Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
General Marshall to President Truman 46
1454 [1450]. Dear Mr. President: Since my message of August 30th, 1422, I have been to Kuling, conferred with the Generalissimo and returned to Nanking where I have conferred at length with Chou En Lai. Following is the situation:
The violence of the propaganda has seriously compromised the project for the meeting of the small group under Dr. Stuart’s chairmanship to find an agreement as a basis of organization of the State Council. Chou En Lai communicated with Yenan regarding the possibility of the Communists coming out with an order for the cessation of hostilities by their armies for a given period of days in an effort to bring the National Government to similar action. Meanwhile different Government spokesmen, including the Minister of Information and the Chief of Staff, made public announcements that there would be no abatement of the five conditions or stipulations by the Generalissimo before he would consider a cessation of hostilities. Chou En Lai had hoped that if the Stuart group reached an agreement on the formation of the State Council that this could immediately be followed by the cessation of hostilities. It has been the hope of Dr. Stuart and myself that by addressing our efforts for the time being to the single problem of the State Council we might make a gain which would sufficiently influence mutual confidence to permit the arrangement of an agreement for the termination of hostilities.
As the Government campaign in Jehol continues to develop to its advantage, the Government’s stand regarding the Communists has become the more implacable regarding the conditions for the termination of hostilities.
In this situation I outlined for the Generalissimo in a completely frank talk the present procedure of the Government, as I felt it involved me and the United States Government indirectly in procedures [Page 161] which were not to be tolerated. For example, when I directed that the Marines be relieved from a number of detached and therefore exposed posts along the railroad, the Marine commander was informed that the campaign then in progress required all of the available troops in that region until September 23, notwithstanding the fact that two armies had recently been landed at Chinwangtao, the last one from Formosa. Since the Marines were keeping the railroad open and the railroad of necessity was becoming a factor in a campaign which I deplored and opposed, this situation had to be terminated. I further pointed out that not only was the Government, in the midst of a deplorable currency and financial situation, utilizing its capital resources for the conduct of the present fighting, but I felt certain it was also utilizing for the same purpose such money as already had been received from the sale of surplus property and was counting on larger sums to become available from that transaction. I referred to the rottenness and corruption and extortion in the lower echelons of the Kuomintang Party and stated that there was little hope for correcting such a condition except on the basis of a genuine two party government.
The Generalissimo turned the conversation to the discussion of the State Council and particularly to the Communist claims he anticipated would immediately follow an agreement regarding the State Council. He was particularly concerned to see that they nominated their delegates to the National Assembly scheduled for November 12th. He inferred that the cessation of hostilities would be made dependent on the Communists nominating their delegates and he spoke of having a first formal meeting of the State Council and at the same time the announcement of the delegates for the National Convention on October 10th, the anniversary of the independence in China. I took issue emphatically with the idea of prolonging hostilities in such a manner and insisted again that we were now on the verge of a spread of the fighting into Manchuria and once that developed the situation would be completely out of hand. I maintained that, in my opinion, the Communists’ first interest at the present time was in seeing that the draft of the constitution to be presented to the Assembly was actually prepared by the committee in accordance with the Political Consultative Council and that the Government should go ahead with the prescribed procedure which had been brought to a halt last April. The Generalissimo felt that the Communists would immediately insist on the reorganization of the Executive Yuan, meaning most of the organs of the government, which would be in accordance with the Political Consultative Council agreements.
Chou En Lai yesterday, in his second lengthy conference with me in the past two days, expressed his reluctance to proceed with the discussion [Page 162] by the Stuart group of the terms for the organization of the State Council unless there was some guarantee that such an agreement would be paralleled by an unconditional cessation of hostilities. He insisted that he should have some guarantee to this effect, but recognized that the Government would not give such a guarantee and therefore appealed to Dr. Stuart and I to do so. We, of course, informed him that we had no power to give such a guarantee. As a matter of fact, this was an exact duplication of the Generalissimo’s demand on me from Mukden in May to guarantee certain actions by the Communists.
When the meeting with Chou En Lai terminated yesterday evening, it appeared that we would consider going ahead with the meeting of Dr. Stuart’s group, but only with the understanding that if an agreement was reached and then if a cessation of hostilities did not follow, Dr. Stuart and I would publicly demand [defend] the position of the Communists in not going forward with their nominees for the State Council until hostilities were terminated.
A few minutes ago Dr. Stuart and I completed another meeting with Chou En Lai. He had listed a series of statements regarding the approach to the State Council meeting which he wished us to comment on before he dispatched them to Yenan to explain the situation accurately and, presumably, to get a clearance to go ahead with the meeting of the Stuart group. I am now leaving for Kuling.
- Copy transmitted to the Under Secretary of State on September 8 by the War Department.↩