711.93/9–346
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)
| Participants: | Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy, and Mr. Vincent |
Mr. Graves called by appointment at his request. He said that he would like to have a discussion in regard to China and then read from notes which he said he had prepared on the basis of a telegram from the Foreign Office.
Among the questions he raised were (1) whether we plan to withdraw our Marines from north China, (2) whether in the light of recent developments we contemplate a change in our China policy, (3) what consideration were we giving to the press report that the Chinese Communists plan to bring the situation in China up for international discussion either by the Big Three or within the Security Council, and other questions of a related nature. He concluded by stating that the British Foreign Office was giving study now to its policy toward China and that he would find anything I could tell him helpful.
I told Mr. Graves that we had no present intention of removing our Marines, although there was a general desire to remove them just as soon as the situation would permit. He seemed to be pleased with this answer.
I told him that General Marshall in his telegrams had paid no attention to the Communists’ statement regarding discussion of the China situation on an “international level” and that we in the Department felt that there was very little likelihood that the Chinese Communists had serious intentions of taking such a step. He said that the Russians might take the lead in bringing up the subject. I told him that if the Russians wanted a “3–Foreign Minister” discussion of the situation in China along the lines of the Moscow Declaration29a I felt that Mr. Byrnes would be quite willing to participate in these discussions. Insofar as discussions of China’s internal situation in the Security Council were concerned, I felt quite certain that the Chinese Government would oppose placing such an action on the agenda of the Council and that it would probably secure considerable support.
I told Mr. Graves that there was no present intention of changing our policy toward China, that the President’s statement of policy on December 15 last still held, and that General Marshall was continuing unrelentingly and with energy his efforts to bring about a satisfactory [Page 116] political solution of China’s internal problem. I then went on to give him a somewhat extended and frank analysis of our attitude and thinking here. I told him I spoke for myself but that I was fairly certain that my superiors in the Department were in general agreement with my views. Briefly, I said that we had no intention of following either of two suggested courses; we had no intention of giving “all-out support” to the National Government in prosecuting a civil war and we had no intention of “washing our hands” of the China problem, explaining that our interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East far transcended any feeling of disappointment we might have over a temporary setback in bringing peace and unity to China. In short, I said that we had every intention of staying with the problem in China and at the same time of staying out of China’s civil war.
Mr. Graves thanked me for the explanation I had given him. I asked him to let me know something of the British Foreign Office’s thinking in regard to China as soon as he obtained the information. He said he would do so.