The enclosure, a memorandum on the above subject from the Secretary,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee
as a matter of priority.
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the State–War–Navy
Coordinating Committee
[SM–4992]
Washington, 13 February
1946.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined SWNCC 83/711 and
SWNCC 83/812 in light of Mr.
Byrnes’ memorandum in SWNCC 83/16.13 Factors
considered in this re-examination, attached as Appendix “A”,14 include the oral
statement of 14 September 1945 by the President to Dr. T. V.
Soong,15 State–War–Navy
Coordinating Committee guidance on U. S. military responsibility in
the training and equipping of Chinese Armed Forces (SWNCC 83/4
amended by SWNCC 83/516 and by SWNCC in its
28th meeting 22 October 1945), the statement of approved policy
towards China of mid-December 194517 upon
General Marshall’s departure for China, and the views of General
Marshall and General Wedemeyer.18
[Page 818]
In submitting a plan for the establishment of a military advisory
group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that they were carrying
out announced U. S. policy toward China and that in carrying out
this policy, they were furthering the U. S. program for stability in
the Far East. It would appear desirable from the practical
standpoint to insure continuity insofar as the military is concerned
of the excellent cooperative spirit already developed. General
Wedemeyer reports that the Generalissimo desires to accept U. S.
military doctrine, organization and equipment exclusively, but that
the British and the Russians are bidding strongly for Chinese
approval of advisory groups similar to that recommended by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the State Department.
With respect to the suggested immunities, privileges and concessions
for American personnel, there are attached, also in Appendix “A”,
statements made by General Wedemeyer and General Marshall concerning
the points raised in the Secretary of State’s memorandum. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff concur with these views. The list of rights and
concessions contained in SWNCC 83/7 was submitted for consideration
of the State Department in negotiating contracts with the Chinese
Government. The establishment of an advisory group was not to be
conditional upon the grant by China of any particular
concession.
The contemplated activities of the Military Advisory Group envisage
advice to higher staffs on organizational and training matters,
assistance in the training of general and special staff groups of
the Ministry of War and the Supreme Headquarters, and provision of
some training and technical assistance in the academies and service
schools of the air, ground and naval forces. Sufficient personnel
for close tactical or technical training assistance in lower
echelons of all Chinese armed forces will not be available. This
participation in training would not under any circumstances extend
to U. S. personnel accompanying Chinese troops in any combat
operations.
The size and organization of the Military Advisory Group must
necessarily depend upon the ultimate political situation of China
coupled with the size and organization of the post-war Chinese armed
forces. The situation in China in this connection is obscure.
A great proportion of the Chinese Ground Forces, which in view of our
wartime equipment and training programs would be most suitable for
continued modernization and training, are at present engaged in
regrouping and reoccupation operations and may not be soon available
for post-war modernization. Determination of U. S. assistance
justifiable over and above the 39–division program should logically
await completion of these operations since the support already given
the Chinese will be an element in the determination of additional
assistance.
[Page 819]
Further studies on a Chinese air program which is reasonably
justified and which the Chinese can be reasonably expected to
support, now indicate that the Chinese Air Force to be assisted by
the United States should not exceed eight and one-third groups until
the necessary supporting agencies for a modern air force have been
established. The Chinese Air Force presently consists of
approximately seven groups. A program for eight and one-third groups
calls for a slight increase in air transport aircraft and is well
within the limitations of time and materiel. Transport groups are
particularly necessary and desirable because of the poor land
communications in China.
Although legitimate Chinese naval requirements are still in the
planning stage, it is recognized that Chinese crews will require
individual training. However, it will probably be several months
before the naval part of the Advisory Group can be in full
operation.
In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a
small military advisory group to China should be established
immediately as an aid to China in modernizing its armed forces.
General Marshall and General Wedemeyer have proposed such
action.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an initial authorization of
750 Army personnel and 165 Naval personnel, or a total of 915, will
be adequate pending further developments in the situation. The
ultimate size and organization of the Advisory Group can be
re-examined when the pattern of political and military organization
of China is more clear.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that as an initial action, the
Secretary of State propose to the President the issuance of a
directive to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy
substantially as that attached as Appendix “B”.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. McFarland,
Brigadier General, U. S. A., Secretary
[Subenclosure]
Appendix “B”
Draft
Proposed Directive To Be Issued by the
President to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy
The Secretaries of War and the Navy are authorized and directed to
establish jointly a U. S. Military Advisory Group to China. The
Secretary of State will conduct the necessary negotiations with the
Chinese Government.
[Page 820]
The object of this Advisory Group will be to assist and advise the
Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the
fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China under
her international agreements including the United Nations
Organization, for the establishment of adequate control over
liberated areas in China, including Manchuria, and Formosa, and for
the maintenance of internal peace and security.
