Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, Dr. Stuart, and Mr. Wang Ping-nan at Nanking, October 10, 1946, 6 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
Mister Wang: I have received a memorandum from General Chou En Lai42 with instructions to deliver it to you. I would like to have your comments on this memorandum.
General Marshall: Yesterday when I saw General Chou En-lai in Shanghai we spent almost a half or ¾ hours over a most unexpected issue. The other day when Doctor Stuart and I succeeded in getting the Generalissimo to agree to this truce, Doctor Stuart returned immediately to the Embassy and sent for you. I was afraid that there might be some misunderstanding as the agreements and proposals were all verbal, so I immediately dictated a personal memorandum for Doctor Stuart dated 6 October. I took about five minutes to do it and it reached the Embassy about 10 minutes after you left. Doctor Stuart informed me over the telephone that what I had said in that memorandum was in effect what he had told you. But I did not learn then that you had not seen the memorandum. I had sent Doctor Stuart an extra copy for that purpose.
Mister Wang: I saw it the next day.
General Marshall: I did not know until the following morning that you had not gotten the extra copy and that it had not been received by Dr. Stuart until after you left. I then sent you a copy and I also sent one by plane to General Chou. This was my personal memorandum to Doctor Stuart, which I dictated in about four or five minutes. Now, when your reply came on October 8 the question came up of whether a release to the press should be made, and that was hurriedly talked over by Doctor Stuart and myself. The release was dictated in about 10 minutes. I left without seeing it typed. Doctor Stuart waited to see it and to take it to the Embassy for preparation for release. I was then a half hour late for an appointment with the Generalissimo.
[Page 355]I have given you this detailed description merely to make plain to you the circumstances under which these two papers were prepared, which would indicate to you my surprise and Dr. Stuart’s surprise when we found that a great issue was made by General Chou over an expression in my 6 October memorandum to Dr. Stuart, which says “The purpose (of the 5-man and 3-Man Committee meeting) is to carry out (the Generalissimo’s 2 conditions)” and in the press release it says, “The purpose is to meet in order to consider.” Neither of those expressions have ever been seen by the Government, and yet I found that was one of the important issues that was being made by General Chou.
Now what does that mean? I gave you the benefit of my confidential memorandum to Doctor Stuart and then an important issue is made over my English. We have so many things that are in dispute, are genuinely in dispute, that it seems too bad when differences between the Government and the Communist Party develop over my wording. I tried to say all this to General Chou but I did not appear to make him understand. I could only guess that his general suspicion was so overwhelming that he could not accept my explanation.
The next, and probably the most important, issue he raised was that to sit down and consider the two propositions put forward by the Generalissimo was equivalent to a surrender. And he confirmed that point of view largely by two things. One, an expression in the Generalissimo’s memorandum of 2 October. The Generalissimo used the expression, “The maximum concession we will make”, and the other was that in the meetings of the Committee of Three the Generalissimo confined the discussion to the location of the Communist troops.
That was not at all the reaction of Dr. Stuart and myself. It was not in our minds that the Communist Party was committed to anything except to sit down at the table. And then we would at last have a beginning of a renewed effort to negotiate the disagreements. Heretofore I had been struggling to secure very much what General Chou was so anxious to have; that was, first, a cessation of hostilities and then negotiations. Dr. Stuart and I were unable to secure such an agreement on the part of the Government. Then we took the issue General Chou had brought up concerning Kalgan and did succeed in getting at least a halt of military operations for a period of 10 days. I repeat again that it was not at all our conception that the Communist Party was bound to accept the 13 delegates proposition, for example. What the Communists were asked to agree to was to sit down at the table and discuss this issue.
The other point made by General Chou was that the things to be discussed were limited, and he refused such limitation. His attitude on that seemed to be a complete reversal of all of his previous conditions, [Page 356] and he left me completely baffled. It was General Chou who has always wanted to limit the discussion to the Committee of Three and the question of the cessation of hostilities alone as the condition precedent to everything else. Dr. Stuart and I endeavored to limit the matters to be discussed just as much as we possibly could so as to have as little as possible intervening in negotiations in order to reach as quickly as possible the point where we could settle the question of hostilities. I do not think General Chou really meant the meaning he conveyed to me, but that is what he said, but it made it appear that we were working at complete cross purposes. All I am endeavoring to do now is to explain what happened, as I understood it, yesterday afternoon in my talk with General Chou.
Now I will turn to this communication (9 October) from General Chou, but I would first like Dr. Stuart to comment.
Doctor Stuart: I would rather go over once more, as a matter of record, what I have said several times before, that it was by no means easy for us to persuade the Government to take the steps they have taken, and it seemed to us a very generous action on their part, a readiness to go as far as they could to initiate the negotiations. We thought of the truce as accomplishing two things: One, to do what the Communists have been urging and that was stop the attack on Kalgan. The plans made through the Executive Headquarters Field teams were to guarantee that the fears expressed by both parties would not materialize. We anticipated those fears by taking these measures, and we told these special teams to observe that there was no abuse of the truce on either side. Two, we expected in those 10 days that between the two committees, the Committee of Three and the Committee of Five, there would be a discussion begun which would reach sufficiently definite results to indicate the purpose of both sides to find the peaceful solution and that through that participation it would be possible not only to stop the fight against Kalgan but to effect a nationwide cease fire, and to carry out the political steps planned by the PCC. What we wanted and expected was a discussion by equals, we did not expect bickerings but a resumption of the previous directives in a determined effort on both parties to provide a solution.
We would not have proposed that unless we had been very confident and had good reason to be confident that the Government would support that policy. So it is a very keen disappointment to us that these efforts have been rejected. We think that if the Communists had been willing to meet with the Government in these committees there was every prospect to expect an early cessation of hostilities and to expect constructive plans that would bring peace and democratic government to this country.
[Page 357]A reply of this nature (Chou’s 6 [9?] October memorandum), from its very character, seems to me to indicate an uncooperative attitude—to make these demands knowing as General Chou must know that the Government will not accept them in this form. These demands prevent any further negotiations, any further hopes. The only possible hope would have been to meet together and discuss in committees the issues he raised here, and together try to find a solution that would be acceptable to both sides. But to make a reply that lays down conditions that quite evidently will not be accepted, is really to close the way to any further possible negotiations.
General Marshall: I do not think I need to add to Doctor Stuart’s statement.
Mister Wang: After General Marshall’s explanation of the misunderstandings on the use of words and also Dr. Stuart’s comments after he has read General Chou’s reply to the Generalissimo, I feel that there is nothing I can add. I will transmit the comments of this conversation to General Chou and to Yenan.
Doctor Stuart: I would like to add one more thought here. I talked as frankly as I did in the hope that our Communist friends would change their attitude and agree to coming to these meetings. We believe that the result they have been hoping for can be achieved. It is going to be increasingly difficult if our Communist friends lose their faith in our sincerity and in our intentions to mediate neutrally. I have not read it, but I have been told that today’s Ta Kung Pao has an article stating that a Communist spokesman in Shanghai said that we two have gone into this mediation with the deliberate intention from the beginning to help the Government. If the Communists have really lost faith in us there is not the slightest use in our making further attempts to mediate. If it is propaganda, it is still worse.
General Marshall: With reference to Dr. Stuart’s expression of a feeling of fair confidence that once we had these actual negotiations under way it would be possible to reach certain agreements for the cessation of hostilities; I want to add the following, in order to avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding.
I am aware of the Communist demand that the Government troops return to their positions of January 13th and I am entirely familiar with the proviso of that agreement. I repeat what I said the other day, that my impression is, though I have had no definite statement on the subject—that the Government will insist on the continuation of the military occupation of those places that have been taken over recently. It may be that they will compromise on this, but I have had no indication of that. I think that they will accept the position as of the June 7th date in Manchuria. I am sorry I can’t give a definite statement [Page 358] regarding either of these matters, but as they have a very important bearing on the negotiations of the military phases, I think it best now to make my impression clear.
I repeat again that I am not stating this as a determined fact, and also that these questions would certainly be open to debate, but I have been concerned over this particular aspect of the problem.
Doctor Stuart: I said what I did about my hopes because I feel confident that, notwithstanding the very real difficulties that General Marshall mentioned, if both parties go into these discussions with sincere purpose to achieve democratization of the government and nationalization of the army, they can, through further discussion, realize the purposes each has held to, and for which we all are struggling and hoping.