501.BC Armaments/3–2047
Position Paper Prepared by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments1
RAC D–13c (Final)
Proposed Initial U.S. Position on the Work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments
The February 13 Resolution establishing the Commission2 provides that there should be submitted to the Security Council the plan of work of the Commission. The United States should prepare for an early meeting of the new Commission a full statement of this Government’s position on the plan of work and be prepared to take a position on other issues which may be raised at the early sessions of the Commission.
The basic problem, at least for the foreseeable future, is not one of negotiation but of gaining and maintaining support for the United States position by the American people and by world public opinion generally, in a way which will not permit this position to be undermined by propaganda attacks.
a. united states position on plan of work
(1) Basic United States Position and its Presentation.
At the initial sessions the Commission will probably take steps to establish its organization, including the appointment of a committee to bring in draft rules of procedure. It can be expected that there will also be a general debate in open Commission in which the views of the various members will be stated.
The presentation of the United States position outlined herein should be so timed as to provide the greatest possible assurance that the position will prevail. For public relations purposes it would be highly advantageous for the United States Representative to speak before the Soviet delegate.
The United States should seize the earliest opportunity to affirm its conviction, based on history and an appraisal of the current steps toward international security, that no system for the regulation of armaments can be successfully established and maintained, except it be reinforced by effective measures for control and enforcement, and the stages in its accomplishment inseparably synchronized with the [Page 438] progressive evolution of international security. The United States view on prior agreement on atomic energy, on peace settlements, and on Article 43 agreements should be restated in this connection. That being its considered opinion, the United States strongly urges that the Commission direct its attention first to the study of those safeguards which are essential ingredients of the establishment and successful maintenance of an effective system of regulation. In this connection, the United States Representative may wish to point out the gravely divergent positions of the U.S.S.R. and the majority report on safeguards with respect to the control of atomic energy.
Attention should be called to the fact that safeguards fall into three categories: political, technical, and organizational, each sufficiently complex to require most searching examination. Further, it should be stated that, not only is a solution of the problem of safeguards necessary before agreement can be reached on any system of armaments regulation, but a prior examination and solution of this problem will in the long run make less difficult the working out of an agreement.
(2) Tactics and Organization.
At an appropriate moment the United States should suggest that the best way to carry out the work of the Commission with proper emphasis on safeguards would be the establishment of two committees as outlined in the latter part of this section. This suggestion should probably not be made in the opening statement but should be so timed in respect to statements by other delegations as best to insure its adoption.
In this connection it is known that the British have the following views which they intend to set forth in a long, formal statement during general debate: (a) that the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces depends primarily on the establishment of international confidence; (b) that the Article 43 agreements should be completed before the adoption of measures for regulation and reduction of armaments; (c) that an effective system of international control and verification must precede the adoption of any system of regulation and reduction of armaments.
Should the British proposals be advanced before the United States suggests the organization of committees, it would be appropriate to suggest that the first item on the agenda of the Committee referred to in (a) below should be a consideration of the British proposals.
The committees referred to above should be as follows:
- (a)
- A working committee or committee-of-the-whole. This committee would deal with such matters as (1) political safeguards, including necessary conditions of international security, and (2) the political and other nontechnical problems involved in the recommendations of the technical subcommittee, when submitted.
- (b)
- A sub-committee of experts. This sub-committee would study the question of technical safeguards and report its findings to the working committee. The objective of the work of this committee would be to develop a program or programs upon the basis of what is technically rather than upon what is politically feasible.
(N.B. These suggestions are based on the experience of the Atomic Energy Commission.)
b. u.s. position on other issues which may be raised
It is anticipated that in the course of the general debate in the Commission certain issues may be presented on which it may be necessary for the United States to take a stand. These issues and the proposed United States positions are as follows:
(1) Immediate Disarmament, or Limitation or Reduction of Armaments.
(It is not unlikely that the U.S.S.R. may make a proposal of this kind.) This is the “what” of armaments regulation referred to by Senator Austin in his February 4 speech to the Security Council.3 The United States Representative should refer to this matter in his opening statement along the lines suggested in the third paragraph of A above; the emphasis given to this reference would depend on whether or not such a proposal has been made before the United States Representative speaks.
The United States Representative should constantly endeavor to discourage, both formally and informally, any premature consideration of such a proposal, emphasizing the over-riding and prior importance of security and safeguards. He should in any case strive to make sure that the question of safeguards receives a higher priority in the Commission’s plan of work.
[If and when the “what” has to be dealt with, the United States might propose that as an initial step a study of the criteria making the possession of certain levels of armaments and armed forces justifiable might be undertaken. This would involve as objective an analysis as possible of the various bases for the existence of armaments and armed forces, such as the examination of the problem of maintaining internal order, individual and collective security, and international commitments in their relation to armaments.]4
(2) Armaments To Be Considered Within the Competence of the Commission.
This involves a number of problems which require careful study before a final United States position can be established. If, however, [Page 440] the question should arise in the near future, the United States Representative should suggest that for the present the Commission has enough to occupy its full resources in studying the problems posed by the regulation of weapons which are clearly conventional.
If this position proves unacceptable and it is proposed that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should deal with weapons which might be considered adaptable to mass destruction, the United States should reiterate the above view. It should add that proposals concerning the control of biological warfare and toxic chemicals should be dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission after it has completed its proposals on atomic energy.
If a decision as to what are “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” is insistently called for, the United States should maintain that such a decision should be made by the Security Council.
(3) Offensive vs. Defensive Weapons.
The Representative of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council has intimated that this distinction, as a basis for regulating armaments, may be urged upon the Commission. The United States Representative should be prepared to make at an appropriate time a carefully phrased statement designed to refute any suggestion that in this age of modern warfare any such distinction is practicable. (Such a statement is under preparation.)
(4) Information on Strength and Location of Armaments and Armed Forces.
The United States position on this subject should remain for the present that set forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the January 6, 1947 memorandum entitled “The Basis for United States Policy in the Security Council During the Forthcoming Consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on the ‘Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments’.”5
(5) Withdrawal of Forces From Territories of Ex-Enemy and Member States.
The position of the United States is that the recommendation of the General Assembly on this subject is directed to individual Members and that no action is called for by the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
c. diplomatic preparation for support of our position in the commission for conventional armaments
A program of diplomatic preparation for the support of the United States position by other Governments in the Commission for Conventional [Page 441] Armaments should be undertaken immediately. In this connection, the following steps are suggested:
- (1)
- The United States Delegation to the United Nations should exchange views with representatives of other Governments with a view to gaining support for the United States position and ascertaining their views.
- (2)
- Similarly, appropriate United States missions abroad should undertake to acquaint the Governments to which they are accredited, endeavoring in the process to elicit their support and to ascertain their views.
d. soliciting views of members of the united nations not represented on the commission for conventional armaments
Consideration should be given to methods of soliciting the views on the issues involved in armaments regulation of United Nations Members not represented on the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Since their security is directly affected by these issues, it is only fitting that some means should be developed for reflecting their thinking in the meetings of the Commission.