893.00/11–1446
The Consul General at Dairen (Benninghoff) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)46
Subject: Sino-Soviet Relations in the Dairen Area and Vicinity.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Consulate General’s telegrams to the Department Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of October 31, November 6 and November 12, 1946,47 respectively, concerning the subject of the approach of Chinese Government troops toward this area, the attitude of the Russians, the movement of Chinese Communist forces, and allied subjects.
(Note: If these telegrams reached the Department, they should have been repeated to the Embassy. True copies are enclosed, however, for use if the telegraphic facilities of the USSR failed to get the messages through.)
In sending these telegrams, the Consulate General desired to transmit information gained in Dairen, from the scanty sources at its disposal, concerning Chinese and American radio reports to the effect that conversations regarding the early entry of Central Government officials into Dairen were being held, and that Chinese Communist forces “from the Dairen area” were being sent south across the Yellow Sea to Chefoo and elsewhere in Shantung to reinforce Communist troops there.
To take the last point first; as of this date, there is no evidence which the Consulate General has been able to unearth which would lead to a belief that the Soviet military are permitting the Chinese Communists to use Dairen or “The Port Arthur Naval Base Area” [Page 1191] for the embarcation of Chinese Communist forces for Shantung. Chinese merchants are constantly traveling back and forth between Dairen and Communist held areas, and not once has even a rumor to that effect been received. It should be pointed out that most if not all the merchants of this type are by nature anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, and they would be only too glad to pass on information to the detriment of either. The Consulate General feels that, as of today, the Russians have not permitted the Chinese Communists to use this Area for any military purpose. If any such activity is taking place, it must be on a very reduced scale, for any large movement of troops could hardly pass unnoticed in a region where the population would on the whole be hostile to such a movement.
When questioned on the subject, the Soviet Acting Consul General, Mr. Petroff, appeared to resent the suggestion that the bona fides of this Government were being impugned, for he said that any use of the Area by Communist troops would be contrary to the Sino-Soviet Treaty. He did not specify the clause of the Treaty which would be violated, but he probably had reference to the agreement that this Area was to be jointly solely* defended by Soviet and Central Government troops.
With reference to a broadcast from Nanking in which a Chinese Government spokesman was quoted as stating that conversations looking toward the early entry of Chinese Government officials into Dairen were being held, neither the Soviet Consulate General nor the Soviet military command would profess to any knowledge of the subject. Needless to say, most unthinking Chinese took this broadcast to mean that Nanking officials could be expected any day. More serious observers, however, hold the opinion that although the entry of Nanking officials cannot be long delayed, an interval of two or three months may elapse before negotiations can result in a satisfactory agreement on details between the Chinese and Soviet Governments.
It is reasonable to suppose that the Chinese Government has approached the Russians concerning the entry of their officials into Dairen. Such an approach would almost inevitably have to be in Moscow, and therefore the ignorance of local Soviet officials on the subject is not surprising. The Russian reaction to such an approach at the present time, even though Nationalist troops are on or at least near the “border” of the Area, would probably be one of delay and obstruction. The political future of the North East is not yet clear; the railroad is not in operation and no agreement concerning it, as provided for in the Treaty, has been negotiated; the status of Soviet [Page 1192] commercial and trading trusts lias not been agreed upon; the Russians probably desire to retain as much as possible of the present pro-Communist regime in this Area; no decision has been made in regard to the difficult problem of foreign exchange. These and similar problems, it is felt, will be dealt with in any Sino-Soviet negotiations looking toward the entry of Central Government officials into this Area.
In studying these questions, the Embassy should also bear in mind the fact that the arrival of Nanking officials and the opening of the port to international trade are synonymous in the minds of most Chinese, and probably in the minds of the Russians as well. The Consulate General feels that the Russians are no more prepared to open the port now than they were five months ago (see despatch No. 16 dated June 20, 194648 entitled “The Soviet Position in Dairen”), as the presence of Nationalist troops to the north of Dairen has not materially altered the general picture as viewed from the Soviet angle. The national interests which the Russians probably consider as vital in this region would be jeopardized by the installation of a non-Communist local government which might attempt to open the port, establish foreign exchange banks, and otherwise endanger the monopoly now held and permanently desired by the Soviet Union. If the Chinese Government is willing to make concessions to safeguard these national interests, including the retention in the area of a Chinese regime with a strong Communist flavor, the Russians might be disposed to abide by their obligations under the Treaty.
Another factor which must not be lost sight of is that the Chinese Communists have not yet been eliminated from the North East, or from Shantung, which is economically and politically tied to the North East. It would therefore appear reasonable for the Russians to play for time in the hope that out of the current politico-military turmoil there will emerge a compromise which will place in power in Changchun Chinese elements favorable to the U. S. S. R. Such a development would make easier for the Russians the solution of the problems mentioned above, and the safeguarding of their national interests.
If this analysis is valid, the observer would normally expect to see cordial relations established between Soviet and Communist troops along the “border” of this Area, and the offer of military assistance of various kinds by the Russians. But such has not been the case in the seven months which have elapsed from the opening of this office. As far as can be learned from inquiries made of Japanese, Chinese and even Russians who crossed from one area into the other, there is almost no interchange of any kind between the two forces. [Page 1193] The Russians in Manchuria appeared just as determined to isolate their troops from “foreign” influences as were their comrades in Germany when they met American and British forces along the Elbe. Nor were reports received of any assistance in military supplies or equipment, although rumors were current that the Russians turned over to the Chinese Communists some captured Japanese equipment. Foreign Service Officers in Mukden or elsewhere may have more accurate estimates of the amount of assistance given the Communists by the Russians.
In the commercial field as well, there does not appear to have been any great cooperation between the two. Although the Chinese Communists for a number of months were in control of large agricultural areas in Manchuria, there is nothing to indicate that they cooperated to any great extent in furnishing supplies to the Russians. It is true that a large quantity of beans and grains was sent to Vladivostok and elsewhere in Soviet bottoms, but all evidence available indicates that this was collected by the Russians themselves during their occupation of a large part of Manchuria. This Consulate General recently learned on very reliable authority that the manager of the local branch of the Soviet grain trust sent agents into Communist territory with a view to purchasing beans, wheat and other cereals. The Communist officials in charge said that all crops had been “Nationalized” and were for the use of the people and were not for sale. This example, the Consulate General was informed, is illustrative of the type of commercial “cooperation” between the Russians and the Chinese Communists.
In the political field, however, the situation is quite different; there is close cooperation. This Consulate General has little information concerning the manner in which Russian political agents operate, but it is believed that they are completely independent of the Red Army or any other normal agency of the U. S. S. R. They are doubtless in close liaison with the Chinese Communist Party. In any event, the Russians have permitted to develop (or, some say, brought about) a situation in Dairen wherein the Communist Party is the only one with a legal existence; the only newspaper quotes only Yenan for its foreign news, and most of the officials other than local figureheads are avowed Communists from places other than Dairen. There has been built up in this Area a Chinese administration which is sympathetic to the Russians, and over which they exercise a controlling voice. It is difficult to believe that they would discard such a regime for one from Nanking, without a substantial quid pro quo.
This office, accordingly, does not believe that the Russians have assisted the Chinese Communists in sending troops to Shantung, or have given them any other substantial military assistance. Furthermore—and this is admittedly speculation—there would appear to be [Page 1194] no reason for the Russians to permit the early entry of Nanking officials into Dairen unless in the negotiations leading to that event they are able to protect and advance their own interests not only in this Area but also in the whole North East.
Respectfully yours,