Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Final Report on the Anping Incident

Peiping, 8 October 1946.

Subject: Report of Colonel M. F. Davis on the Complete Investigation of the An Ping Incident of 29 July 1946.⁷

This report of the investigation by Team 25 as completed by me is submitted in accordance with the following directives (copies attached).

a. “Report of Conflict” dated 2 August 1946 to “Field Team No. 25” from The Three Commissioners.⁸

b. “Program of Procedure” dated 10 August 1946 to “Field Team Number 25” and signed by The Three Commissioners.⁹

c. “Team 25 Investigation” dated 3 October 1946 to “Colonel M. F. Davis, U. S. Member, Team 25” signed “Walter S. Robertson, U. S. Commissioner.”¹⁰

I. Introduction:

1. Team No. 25 conducted as thorough and complete a fact-finding investigation as the National Government and United States Branches were able to force through under the intensive obstructionist attitude of the Communist Party. The data obtained clearly satisfied the United States Member that the team had established the facts of the incident. (The National Government Member’s attitude indicated his concurrence with the U. S. Member.)

2. The Team investigation work, lasting from 4 August to 3 September (inclusive) was continuously handicapped by the delaying attitude of the Communist Party Member and broke down completely on 9 September by an absolute refusal by the Communist Party Branch to complete the investigation.

3. In accordance with your instructions of 3 October (incl. c), I interviewed the last two witnesses of the investigation as planned by the team and thus completed, as an individual U. S. Officer, the prescribed schedule of investigation. Both National Government and Communist Party Members were invited by me to attend these interviews as observers, (Index 58¹¹). National Government representatives did attend but no Communist Party representatives were present.

II. The Facts of the Incident:

1. The reported conflict actually occurred on the Peiping-Tientsin Highway just south of a bus station at a road-junction leading east about four hundred (400) yards to the village of An Ping.

• Reference—Index No. 14, p 2

2. Date and time: 29 July 1946 at about 1205 hours.

• Reference (1) Index No. 3
• (2) Index No. 5, p 2

3. Forces involved:

a. Communist: A force of Communist Party troops in strength approximately five hundred (500). The Communist Party troops included members of the 5th Company, 53rd Regiment, 8th Route Army, and of the Tung Hsien (Tung-Chow) Battalion.

• Reference (1) Index No. 2
• (2) Index No. 3
• (3) Index No. 36, p 9, last statement
• (4) Index No. 36, p 25, line 21
• (5) Index No. 37, p 12, last line and ⅔ page 13
• (6) Index No. 61, p 5

b. U. S. Marines: A U. S. Marine Supply Convoy of twenty-three (23) vehicles with armed drivers and guards, totaling forty-two (42) in number, from the 1st Battalion, 11th Regiment, U. S. Marines.

• Reference (1) Index No. 16, p 2
• (2) Index No. 31, p 3
• (3) Index No. 9, ps 1, 2 and 3

(1) This Marine Convoy included and escorted as casuals:

(a) Two Executive Headquarters sedans with Army Officers, Enlisted Men and one Civilian employee passenger.

(b) One Chinese owned truck carrying CNRRA¹² supplies with Chinese Civilian occupants.

• Reference—Index No. 9, p 2

4. Non-participation by National Government Forces: No National Government Forces were engaged in this conflict in any manner. The several witnesses were all very definite as to non-participation by National Government troops. It is evident to my satisfaction that National Government forces had no relation whatsoever with nor were in any manner a factor in the conflict.

• Reference (1) Index No. 30, p 6, middle of page
• (2) Index No. 29, p 6, last third of page
• (3) Index No. 33, p 15, middle of page
• (4) Index No. 33, p 30, first line
• (5) Index No. 35, p 5, middle of page
• (6) Index No. 45, p 3, bottom of page and first half of p 4
• (7) Index No. 36, p 24, middle third of page p 36, line 7
• (8) Index No. 61, p 5

5. Commanders of forces involved:

a. Communist Party: Company Commander, Li Ching Chun, of the 5th Company, 53rd Regiment, 8th Route Army.

• Reference (1) Index No. 36, p 4, lines 6–8
• (2) Index No. 36, p 17
• (3) Index No. 36, p 23, last statement

b. U. S. Marines: 2nd Lt. Douglas A. Cowin, 11th Regiment, U. S. Marine Corps, who was killed at the start of the action and was succeeded in command by Platoon Sergeant Cecil J. Flanagan, U. S. Marine Corps.

• Reference (1) Index No. 9, ps 1, 5 and 7

6. Responsible officer for planning and ordering the attack: Communist Party Vice-Commander Wang Chih Tao, commanding that portion of the Communist designated 14th Sub-Military District of Communist Party East Hopei Area, in which An Ping is situated.

• Reference (1) Index No. 36, p 1, 1st statement
• (2) Index No. 36, p 2, lines 27 to 40
• (3) Index No. 23, last statement

7. Responsible officer conducting the attack: Li Ching Chun, Communist Party 5th Company Commander of 53rd Regiment, 8th Route Army.

• Reference (1) Index No. 36, p 1, statement
• (2) Index No. 36, p 2, 6th line from bottom
• (3) Index No. 36, p 23, last statement

8. Events prior to day of conflict:

a. Marine convoys had customarily used the Peiping-Tientsin Highway for supply and administrative purposes for a considerable time prior to 29 July. Marine Headquarters in China understood that this highway was considered as being National Government territory throughout its length and were not cognizant of any question as to the propriety of their use of this highway. On 23 July, due to spasmodic sniping just adjacent east and west of An Ping, a once-each-three-day convoy had been instituted with armed guards for protection. The 26 July convoy was fired on more heavily than before, so the strength of the guards for 29 July had been increased by some seventeen Enlisted Marines.

• Reference (1) Index No. 8, p 2, 3 and 4
• (2) Index No. 31, p 2, last ⅔ page
• (3) Index No. 31, p 3, 1st part of page
• (4) Index No. 31, p 5, 1st part of page

b. An Executive Headquarters sedan, traveling alone from Peiping to Tientsin, was subjected to sniping fire at this locality on 28 July.

• Reference (1) Index No. 7, par 2

9. Events of morning of 29 July:

a. A Chinese commercial truck with the owner and a driver as occupants was captured at the scene of the incident by the Communist Party Forces sometime shortly before noon and taken into An Ping. The truck owner was wounded by Communist rifle fire while being captured.

b. The Communist main body approximately four hundred (400) in strength arrived subsequent to the capture of the civilian truck and were in position with the ambush prepared prior to 1200 hours.

Note: The Communist Party Member refused the team interview of these witnesses and by his action (upheld by Communist Party Commissioner Yeh and later by Communist Party Representative Chou En-lai in Nanking) stopped the team’s investigation at this Item (F) of its procedure directive.

• Reference (1) Index No. 38, p 17, last par.
• (2) Index No. 55
• (3) Index No. 56
• (4) Index No. 60
• (5) Index No. 61

10. Start of conflict: The convoy was proceeding west toward Peiping at a normal rate of speed (25–30 m. p. h.) and approached the An Ping road-junction just about 1200 noon. The convoy was stretched out with intervals between vehicles of from 50 to 100 yards with the lead vehicle being a jeep driven by the convoy commander, 2nd Lt. Douglas A. Cowin.

As the convoy reached a spot just short of the road-junction to An Ping a road-block was encountered. The block consisted of a row of fairly large size rocks across the road and shortly beyond two un-wheeled Chinese carts.

The lead vehicle came to a halt and the other vehicles reduced speed in closing up distance. On stopping the Marine driver, Lt. Cowin, dismounted and, as he cleared the vehicle, was instantly killed by combined hand-grenades and small arms fire. Simultaneously, the entire convoy was taken under fire and came to a halt in a confused manner, completely disarranged.

Note: The details here are rather confused as the ambush was a complete surprise to the Marines with no plans or instructions having been formulated for such an eventuality.

• Reference (1) Index 9
• (2) Index 31, p 20, middle of page
• (3) Index 31, p 24
• (4) Index 31, p 32, p 2, line 2
• (5) Index 33, p 2, 1st statement
• (6) Index 35, p 12

11. Continuation of conflict: The personnel of the convoy took to the side ditches and adjacent cornfields for concealment, and individually returned fire as opportunities were presented.

The main engagement lasted about one hour, and then, with the attackers holding position, a light exchange of fire continued until about 1600 hours.

At some time during the second part of the conflict, the road-block was opened by the Communist Party attackers and a U. S. Marine radio-jeep, with some captured small arms aboard, was pushed through and taken away by Communists.

At about 1545 hours a white flag was exhibited by the Communists and the Marines started back to their vehicles. A few shots were sustained by Marines during this phase. Wounded were then collected and the survivors, with some nineteen vehicles that were serviceable, proceeded to Peiping.

• Reference (1) Index 6, p 2, pars 8, 9 and 10
• (2) Index 7, p 2, par 6
• (3) Index 29, p 2, Maj. Freese
• (4) Index 31, pp 30, 25, 34
• (5) Index 32, p 7
• (6) Index 33, p 21
• (7) Index 33, p 4
• (8) Index 36, p 24, middle of page

12. Summation (Reconstructed) of Communist Party Forces’ activities in this locality prior to, during and on termination of conflict:

A Communist Party armed force probably the irregular plain-clothed platoon of the Tung Hsien Battalion was at An Ping by 23 July. This force totaled at least twenty-two (22) persons and was evidently responsible for the sniping fire on the Marine Convoy of 23 July. (See Par. 8)

On 24 July the Tung Hsien platoon was reinforced by the platoon (thirty-six (?) men) of the 53rd Regiment and the combined force totaled an approximate one hundred (100) men. Under the command of Li Ching Chun this force evidently were preparing for the ambush and were at the point of conflict on 28th July as evidenced by the sniping fire on the Executive Headquarters sedan on that date. (Par. 8)

In the early morning of 29 July the ambush was laid and road-blocks established. At the same time the main body, a possible four hundred (400) in strength, of the Communist Party Force started for the scene of the ambush and arrived there sometime between 1000 and 1200 hours. (Executive Headquarters and Marine participants estimated the strength of the attackers at more than three hundred (300). The Communist Party commander stated that he had a total of fifty-eight (58) men at An Ping on 24 July and the Communist guide testified to leading a force of four hundred (400) 8th Route Army personnel to the scene).

• Reference (1) Index No. 36, p 10
• (2) Index No. 36, p 25, last line
• (3) Index No. 61, p 6

My reconstruction of the Communist Party activity is:

A small force of Communist irregulars were present in this vicinity prior to 23 July and observed the use of the highway by the Marine convoy together with no patrolling or reconnaissance at this locality by National Government troops.

As of 23 July, the possibilities of the ambush being recognized, the Commander, Li Ching Chun, was dispatched with his platoon to complete the plans and make the appropriate preparations.

On the morning of the 29th July the main body arrived and taking up positions were in readiness by 1200 noon when the ambush was consummated.

The ambush was not the success anticipated due to the unexpected strong resistance (convoy had been reinforced and strengthened in fire-power) and after the initial surprise the attackers were more or less pinned down in their positions and as soon as they could they broke off the engagement and withdrew.

13. Event subsequent to conflict: A rescue party, organized by the Marine Forces in Tientsin, arrived in the late evening. The bodies of Marine dead and the abandoned vehicles were collected and taken to Peiping.

• Reference (1) Index 31, p 13

14. Casualties:

a. U. S. Marines:

Killed: 1 Officer and 3 Enlisted Men

Wounded or Hospitalized: 1 Officer and 11 Enlisted Men

• Reference (1) Index 9, pp 5 and 6

b. Communists:

Killed: Eight (8)

Wounded: Eighteen (18)

(This from testimony of Vice Commander Wang Chieh Tao)

• Reference (1) Index 36, p 4, line 8 from bottom

III. Conclusions:

1. That a Marine convoy consisting of twenty-three (23) vehicles of assorted types, manned by one (1) officer and forty-two (42) men left Tientsin at 0900, 29 July 1946 and did proceed at a normal rate of speed until it reached the village of An Ping, where it was attacked by recognized forces of the Chinese Communist Party, at about 1205 hours.

2. That this Marine Convoy was in no sense an offensive patrol and the guards were solely a protective force to discourage pilferage or banditry.

3. That this Marine convoy was proceeding in accordance with its assigned and customary convoy mission and anticipated no trouble more serious than a chance running encounter with individual dissident Chinese elements enroute.

4. That no National Government personnel were engaged in the conflict. That all evidence presented to the team is the opposite of the Communist Party claim that National Government forces accompanied the U. S. Marine Forces on this convoy.

5. That certain intelligence information regarding at least the approximate size of the convoy must have been known by the Chinese Communist Party Commander since the entire convoy was simultaneously taken under fire as it was drawing to a stop.

6. That this ambush was methodically planned, prepared and executed by the Communist Party Military Forces.

7. That these Communist Forces engaged in the conflict with the full knowledge, consent and orders of their superior commanders.

8. That the Marine convoy personnel were completely unaware of the premeditated danger as evidenced by the disorganized manner in which they deployed and defended themselves, and by the fact that they blindly drove their vehicles into the ambush which had been laid by the Communist attackers.

9. That the Chinese Communist Party representatives, throughout the investigation, have displayed an extremely reluctant attitude in the establishment of facts directly related to the incident; and that due to this reluctance, it must be concluded that the Chinese Communist Party was not interested in establishing facts. The facts established, when evaluated, lead to my conclusion that Chinese Communist personnel deliberately planned, laid and executed a military offensive ambush whose goal was the capture of the convoy and/or the destruction of the U. S. Marine armed guards.

10. Entire responsibility and blame for the An Ping incident with its resultant dead and wounded of Chinese and American soldiers, is attributed to the Chinese Communist Party.

IV. Chronological Record of the Investigation of the An Ping Incident:

4 Aug.	—Senior National Government and United States Members present in compliance with instructions of Director of Operations, Executive Headquarters for Team organization. Senior Communist Party Member failed to appear. No business.
5 Aug.	—Team organized but due to confusion caused by the Communist Party Member no work accomplished and National Government Member withdrew from Team.
6 Aug.	—Team organized with new National Government Member. Team procedure suggested by chairman (U. S. Member) and certain witnesses available. Communist Party blocked proceeding. Chairman (U. S. Member) submitted a written report addressed to “The Three Commissioners” to the Director of Operations. The conclusion of this report was that the U. S. Member was convinced “That no impartial team investigation with the Three Branches of Executive Headquarters represented can be accomplished” (Index 10).
7 Aug.	—Team meeting. No work accomplished due to non-cooperation by Communist Party Member.
8 Aug.	—A.M. meeting of team showed team at a stalemate with Communist Party Member refusing to interrogate witnesses or visit scene of incident. On oral report to U. S. Commissioner he secured Communist Party Commissioner action that team would carry out planned visit to An Ping, the scene of the incident. Visit was made but with incomplete results as Communist Party Member refused to participate in any interrogation of the several witnesses who were present.
9 Aug. 16 Aug. (Incl)	—No constructive work accomplished due to Communist obstructionist action.
12 Aug.	—Special Report by U. S. Member to The Three Commissioners recommending action by them that Team could get to work with the investigation (Index #22).
14 Aug.	—Detailed directive “Program of Procedure” received from Three Commissioners (Index 18).
15 Aug. 3 Sep. (Incl)	—Team completed Items A thru E, “Program of Procedure” (Unnecessary delays and difficulties throughout this period caused by Communist Party Members).
4 Sep. 9 Sep. (Incl)	—Team meetings but no results as Communist Party Member each day refused to permit continuation of investigation.
7 Sep.	—Special Report of U. S. Member to U. S. Commissioner on Impasse (Index 51).
9 Sep.	—Communist Party Member as chairman assembled Team but no business conducted.
9 Sep. 3 Oct.	—Communist Party Member as chairman failed to call any meetings.
3 Oct.	—Col. M. F. Davis directed by U. S. Commissioner to complete investigation as an individual (Index 57).
4 Oct.	—Individual completion of investigation accomplished. Work started on report.

M. F. Davis

[Enclosure 1]

The Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters to Field Team No. 25

Peiping, 2 August 1946.

Subject: Report of Conflict

1. It is hereby directed that Field Team No. 25 will investigate the reported conflict between the personnel of a United States Marine convoy and an unidentified Chinese force, which occurred 29 July 1946, on the Peiping-Tientsin road in the vicinity of Ta Hsiao San Ho, about 35 miles southeast of Peiping.

2. The Field Team will conduct a thorough and complete fact finding investigation of the entire incident with special emphasis on the identity of the attacking force and the identity of the leaders and individuals responsible for ordering and conducting the attack.

3. Upon completion of the investigation with least practical delay, Field Team No. 25 will return to Peiping and report the results of the investigation to the Three Commissioners.

__________________

Cheng Kai-Min

National Government Commissioner
__________________

Yeh Chien-Ying

Communist Party Commissioner
__________________

Walter S. Robertson

United States Commissioner

[Enclosure 2]

The Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters to Field Team No. 25¹³

Peiping, 10 August 1946.

Subject: Program of Procedure

1. It is agreed that the following program of procedure to accomplish the mission assigned to Team No. 25 in our agreed directive of 2 August will be adhered to by that Team in the order enumerated:

a. Interrogate and record the testimony of eye witnesses, Major Freeze and Mr. Duke, Executive Headquarters’ personnel who were passengers in the motor convoy, escorted by Marine Armed Patrol.

b. Interrogate and record the testimony of the U. S. Marine Corps Commander, Lt. Colonel Thomas R. Belzer, and the U. S. Marine Corps personnel who participated in the conflict.

c. Visit, interrogate and record testimony of Communist Commander and enlisted personnel of Communist Unit participating in the conflict. (Safe conduct will be issued by both the Government and the Communists, while transportation will be provided by the American Branch within practical limits.)

d. Visit the area of conflict to interrogate and to record the testimony of such witnesses as may be made available.

e. Visit and interview Major General Keller E. Rockey as Commander, First Marine Division (Reinf), Tientsin; General Sun Lien Chung, as Commander 11th War Zone; and the Senior Communist Party Commander in area where incident occurred.

f. Interview and record the testimony of such other witnesses as each Branch considers necessary to establish facts directly related to incident.

g. Visit, interrogate and record testimony of National Government unit which Communists allege participated in the conflict and which National Government and First Marine Division Commander, Major General Rockey, denied participated in the conflict.

h. Convene in Team Meetings for preparation and submission of report to the Three Commissioners.

It is further agreed that three senior members representing the Three Branches of Team No. 25 will take turns in acting as Chairman of the Team Meetings.

It is further agreed that no distinction should be made between types of witnesses whether they were present at the place of incident during the conflict or not. No witnesses were “arbitrators.” Anybody who gave testimony before the Team was a “witness” and the credibility of the testimony of all witnesses would be determined by the Team.

It is further agreed that the Team should carry out the entire program of procedure laid down by present agreement and that no pretext should be allowed to prevent them from doing so, unless a change was unanimously agreed upon by the Three Commissioners.

__________________

Cheng Kai-Min

National Government Commissioner
__________________

Yeh Chien-Ying

Communist Party Commissioner
__________________

Walter S. Robertson

United States Commissioner

[Enclosure 3]

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Colonel M. F. Davis

Peiping, 3 October 1946.

Subject: Team 25 Investigation

1. In order to prevent further delay and to conclude United States participation in investigation of the Anping incident by Team 25, you are hereby instructed to:

a. Interview and record the testimony of the remaining witnesses commencing today, 3 October 1946.

b. Notify National Government and Communist Party Branches of these instructions, including time and place of interview, and, further, that they are invited to designate observers to be present during your interrogation of the remaining witnesses. Transcript of testimony will be furnished each branch if requested.

c. Review carefully all Directives from the Three Commissioners outlining the mission of Team 25.

d. Submit to the United States Commissioner without delay your own complete report of the entire investigation, if circumstances require, appending the position of the other two branches if made available to you.

2. The above course of action is directed in view of the fact that Team 25 has been deadlocked since 9 September 1946 and unable to complete the investigation in accordance with Directives to the team signed by the Three Commissioners.

Walter S. Robertson

7. Submitted to the American Commissioner (Robertson) of Executive Headquarters, at Peiping.
8. Enclosure 1, p. 328.
9. Enclosure 2, p. 329.
10. Enclosure 3, p. 330.
11. References in this report cited by index numbers not printed.
12. Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
13. Notation by the U.S. Commissioner (Robertson): “Not signed until August 14.”