500.A/1–847
The Secretary of State to the
Secretary of War (Patterson)
secret
Washington, January 8,
1947.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I enclose herewith copies
of a paper prepared in the Department of State designed to form the basis
for the position to be taken by the United States Representative in the
Security Council of the United Nations during the forthcoming consideration
in that body of the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December
14, 1946, concerning the “Principles governing the General Regulation and
Reduction of Armaments.”
Officers of this Department have consulted informally with officials of the
War and Navy Departments in the course of preparing this paper.
As consideration of this subject is expected to take place in the Security
Council in the immediate future, this is a matter of great urgency. I
should, therefore, appreciate it deeply if you and the Secretary of the
Navy, to whom I am today sending a similar letter,1 could, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, let me have your views on the enclosed paper as soon as possible.
It will not be necessary to have comments at the same time on the
parenthetical paragraphs under points (3) and (5) of the enclosure, relating
to the need for agreement upon necessary intra-governmental organizations
and procedures. As these are, nevertheless, matters which
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require early action, I have asked the State
Department member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to consult
with his colleagues from the War and Navy Departments with a view to making
appropriate recommendations as a matter of urgency.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
The Basis for United States Policy in the Security
Council During the Forthcoming Consideration of the General Assembly
Resolution of December 14 on the
“Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of
Armaments”
It is recommended that the following points form the basis for the
position to be taken by the United States Representative on the Security
Council in connection with the forthcoming consideration of the General
Assembly Resolution of December 142 on this
subject.
- 1.
- In the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of
December 14 on general regulation and reduction of armaments, the
Security Council should give consideration first, and as soon as
practicable, to the problem of the control of atomic energy to the
extent necessary to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. The
Council should make the Atomic Energy Commission’s report the basis
of its consideration.
- 2.
- When the Security Council has completed to the satisfaction of the
United States its forthcoming consideration of atomic energy
control, the Atomic Energy Commission should be instructed to
proceed with the drafting of a convention to implement the
plans.
- In the event that the Security Council is unable to complete
satisfactorily its forthcoming consideration of the report of the
Atomic Energy Commission, the United States will have to reconsider
its general position on the regulation of armaments.
- 3.
- Not until after its completion of the consideration referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 above should the Security Council take up the
second priority problem, that of the international control of other
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. In the consideration of
this problem primary emphasis should be placed on the provision of
adequate safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards
of violations and evasions. This should also be dealt with by the
Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with its terms of reference
(Paragraph 5(c), General Assembly Resolution
of January 24, 19463).
- Decision by the Security Council as to the exact time when the
Atomic Energy Commission should take up this subject should be made
after the forthcoming consideration of the control of atomic energy
has been completed in the Security Council.
- (Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be
immediately agreed upon for formulation of the United States
position on international control of these other weapons of mass
destruction.)
- 4.
- No additional United Nations machinery is necessary at the present
time to deal with the regulation of armaments.
- 5.
- As regards armaments other than those adaptable to mass
destruction—the “minor weapons” of paragraph 4 of the General
Assembly Resolution—the formulation of plans for the regulation of
such armaments and of armed forces should not be taken up by the
Security Council until a later date. The United States position is
that the prospects for success by the United Nations in their great
undertaking of a general regulation and reduction of armaments and
armed forces will be enhanced if success is first attained in
working out controls for the major weapons. Indeed no general
international regulation of armaments and armed forces as a whole
could be effective without such controls. Were the Security Council
to itself discuss, or establish any agencies for the discussion of
the details and complexities involved in attempting to regulate
conventional weapons and armed forces, progress with respect to the
major weapons might well be retarded. Consequently the United States
will not itself advance proposals relating to the regulation of
conventional weapons and armed forces at this time or in the
immediate future, except possibly as its proposals relating to major
weapons may as a necessary incident include other weapons. The
United States should discourage other members of the Security
Council from advancing proposals regarding conventional weapons and
armed forces. In the event that other Security Council members
should nonetheless advance proposals which are not confined to major
weapons the United States will determine its position with respect
to the advisability of Security Council consideration of any such
proposals on the basis of its decision as to whether such
consideration is likely to promote international security and
particularly United States security and whether it will in fact
facilitate or obstruct the working out of a satisfactory system for
the overall regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
No commitment should be undertaken by representatives of the United
States to agree to discussion by the Security Council of any
proposal relating to the regulation of conventional weapons and
armed forces unless a specific decision is made by the Government of
the United States with respect thereto.
- Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be
immediately agreed upon for a detailed formulation of the United
States
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position on the
regulation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces.
This information should include the preparation on a tentative basis
of specific proposals which may be introduced in the Security
Council when it is decided that presentation of them will be timely.
These proposals should emphasize the provision of adequate
safeguards. Among the factors to be considered in determining the
timing of their introduction are: (1) the progress made in the
international control of atomic energy and of other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction, in accordance with paragraphs 1–3
above; (2) progress achieved in the settlement of issues arising out
of the Second World War; and (3) progress in the negotiation of the
special agreements for the provision of armed forces in accordance
with Article 43 of the Charter.)
- 6.
- As regards the negotiation of special agreements pursuant to
Article 43 of the Charter (referred to in paragraph 7 of the General
Assembly Resolution), the Military Staff Committee is already
working on Article 43 from the military point of view. The early
conclusion of those agreements is desirable to carry out Charter
commitments and is called for by the General Assembly Resolution.
Early consideration should therefore be given to methods whereby the
conclusion of these agreements may be accelerated.
- 7.
- Another recommendation made by the General Assembly in paragraph 7
of its Resolution concerns withdrawal of armed forces of members of
the United Nations from ex-enemy territories. This is directed, not
to the Security Council, but to individual Members of the United
Nations. The United States has already proposed that this matter be
dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers and it should be
followed up there, not in the Security Council.
- 8.
- If the question of the withdrawal of troops from territories of
other Members is raised, the United States will determine its
position in the light of the particular proposals made. So far as
United States troops are concerned, we have made it plain that, as
the Secretary pointed out on December 13 to the General Assembly,
our troops, except in ex-enemy countries, are stationed abroad with
the consent of the states concerned and in no sense constitute a
threat to the internal or external peace of any country.
- 9.
- Information on the armed forces of Members of the United Nations
is not necessary to give effect to the General Assembly’s Resolution
on general regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, if
this question is again raised in the Security Council, the United
States should take the position that any request for such
information should not be based on the General Assembly’s Resolution
on this subject. If the question should be raised independently,
however, and, not in connection with implementation of the
Resolution on general
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regulation and reduction of armaments, the United States should not
oppose the Council’s making such a request. The United States is
prepared to support a request by the Council asking for troops at
home as well as troops abroad. It will not oppose the adoption of
such a request even if it excludes home forces.
- 10.
- Information on arms and armaments, as distinct from that on armed
forces, should be neither requested nor supplied at the present
time, but only in response to the requirements of the overall
program for the regulation and reduction of armaments as developed
in international arrangements according to the sequence set out in
paragraphs 1–5 above.
