Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

890.0146/1–2147

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)

Washington, February 12, 1947.

Excellency: I have the honor to refer to your note of January 21, 1947, commenting upon Mr. Acheson’s note of November 6, 1946 with reference to the terms upon which the United States Government is prepared to place the former Japanese Mandated Islands under trusteeship.

The United States Government regrets that it does not share the view of the United Kingdom Government that the action proposed by the United States cannot take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan and that it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council.

As to whether the proposed action can take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan, the United States Government does not consider that there is any barrier to the placing of these islands under trusteeship in accordance with the Charter whenever the Security Council approves the draft agreement. The islands never did belong to Japan, which, moreover, as a result of the war, has ceased to exercise any authority therein. Further, it was agreed at Cairo and Potsdam, and reaffirmed in the instrument of surrender accepted by the powers responsible for Japan’s defeat, that Japan should be deprived of any authority in these islands. Moreover, practically all the states which might conceivably have an interest in the disposition of the Japanese Mandated Islands are either members of the Security Council or, as in the case of the Philippines and New Zealand, have been provided with information about the United States proposals. For these reasons, the United States considers that the conclusion of the trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands can be properly dealt with now by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter and does not depend upon, and need not await, the general peace settlement with Japan.

As to whether it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council, the United States Government believes that such formal presentation should be made at an early date. These islands were administered for nearly a quarter of a century under a mandate of the League of Nations and, therefore, they appear clearly to belong in the category described in Article 77 (a) with regard to which the spirit and intent of the Charter indicated the early placing under trusteeship. Moreover, the General Assembly Resolution of February 9, 1946, expressly invites “the states administering territories now held under mandate” to undertake practical steps to place such territories under trusteeship. The United States is not, of course, a mandatory over the former Japanese Mandated Islands, but it has been administering them de facto and, therefore, considers it a duty to do its part in giving prompt effect to the Assembly Resolution. The United States believes that it should proceed with this program in order that other governments and peoples may know the reasons underlying the United States proposal. There would also seem to be sound, practical grounds why, in the interest of the inhabitants and the general stability of this area, a definitive arrangement should be provided for as soon as possible rather than delay it to an indefinite date in the future. Finally, it will be recalled that the President, in his announcement of; November 6, 1946, stated that the draft trusteeship agreement would be submitted to the Security Council for its approval at an early date, and any further delay might be likely to lead to misunderstanding.

The United States Government notes, however, that the Government of the United Kingdom considers that, from its point of view, such action by the United States would be open to the “serious practical objection” that it would confuse the issue about trusteeship for the; former Italian colonies. The United States Government has no desire to contribute to any confusion of the issue about the Italian colonies. It does not see any obvious or direct connection between the two categories of territories in question. Although the territories in both categories are under military occupation, the status of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, having been for many years under an international mandate and never having been under the sovereignty of Japan, appears to be entirely different from that of the Italian colonies in these respects.

However, after its proposal has been formally placed before the Security Council the United States would be quite willing to consider acceding to any reasonable postponement of consideration and action if this were deemed to be desirable or convenient by other members of the Council although, as stated before, it does not feel that action by the Council need necessarily be deferred until the negotiation of; the Peace Treaty with Japan.

In view of the foregoing, the United States Government believes that there should be no serious objection to its announced plan to make an early formal submission of the draft agreement to the Security Council, and hopes that the United Kingdom Government will be convinced of the desirability of this course.

The observations made by the United Kingdom Government on certain textual points in the United States draft proposal is made the subject of comment attached hereto. These comments will be elaborated more fully when the terms are presented to the Security Council.¹

Accept, [etc.]

G. C. Marshall

[Attachment]

Observations on Textual Points Raised by the United Kingdom Government in Memorandum Enclosed in Note of January 21, 1947

1. Preamble

By its second recital the United States, of course, does not claim to be in the islands as a mandatory power but it recognizes that it is administering islands which formerly were under mandate. These islands were militarily taken from Japanese forces, but since, in our view, they did not belong to Japan, they could not legally be taken away from Japan. Hence, they do not completely fit the category of Article 77(b) (enemy territory). However, no difficulty is seen in clarifying the point that the United States is not in these islands now as a mandatory power.

2. Article 8(1)

The United States considers that in a strategic agreement security factors take precedence over economic factors. Moreover, it is not believed that there is any inconsistency with the provisions of the Charter. It is not the intention of the United States to seek any economic advantage for itself but merely to provide the necessary protection for areas which may need to be closed.

3. Article 8(111)

The United States considers that the proposed regulation on traffic rights to aircraft flying into and out of the trust territory is precisely in accord with the Chicago Aviation Convention and that the same situation would apply whether Article 8, paragraph 3, were included in the draft or not.

4. Article 13

This proposal appears to state the position somewhat more precisely in terms of Article 83(3) of the Charter and will be carefully studied by the United States.

5. Article 1 and Article 13

The United States takes the view that the territory to be placed under trusteeship by the draft agreement is the same area as that under mandate to Japan and that the territorial waters included in the trust territory would be determined by customary interpretations of international law.

1. With the exception of the paragraph pertaining to the former Italian colonies, substantially similar notes were transmitted on the same day to the Soviet Ambassador (Novikov) (890.0146/12–746) and the Australian Ambassador (Makin) (890.0146/1–2147).