USUN Files
Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, March 26, 1947, 10:30 a.m.1
| Present: | State Department—Mr. Acheson, Mr. Joseph Johnson |
| War Department—Mr. Patterson, Assistant Secretary Petersen, Colonel Hamilton | |
| Navy Department—Mr. Forrestal, Under Secretary Sullivan, Admiral Wooldridge | |
| U.S. Delegation—Senator Justin, Mr. John Ross | |
| Atomic Energy Commission—Mr. Lilienthal, Mr. Bacher2 |
Senator Austin outlined what seemed to be the present positions of the various members of the Atomic Energy Commission. It seemed likely that the Russians would press for prohibition and outlawry of the atomic bomb. The British seemed inclined to take the easiest matters first. The Canadians seem to feel that any approach would be better than the Russian approach. The French seem to feel that it would be best to proceed by easy stages.
The Senator said that he was not asking for an immediate decision. He wanted to lay a suggestion on the table for an exchange of views and later decision, namely, would it be desirable for the United States to propose as the starting point the charter of the proposed international control agency, that is, the organization and functions of this agency. The Senator referred in this connection to Chapter 2 of a treaty outline which had been prepared by Mr. Ingraham of Mr. Fahy’s staff.3
[Page 443]The Senator said that at the Assembly meeting last fall the Russians had changed their position from one of favoring strict national control to favoring strict international control. He said that the Russians had indicated that they were against unlimited international control. In this sense their position was basically no different from that of any other country. No country would accept unlimited control beyond the needs of the situation, that is, reaching into the whole economic life of a country beyond the control of atomic energy plants.
Mr. Acheson asked just how much agreement had been indicated by the Russians, that is, how much change there really had been in their position since they first proposed last June their convention for the outlawry of the atomic bomb. He was aware of statements which had been made by Stalin,4 Molotov and others but he wondered whether in the light of Gromyko’s most recent statement in the Security Council we were not really right back where we started from last June.
The Senator said the statements which had been made by the Russians were subject to various interpretations. One interpretation was that given by the Acting Secretary. It was clear that there was general agreement on many of the principles contained in the Atomic Energy Commission’s Report. There was clear disagreement only with regard to those items on which Gromyko had introduced amendments. We would never know exactly how much agreement we had from the Russians until we layed down a specific proposition and got yes or no answers.
Mr. Forrestal said that the American public misunderstood the gradations of agreement. Assuming that there had been agreement with regard to many matters the American public did not distinguish between the importance of these matters and the importance of other matters upon which agreement had not been reached.
Mr. Sullivan raised the question whether, even assuming that we got agreement on the points at issue, we would have any real guarantee that international control as envisaged would be effective.
The Senator said the only thing specific we had from the Russians was their proposal for a treaty outlawing the bomb which of course did not give us any guarantees.
Mr. Forrestal observed that the American people probably did not understand this point and that perhaps this should be the starting point.
Mr. Petersen asked whether it was agreed that by taking up one part of the whole problem first, our position with regard to any definitive action on the whole problem would be protected.
[Page 444]The Senator made clear that it was definitely agreed that agreement to any part of the overall proposals did not imply a commitment to agree to the whole. Each government’s position was fully reserved in this respect.
Mr. Acheson said that he leaned towards the Senator’s suggestion that we propose taking up first the charter of the international authority. If we started with the Soviet approach of outlawing the bomb, discussion of this subject could go on for months and the United States might be in a negative position vis-à-vis public opinion. The Acting Secretary asked the representatives of the United States Atomic Energy Commission whether it would be feasible to determine in the United Nations Commission the degree of authority required by the international authority without getting into the writing of actual treaty provisions as he had understood the Senator to suggest.
Mr. Lilienthal replied that whichever of the two approaches were followed, it led logically and otherwise to the same point, that is, do we or do we not want to use our knowledge of atomic fission as a source of energy. It was not realized that outlawing the bomb did not stop there. If we were going in for this type of program we would have to outlaw everything, root and branch, that is to say, the plants which made it possible to manufacture the bombs. He said he would want to give some thought to the matter but that he leaned in the direction of attempting to write the charter provisions. In response to a further question by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lilienthal said that one of the problems would be how to achieve the objective of writing the charter provisions without giving information which it would not be proper to give during this process.
Mr. Bacher commented that he was quite sure that the closer we got to the drafting of detailed provisions the greater would be the vigorous demand from other countries for information which they would consider essential to understand the provisions they were being asked to draft.
Mr. Patterson asked for a brief review of historical developments which Senator Austin gave him. Mr. Patterson then asked whether we had not gained a great deal by the December 31 Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Senator Austin said he thought we had.
Mr. Petersen asked whether the controls were positive or negative in character as envisaged in the Report.
Mr. Acheson observed that the Report seemed to narrow down [Page 445] the control aspect to a negative police kind of control away from the positive developmental control.
Mr. Sullivan asked whether it is possible technically to accomplish what we are groping for.
Mr. Lilienthal replied that short of international planning, design and operation of plants control was not possible.
Mr. Sullivan asked whether assuming this there would be any point at which operations could be turned over to national control. He had in mind, for example, a remark made earlier by the Senator about a possible British concern over losing control of atomic energy which might be a vital factor in their economic recovery.
Mr. Lilienthal replied that the output of atomic plants, that is to say, for example, electricity, could readily be placed under national control. National governments would determine the use to be made of the electricity to be produced by atomic plants. On the other hand, the international authority would probably have to determine the location of atomic plants and it might have differences of opinion with national governments in this respect. The authority would presumably be thinking in terms of international security and economic factors while the national governments might be thinking in terms of national security.
The Senator then posed this problem. Assume an international control authority acting under majority rule. Assume further the most absurd situation, this Authority might suggest to us that we move all our atomic plants to very different locations, Would we submit to this? Mr. Patterson replied without any hesitation that we could not avoid that, we must submit to this kind of authority. Mr. Lilienthal seemed to agree and there was no objection stated.
Mr. Sullivan observed that he liked Senator Austin’s suggestion that we propose in the Atomic Energy Commission as a starting point that consideration be given to the charter of the proposed international authority. Mr. Forrestal indicated that he was coming around to this point of view.
As the discussion had developed it seemed clear that the consensus of opinion in the group favored this approach. A definitive decision was not taken, however, it being tacitly understood that Mr. Joe Johnson’s committee would probably prepare a paper on the subject for appropriate clearance. In discussion subsequently with Senator Austin and Mr. Dean Rusk the Senator indicated that he would like to have this done.
- These minutes were drafted by Mr. John C. Ross; minutes located in file 811.002/1–247 provide less complete treatment of the discussion of international control of atomic energy and indicate that the three Secretaries considered other matters later in the meeting.↩
- Dr. Robert F. Bacher, member, United States Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- The document under reference, RAC–D/14, Tentative Outline Plan of a Treaty or Convention for the Control and Development of Atomic Energy, is not printed. Ingraham had been attached to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and had been working on matters relating to a draft treaty for international control since June 1946.↩
- Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.↩