’s June 11 Proposals: Analysis of Soviet and U.K. Views

1. I called Mr. Osborn with respect to the question of whether or not the U.S.S.R. had modified its position regarding the time relationship between a convention outlawing atomic weapons and a convention establishing a system of international control of atomic energy. I reminded him in this connection of Senator Austin’s conversation with Mr. Gullion of Mr. Acheson’s office on June 12¹ in which the Senator said he thought Gromyko had retreated to the extent of contemplating simultaneous conventions. I told Mr. Osborn that it was our opinion here, in which Mr. Acheson concurred, that it was desirable to have this point cleared up by Mr. Osborn’s asking Gromyko directly whether or not he now envisaged two simultaneous conventions.

Alluding to the newspaper stories in which it was stated that Gromyko in a press conference held after his speech had said that he still favored outlawing the bomb before establishing controls, Osborn said he recalled quite clearly hearing Gromyko making a statement to this effect. He agreed, however, that it would be desirable to clarify the point and for that purpose he would ask Gromyko the question directly either in a meeting or privately, and inform the Department. He agreed to my view that it would be undesirable to put the question in such a manner as to give the impression that this was the only or even the most important of the differences between the U.S. views and those of the U.S.S.R.

2. I inquired of Mr. Osborn whether he and his staff were making analyses of the Soviet and U.K. proposals.² He said that they were examining the Soviet proposal carefully and promised at my request to send down a half-dozen copies of any analysis prepared by USUN.

As regards the U.K. proposal, Mr. Osborn felt that it would be difficult to analyze it without having the full text instead of the outline which has been furnished us. He commented also that the U.K. proposal might not, if the present discussions in London are satisfactory, ever see the light of day. I replied that it was the feeling here that a careful analysis of the U.K. proposal is desirable and said we would try to undertake one in Washington, letting him have copies of what is prepared.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Osborn indicated that Sir George Thomson of the U.K. delegation is becoming much less opposed to the U.S. position than when he first came over. This changed attitude of Thomson was evidently one of the reasons why Mr. Osborn had thought that the U.K. draft proposal might die aborning.

4. Mr. Osborn said that in the meeting this afternoon of Committee 1 Gromyko had striven desperately to have his proposals referred to Committee 2 and given priority. If successful, this would of course have had the effect of stopping in its tracks the present work on the development of the functions of an international agency. Mr. Osborn had kept silent during the meeting but the French, Belgian, Canadian and other representatives vigorously opposed Gromyko’s proposal. While no vote was taken Mr. Osborn was confident that Gromyko’s attempt would be unsuccessful, despite his intemperate insistence.

J[oseph] E. J[ohnson]

1. For Gullion’s memorandum of the conversation under reference, see p. 506.
2. For the text of the proposals, see Gromyko’s speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11, AEC, 2nd yr., Plenary, pp. 20–24. For a summary of the British proposals, see p. 498.