Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, Dr. Stuart, and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, September 5, 1946, 4:40 p.m.

Nanking, September 5, 1946, 4:40 p.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong
	Mister Chang

General Marshall: I saw Doctor Stuart this morning and told him of our general conversation yesterday and, specifically, the latter part of it. I arranged then for this meeting this afternoon at 4:30. So, Doctor Stuart is familiar in general with the points you made to me yesterday regarding your position in relation to the State Council. Now I have expressed myself to you in some detail regarding the matter and I suggest, at least for the moment, that you discuss our apparent misunderstanding, in which Doctor Stuart shares, with Doctor Stuart.

General Chou: I think it cannot be called a misunderstanding but rather there are a few points that I would like to get clarified. In the first place, I hope that Doctor Stuart would understand my position that at the very beginning when Doctor Stuart proposed an informal discussion group, I was not feeling very secure but rather I was fearful that the Kuomintang would not issue the cease fire order as soon as the formula for government reorganization has been worked out. Instead the Government’s and the Generalissimo’s intention is to stall in the matter of cease fire so that the Government may occupy more places and they would bring up the 5 point demand again to the State Council for discussion. That was my understanding of the Government’s purpose. Dr. Stuart suggested that we should make a trial, so that at the completion of our discussion we may secure the issuance of a cease fire order. Therefore I suggested that we make clear this point: that after the discussion of the government reorganization a cease fire order will definitely be issued and that the 5 conditions will be dropped once and for all. I repeated this point several times. Later on the Government merely agreed to the meeting of this informal group. Its reply with regard to the cease fire is rather ambiguous.

As regards the 5 conditions, it was Doctor Stuart’s and Mister Fugh’s hope that the Government would not raise the issue again and so we all should not touch on that point. But actually I have a sure feeling that the Generalissimo would certainly bring it up for discussion before the State Council. So at least when we were talking together with General Marshall and Doctor Stuart, I tried to get clarified the Government stand in connection with the cease fire order. On the previous day Doctor Stuart told me General Marshall’s conversation with the Generalissimo in which the Generalissimo made the remark that as soon as the Communist Party will stop fighting he will stop. Then Mr. Fugh and Dr. Stuart asked whether that statement could be exploited to some purpose.

Therefore, I made the suggestion that perhaps the Communist Party could issue a cease fire order for three or four days but still I had some doubt as regards that statement so I inquired of General Marshall. He related to me the whole story of that conversation. But still General Marshall thought it could still be tried along that line so I suggested wiring Yenan. On Friday I called on Doctor Stuart and told him about the four possible cases which have been related yesterday and I said that the fourth case would not be acceptable to me. Dr. Stuart agreed with my point of view. I also asked Dr. Stuart to transmit the main points of my message to Yenan to Gen. Marshall.

On Friday I read the statement of Doctor Peng Hsueh Pei and also the public statement made by Mister Wu Teh Chen in Kuling. On Saturday I read the statement of Mister Wu Ting Chang. They all declared that the war was initiated by the Communist Party so all that should be done is that the Communist Party should issue a cease fire order. So, I am led to the conviction that the Government desires the Communist Party to issue a cease fire order and it denies their part in the present civil war. They also want to exploit the issuance of a cease fire order by the Communist Party side as an explanation that the Communist Party alone is to blame for the state of war.

On the day before yesterday Wu Teh Chen and Chang Li-sheng said that the Generalissimo had given them no instruction with regard to the cease fire order and they made a statement to the press along the same line. They said the cease fire matter could be taken up by the forthcoming State Council. That means definitely that the cease fire will only be brought up for discussion after the State Council has been inaugurated. It is an uncertainty what procedure will be adopted by that time and that is the reply of the Government toward the cease fire suggestion.

Now you led me to believe that the State Council was helpless without assurance of a cease fire order. Yesterday afternoon General Chen Cheng again said the same thing in the press conference. The Government stand has been explained by four leading Government officials. This cannot be regarded merely as a matter of propaganda. From the conversation General Marshall had with me yesterday I was informed of the Generalissimo’s idea with regard to the cease fire; and that is it will most probably be assured not earlier than when the State Council has been convened. So, I came to understand that the Generalissimo would bring up the question of the five conditions again when the State Council is being convened. As a matter of fact, the last time General Marshall came back from Kuling he told me that the Government still insists on the 5 conditions. In case we refuse to turn those places over, they would take them by force. Also, the Kuomintang will hold the majority in the State Council. Including the votes of the Young China Party they would constitute ¾ majority in the State Council so that they can pass any transaction. So, they may try to force the State Council to pass such actions that the Communist Party should give up those 5 places, otherwise they would say that the Communists are breaking faith. Nor will they let us have the veto on this matter because every time it will be decided by the Kuomintang whether a transaction will be passed by ¾ majority or by simple majority. The outcome will be that as soon as the State Council is convened there will be a split again and fighting will be resumed. This is my definite vision about the forthcoming State Council.

At the last meeting with Dr. Stuart, I stated clearly that I am quite certain that nothing will be gained by discussing the government reorganization at this time because I feel quite sure that the Government is trying to stall the matter. But still I will try my best just to give it another chance. Now General Chen Cheng again declared the Government would attack Kalgan and the third move, as previously declared by General Cheng Kai-ming, the Government will attack Yenan. So as the matter now stands, while we are working to discuss the government reorganization, the Government troops will continue to attack the Communist areas one after another.

In case the Government would give the guarantee that as soon as this discussion is completed a cease fire order will be issued, then I certainly will be glad to devote two or three days’ time to such a discussion. I am even prepared to make concessions with the hope that the question of government reorganization can be settled in one meeting so that we will have a cease fire order issued. But if there is no such guarantee, then my concessions will lead nowhere and how can I then convince Yenan to make a commitment with regard to the government reorganization? I know also for sure the Government side is not prepared to make concessions. They still take the stand of distributing the seats among the various parties according to the formula of 8–4–4–4. On the other hand, the war is still being continued so at the end we will not have any settlement. It became quite hopeless to ask from the Government any kind of guarantee. Now it all depends on how you as mediators will evaluate the situation.

Yesterday Dr. Stuart said that he felt certain that a cease fire order can be issued but when I talked with General Marshall, General Marshall conveyed to me quite clearly that it is very difficult to get such a guarantee. It might be hopeful when the State Council has been convened but I cannot wait until that time because I told you (meaning Dr. Stuart) before that we can nominate the candidates only when the cease fire order has been issued. So if I enter into an agreement now the Government would force us to nominate the candidates again and in case we would yield to that demand then they would again claim that the State Council first be convened before the matter of cease fire can be taken up. That means that I am forced into a commitment step by step and which is not my original purpose.

Now it appears quite plain that there is no prospect of securing a cease fire and a promise that the government would drop the 5 conditions. I get this impression not only from the newspaper reports but also from the statements the Government representatives made to me. So, under such circumstances, it appears that to enter into a discussion at this time would definitely lead nowhere because I know for certain that there is no hope for a settlement of the cease fire. I had hoped that in case you two could give me the definite assurance then I could transmit it to Yenan to ask for instruction. Now it is plain that no such assurance can be given because the Government standpoint is crystal clear.

In my previous statement, I was thinking over the different prospects and what the final reply of the Generalissimo might be as to whether the cease fire issue should be discussed by the State Council. I came to this conclusion, in view of the statements made by Wu Teh Chen and General Chen Cheng and also from the procedure General Marshall outlined yesterday, that the Government would be unwilling to issue a cease fire. So a discussion would not lead to a positive result. From our point of view, our fear is not entirely caused by the possibility that we will be over-ruled by a Kuomintang majority in the State Council. That is the ultimate fear, but not the only cause of fear.

The problem is rather like this—from the very beginning I took a stand that as soon as a formula had been worked out the Government should issue a cease fire order and we want to have such a guarantee. In case such a guarantee is given then the informal discussion group can immediately be convened (Dr. Stuart’s group). Now, the Government would not give such an assurance nor does it admit that a war is actually existing. So it seems it has become hopeless.

I am rather inclined to have the Committee of Three and Dr. Stuart’s group meet at the same time so that we can have a parallel procedure of those two committees which I think is workable. The reason why we turned to discuss the government reorganization first was merely to give the Generalissimo an assurance that he would feel secure, but on the other hand, we would also have to ask a guarantee for the eventual issuance of a cease fire order. Speaking frankly, it appears to me that even if the Generalissimo gives such a guarantee he still has quite a great latitude to manoeuver in the discussion. He can put stumbling blocks into the discussion on the State Council so that no agreement could be reached until the Government is militarily in a favorable position, such as having taken Kalgan or other places. Until the Government feels that it has secured a favorable position, it may just go ahead to stall the discussion. The Generalissimo can always bide for time. But now it seems that the Generalissimo would not even consider such a proposition and he sticks firmly to the stand that the matter would only be taken when the State Council has been formed. I cannot agree, therefore, even if it will be discussed at that time by the Committee of Three.

General Marshall: In other words it is an impasse.

General Chou: In my opinion, we have to consider two things:

1. Objective circumstances, and

2. Subjective endeavors and efforts.

The actual situation indicates there is a state of war. The Government, however, refuses to admit that situation, and merely states that the Communists alone are attacking. This can easily be discounted, because as everybody knows there is a war.

Regarding the subjective endeavors, the Communist point of view is that an unconditional cease fire should be effected, or the Committee of Three should immediately discuss this question.

Regarding the State Council, our stand is that it can be discussed provided that as soon as a basis has been worked out, the cease fire order will be issued. However the Government insists that as soon as a formula is worked out the candidates should be nominated and the State Council should be called into function. On the other hand, they say there is no war and therefore only the Communist Party alone should issue a cease fire order. Now the question that I like to ask is what is the attitude of General Marshall and the American Government? I think that it is necessary for you to make a statement toward this question because we have to get your actual view clarified. What will be the attitude of the American Government?

I wish also to ask you whether, according to your opinion, a war is existing or not? For if, as a matter of fact, only the Communist Party alone is attacking while the Kuomintang does not, then the whole world should throw the blame upon the Communist Party. But we know that this is not the case because if one party alone waged the war there would be no war. What we want now is to stop the war, but the Kuomintang refuses to admit that a war exists. Now what will the U. S. Government do in the face of such a situation? Do you think that there is a war in China now?

Now you also initiated the suggestion to establish the State Council. We are also willing to enter into that discussion providing there is a guarantee that a cease fire order will be issued. Now I want to ask whether the American side can give such a guarantee or not? If war is still continuing, I think your mission cannot be considered as finished. You should try to ask the Government side to stop this war and the Government should furnish a definite reply. Otherwise it would become plain that the Government has a definite intention to carry on this war and that war cannot be stopped. Our hope that the Government will give a guarantee for the cease fire was frustrated. So, as it is, you have no means to secure the cessation of hostilities, but it would appear to the public that you are actually in favor of the Kuomintang side.

Now, another question that we have to consider at this time is what should be done with the Executive Headquarters and the field teams. The misunderstanding is going to increase day by day and the Kuomintang is trying to sow dissension between the American and the Communist sides. As a matter of fact the American Government still continues to give assistance to the Government side. This caused much concern on the Communist side. We will have to face a difficult situation. I am very worried about it. We, here, represent the Committee of Three and we have to work out some sort of settlement. I am indeed very much worried by this state of affairs because my subordinates will ask me what they should do in the face of this situation and I am at a loss as to my reply.

General Marshall: I will answer two or three questions immediately. I consider a war is going on. I can offer no guarantee of the cessation of hostilities. Regarding Executive Headquarters and General Chou’s statement that the Government representatives were stirring up hostilities between the Americans and the Communists, I do not know specifically as to that. It may be. I do know that General Huang created more hostility than any number of Government officials by his actions which to my mind were utterly inexcusable.

I won’t go into a further discussion of the U. S. Government’s assistance to the Kuomintang Party. That can be endless in disagreement, in misrepresentation other than to refer to General Chou’s statement yesterday. One point he made I accept. That was, that money received from the sale of surplus property might be used to further government war effort. That is correct, but I will add that I had; already taken that up with the Generalissimo in very positive terms before General Chou had ever referred to it and stated that I would not only be opposed to such a procedure, but I would take every measure to block it.

Now, General Chou made three or four statements regarding the Government stand, or the Generalissimo’s stand, which must have been taken from these public statements in the press with which I am unfamiliar, but they are not in accordance with what the Generalissimo had said to me personally. He did not say to me personally that the State Council must be actually sworn in and would then determine the basis of cessation of hostilities. He referred in a general way to the fact that many matters in dispute including even military (as I recall he used the word “even”) would find a place for debate before the State Council, but he did not state that the State Council was to be sworn in before any other action would be taken. As a matter of fact, I outlined a possible procedure, and I believe later described it to General Chou, in which I stated that assuming an agreement was reached by Dr. Stuart’s group and assuming that such agreement was confirmed by the Steering Committee, and assuming the individuals, had been designated for membership in the State Council, then we could turn to the problem of the cessation of hostilities.

I further stated that we might even go so far as to swear in the State Council but it was not conceivable to me that any negotiation could be carried on while the fighting was still in progress. In other words, the State Council would not be convened for business until we had stopped the fighting. The Generalissimo replied that that was: an interesting statement and he would give it careful consideration, but he never has stated to me what General Chou has just indicated as the stand of the Government and from which I assume he (General Chou) must be drawing conclusions, with the additional influences of the statements the press credited to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Information and Wu Teh Chen. Therefore, that portion of General Chou’s statement I do not know how to answer other than as I have just stated. I will repeat again the purpose of the effort of Dr. Stuart and myself.

An impasse had been reached and we decided that a direct and simple approach to the State Council issue offered the one hope we could see to break the stalemate and afford a better possibility of reaching an: understanding for the cessation of hostilities. Now, that has been blurred by so much propaganda and so much complication that I asked General Chou what was to be done. Are we to cease negotiations and let the war go on and abandon any possibility of an agreement as a basis for the formation of a State Council?

I think that after that is translated it would be best for Dr. Stuart to say what he wishes to say in addition to what I have just stated.

Doctor Stuart: General Marshall has already said practically everything that I want to say except about this small informal committee. We have made all our plans to meet. All sides have agreed to the meeting. It is the only solution that I see for us Americans helping any further in this situation. I have felt from the beginning that if that committee could meet and make some progress it would be much easier for us to help in finding a solution in the military problems and the cease fire. I still feel that way. I think it is the best way possible for us to help towards the thing we want very very greatly and that is the end of hostilities. It seems to us that if this committee can meet and make some progress then we will be in a position to help more than we can otherwise. Of course we cannot guarantee anything but we can promise to do everything possible to help and so I hope very much this meeting can meet as it will make a very good impression in China, in America and the world at large. People are waiting and wondering now what will happen. The meeting can go ahead with its special problem, which is the State Council. In the light of my conversations with General Marshall and the Generalissimo, I still hope that they will lead to a solution that will be satisfactory to everybody.

Now I have not paid very much attention to the newspaper propaganda but I have talked to Mr. Wu and Mr. Chang and have been favorably impressed with their attitude toward the State Council. They don’t discuss the other aspects of the State Council because their present function is to discuss only one thing.

General Chou: I cannot refuse to consider anything.

Doctor Stuart: I understand your point of view. We want to help and the only way we can help is through this small committee. If this makes progress, I feel there is quite a little hope to accomplish what we want—to stop the fighting. But I don’t see any other way that we can help, other than simply retiring and watching the fight. We have done everything we can. My advice is let the little committee meet and see what happens. I know General Marshall well enough to know that he is going on with his side of it. We cannot promise anything else but we can promise that we want both sides to come together in the coalition government and, before that happens, to have the fighting finished. We can promise that with our whole hearts, and we have the American Government with us.

General Chou: Now I won’t go into details to start a new discussion but I wish to point out that you both will certainly agree that I am purely for a cessation of hostilities. Now the trouble is that the Generalissimo would not enter into such an agreement and so at this juncture Doctor Stuart suggested that we might perhaps discuss the State Council business in order to let the Generalissimo feel secure. So, in the latter half of August we came to contemplate whether we will make another trial. But the outcome was merely that the Government representatives feel that they have only a responsibility to discuss the State Council question. On my part I have the full responsibility for all the outstanding issues. I have the responsibility to ask whether after the completion of that discussion the Government would agree to stop fighting. The Government’s reply is in the negative. I won’t refer to the press statements but I have to point out that even the Generalissimo did not give such a promise.

Now I have to turn to the American mediators to ask whether such a promise can be made and the reply is also, “No”. So on what can I rely? Of course I cannot rely on the Kuomintang but now I cannot also rely on the American side. So I feel that I am hanging in the air. But, in committing my party to this negotiation, I must point out a prospect to them that there will be positive result. Now, according to the outline of General Marshall, it might be assumed that until such time as the candidates are designated and as the State Council has been sworn in that no cease fire will be realized.

You already said that you “cannot conceive that negotiations can be carried on while the fighting is still going on”. The Generalissimo’s reply was simpler. He said he would carefully consider the matter. It all means there is no firm commitment. I recall that during the disputes over Changchun the Government declared that it would stop the fighting when they took over Changchun. They took it by force so they declare they have no obligation to adhere to that promise. Then the question of Harbin turned up and we again secured from Yenan agreement regarding that concession and still nothing came out of it. Then the Government opened the question of North Kiangsu. I arranged that we would reduce the army strengths in North Kiangsu and nothing came of that. Then 4 conditions were raised and when Doctor Stuart entered the negotiations it was brought up to five.

General Marshall just said he is feeling tired of the negotiation and I share his feeling entirely because I also feel very tired but I wish to state in very brief terms my stand. We are willing to stop the fighting and we are willing to discuss the State Council affairs but we must have a guarantee that the fighting will definitely be stopped. For that purpose I am ready to make concessions with regard to the State Council affairs with a view that it can be settled in one meeting. But when there is no such a guarantee then obviously the Dr. Stuart group cannot be called to meet. From the very beginning I stated time and again that we must have a guarantee. I think my attitude is perfectly clear from the very beginning and my intention to make concessions is also, because of the hope that we might get such a guarantee. But now it is clear I can expect that the Kuomintang would not give a guarantee. It was, however, rather beyond my expectation that the American side would also refrain from giving such a promise. So I sometimes came to doubt whether or not I have been misled. I have also come to think what I should do with Executive Headquarters and the field teams because we here as the Committee of Three and General Marshall as Chairman have to devise some arrangement with regard to that institution.

Now I have to add this, that before you issued a joint statement there had been disputes back and forth between the two parties. Now I want to drop discussion of that but I wish to state one thing. After the joint statement we merely waited for this one thing and we all were in favor of Dr. Stuart’s proposal but I stated definitely that we are still not clear whether the Government would guarantee a cessation of hostilities and we have been waiting for that all the time. Previously Doctor Stuart said that such a guarantee must be secured and he will try to secure it both with his power as well as the power of the American Government. But now we know such a guarantee is about hopeless.

Doctor Stuart: I still don’t think that it is hopeless. I feel it is hopeful. I don’t feel any less hopeful now than when this proposal was first made. The facts are all essentially the same. If we go ahead with this small informal committee and clear the way for the State Council, I still think there is hope of securing your guarantee. But I don’t believe the guarantee can be made until this committee meets and gets some results. I cannot promise anything but that is my advice and my hope. I will go further, I think there ought to be such a guarantee as soon as this committee has accomplished some results.

General Marshall: I would like to say something first. I want to get clear in General Chou’s mind that my effort to explain the possible procedure as described by the Generalissimo is the only indication I have had from him on the subject. General Chou referred to my stating only that it was not “conceivable” to me that negotiations could be carried on by the State Council while fighting was going on. He appears to have drawn a wrong conclusion. I intended to convey that thought to the Generalissimo, and now to General Chou, that it was unthinkable to me that the State Council could negotiate at all while fighting was going on. And, in stating the possible procedure I used the expression “and the State Council might even,” I repeat, “even be sworn in”. But the Generalissimo did not make that as a condition nor did I. For example, it might be that General Chou would go into the meeting of this group and they would find a basis for agreement and they would go further to the Steering Committee, of which I believe he is a member, for the formal confirmation of that informal agreement. And they might “even,” I repeat, “even” announce the names of the individuals but with the stipulation that they would not take their seats in the Council until the fighting had ceased. That was more or less what I had in mind; that if the negotiations reached that point that our chances, Dr. Stuart’s and mine, of prevailing upon the Government to agree to cessation of hostilities would be greatly increased. I repeated all this again to make clear to you that this is all I know of this phase of the matter. What has been said by Government spokesmen I do not know, but I will have this information carefully collected tonight and tomorrow morning.

One more thing. I asked a question which General Chou has not answered. If we are not to go ahead with the meeting of Doctor Stuart’s group, then what does he expect of Doctor Stuart and myself? I ask again, are we to drop negotiations and wait around and watch the fighting develop? He has not answered that question.

General Chou: Now I wish first to ask Doctor Stuart one question that was brought up by his statement. Doctor Stuart just said that there ought to be a guarantee as soon as the committee gets results. I would like to know when we would consider the committee had gotten results. What is your conception of the “result”? I would like to get that clarified first.

Doctor Stuart: If the points of issue about the State Council; that is, the membership, the veto power question, are settled in the committee, and we assume they will be approved by the Steering Committee, it seems to me that General Marshall and I have a very strong argument to use with the Government that the cease firing order should be given. I cannot guarantee it. I can promise that we will do everything in our power to reach that. We can give no guarantee, but suppose General Marshall and I do nothing and the fighting goes on. We guarantee that we will do everything we can to stop the fighting.

General Marshall: I will add to that a repetition of the statement I have made several times which I wish General Chou to keep clearly in mind. The Government did not propose this committee; the Government did not propose this effort to create the State Council. It was initiated; it was thought of by Doctor Stuart and myself and was seized upon as one move in this state of impasse that might be productive of results. It would help us find a basis of agreement for the cessation of hostilities. It was not a Government proposition at all. In fact, I lost many days in getting the Government agreement. I am now losing many days in the present discussion.

General Chou: To me it seems quite clear. At the very beginning the Government did not accept this proposal because it was afraid that it might lead to a cessation of hostilities, but now the Government comes to feel rather convinced that even if a formula has been worked out by this informal group they can still continue to wage the war. They can stall the matter one step after another. So the Government is trying to exploit this arrangement and at the same time not commit themselves to issue a cease fire order.

From Doctor Stuart’s statement it seems to me that the guarantee that he has in mind is only that he will exert further efforts to put pressure upon the Government instead of securing a guarantee from the Government side. Still we will have no settlement. For example, if we resolved the issue of the veto power and the membership, we have to secure the approval of the Steering Committee. At that juncture the other parties are to make a cease fire order but the Government would refuse and there will be further argument regarding the candidates. Even if the committee is called nothing will come out. Even the Steering Committee would not bring a settlement to the over-all issue.

General Marshall: What do you mean by “over-all”?

General Chou: The cease fire. Following that we have to nominate the candidates. So all the time the Government would give excuses for delaying the issuance of the cease fire order. All the American representatives can do is to push the Government toward that end, but nevertheless the fighting may go on. On my part I am making one concession after another without any result. That is all that I can state today. I have it quite clear in my mind that the Kuomintang would not give a guarantee for the cease fire, but it is only today that I can understand that the American side cannot give that guarantee. The reason that I want to enter into the discussion of this small group is for the purpose of securing a cease fire order. It was beyond my expectations that it cannot be obtained. I only came to realize that today.

General Marshall asked me what should be done as the next step. I must say that I do not know how to answer this question. I have supposed that the Kuomintang would not give this guarantee, but I was still hoping and assuming that you would give this guarantee. I was debating with myself whether under this condition I would enter into the discussion of this informal group, but as you two said, you cannot give this promise. I have to consider further what should be done as a next step. It is, of course, my hope that you would continue to mediate, but now it seems that you cannot give this guarantee and I feel very much disappointed. I have never thought of such a possibility and I am left very much in the air.

General Marshall: Doctor Stuart wishes to say a few words, but I wish to get something in here.

If Doctor Stuart and I could guarantee the cease fire, the fighting would have stopped months ago. I don’t understand you. I am not the Government of China. Doctor Stuart is not the Government of China. Incidentally, the Generalissimo asked me when he was in Mukden to guarantee in a similar manner the Communist action and I declined for a very evident reason. I am not the head of the Communist Party. It is not within the power of Dr. Stuart and myself to furnish such guarantees. As I said, the fighting would have stopped long ago had we such power. You just made the statement that you had made a great many concessions. In this particular matter I don’t see that you have made any concessions.

Doctor Stuart: General Chou agreed last week, as I understand it, to enter in and participate in this small group. Nothing has happened to change the circumstances. The Government has designated its two candidates. There has been a great deal of propaganda from the Government and from Yenan. I pay no attention to any of that. I have never made any guarantee. General Marshall just said that we cannot guarantee any cease fire, but we have guaranteed that we will do everything we possibly can in urging that the fighting be terminated. That is all Ave have ever been able to do. We have not changed our attitude whatever.

(Doctor Stuart and General Chou had a short discussion in Chinese after which Doctor Stuart left the meeting.)

General Chou: I want to mention two points.

First, as to the concessions I have made during this period. As you will recall, from the very outset the Communists desired an unconditional truce. In the June negotiations I made a number of concessions with regard to the various subjects. Those concessions still stand, but at that time I also declared that no new subjects should be brought into discussion. But later on Dr. Stuart made this suggestion regarding the State Council. That was, of course, not in keeping with the original point of view, but then I still agreed to enter into the discussion. As I see it, this constitutes a concession because that is a subject which was not included on the original June negotiation agenda.

Second, as to the statement of Dr. Stuart concerning new factors, the situation did undergo some change. Whereas Yenan has made no reference to the business with the informal group, the Government side did make a lot of propaganda about this informal group and Wu Teh Chen has already expressed his opinion on this matter. When the question of the State Council was first brought into discussion, I had the clear impression that as soon as a solution was worked out the fighting would be stopped. Now the Government representatives have already expressed themselves before the committee has been convened. It was my original idea that when the committee was convened I would first put forward the question of whether it is the Government’s idea that as soon as the membership and veto powers have been settled the Government would agree to stop the fighting. Now Wu Teh Chen has already said that they would not do it. While I am the Communist representative with full authority, the Government representatives have only one responsibility; that is toward the State Council discussion. So I cannot but feel that I have the obligation to ask you and Dr. Stuart whether you can settle the question of the cease fire at the time when the discussion of the State Council is finished.

It seems that you are not in the position to answer that question. I feel rather disappointed that the concessions I made did not produce the result. That is my present position. The present action indicates that there is no hope with the cease fire. I asked if you could furnish a guarantee. What I had in mind is whether or not you could guarantee to the Communist Party that in case the small group has obtained results to step out in case the Government still delays the issuance of the cease fire order. It appears to me that you can offer no guarantee at all. Dr. Stuart has said previously that in case the discussion has been completed but no cease fire order issued, he would step out to criticize the Government. I had a conversation with Dr. Stuart and he said he certainly would criticize the Government. I admit that the conversation I had with Dr. Stuart had no official record. We had an informal Chinese record. Some times the discussion was rather confused. So, I have just asked Dr. Stuart if I may put into writing a few questions and Dr. Stuart would give his answer. That would help clear up the situation.

General Marshall: Now, if an agreement had been reached as to the basis for the organization of the State Council and if it had been cleared by the Steering Committee and then the Communists stated they would not nominate their members until the fighting had ceased, I would confirm their action as being my understanding; that they were under no obligation to nominate their members until the fighting had ceased. In other words, to that extent I would endeavor to protect the Communist Party against the accusation that they were showing bad faith in refusing to go ahead with the State Council under those conditions, and therefore the Government was unjustified in making such an accusation. Now, whether or not I would go further than that would depend on the terms for the cessation of hostilities. I am not referring directly to the five conditions made by the Generalissimo, but I am referring to the confused state of things which has occurred since early June. Therefore I do not know now how it is to be unravelled. I would have to decide that at the time the Committee of Three sat down to indicate how the troops were to be re-disposed.

It is getting late and I suggest that we adjourn.