Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between Dr. Stuart and General Marshall at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 12, 1946, 9:30 a.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey17

Dr. Stuart opened the meeting by outlining his meeting with General Chou the previous evening. Dr. Stuart said that General Chou was vitriolic toward the Generalissimo18 and Kuomintang members. Dr. Stuart attempted to get the meeting to a practical basis by asking General Chou to concern himself with the immediate situation and the steps and procedures that were necessary to proceed with a peaceful solution. Dr. Stuart reported that General Chou also said that the joint statement by himself and General Marshall was a definite indication that Americans felt General Marshall’s mission had failed. Dr. Stuart told General Chou that such was definitely not the case. General Chou then outlined the conditions under which the Communists might accept the Generalissimo’s recent terms:

North Kiangsu:—According to the 25 February reorganization plan,19 three divisions were initially to be located in North Kiangsu. The Communists now would consider the allocation of one division only to that area.

Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad:—Communists would withdraw completely.

Jehol:—Communists would accept withdrawal of Southern Jehol providing they could keep troops in Chengte itself.

Manchuria:—Antung is the only major issue involved and that could probably be resolved satisfactorily.

Shantung–Shansi Provinces:—Communists would agree to evacuate towns and cities occupied since June 7th providing Nationalists Forces did likewise.

General Chou had continued by saying that most all of these military matters could be resolved, but always the civil administration problem cropped up, which was creating greater and greater divergence of views.

When Dr. Stuart had asked General Chou why the Communists could not give up North Kiangsu province, General Chou replied that there was a large population involved. Dr. Stuart stated that although this particular population was large, the overall Chinese population was much larger and that in the interests of peace and a unified China the Communists could probably afford to make a concession on that particular point. General Chou had rejected that [Page 8] particular argument by stating that if the Communists made a con cession in this province the National Government would demand greater concessions elsewhere in China.

Dr. Stuart had continued by informing General Chou that the present situation could almost be considered amusing wherein two Americans were trying to convince Chinese that they should stop fighting. Dr. Stuart concluded the summary by stating that General Chou had requested that he not go to Peiping today.

General Marshall then took up with Dr. Stuart Admiral Cooke’s reaction to the present situation (per 675820). General Marshall then asked Dr. Stuart for his comments as to whether he (General Marshall) should make a public statement at the same time withdrawing American participation from the Investigating Committee. Dr. Stuart was highly in favor of such a procedure although General Marshall stated that he was reluctant to do so because if he did it would prove conclusively to the Government that he too had come to the conclusion that it is not practical to settle matters by the processes of negotiation with the Communists and that such a statement would undoubtedly sterilize completely Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall then stated that General Chou was coming later in the morning for a meeting. He proposed to completely orient General Chou with reference to his (General Marshall’s) thoughts on the present status of the Investigating Committee and also with reference to a possible public statement. Dr. Stuart asked General Marshall to tell General Chou that although he (Dr. Stuart) believed such a statement would be profitable, that he believed so because he was convinced of the Communists’ sincerity and willingness to continue negotiations.

  1. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall’s staff.
  2. President Chiang Kai-shek.
  3. Vol. ix, p. 295.
  4. Probably the same as telegram of August 9 from Admiral Cooke to General Marshall, not printed. Telegram No. 6758 from Executive Headquarters not found in Department files.