893.00/9–2746: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 30—2:42 p.m.]
1555. In the belief that a comprehensive summary of recent military developments in China was needed, Embassy requested Acting Military Attaché to prepare such an analytical report. It is transcribed below:
“In reviewing the military situation in China, it appears impossible to establish definitely which side has been the principal aggressor in the numerous complicated operations which have taken place during 1946. The political issues behind these operations have been so beclouded by claims and counter-claims on both sides that it is impossible to decide, with any degree of certainty, just who started what. A careful analysis of all reports submitted by the Executive Headquarters teams in the field would doubtless shed considerable light on who has been the aggressor in many local situations, but even such a study would not, in my opinion, fix the primary responsibility for the present situation. Even in instances where it appears clear that one side or the other has been the aggressor, justification for assuming the offensive might be claimed on the ground that such action was necessitated by moves, threatened moves, on the part of the opposition.
The first indication of the present National Government offensive was noted in July of this year in an area on the border of Honan [Page 232] and Hupeh which since 1945 had been occupied by Communist forces under General Li Hsien-nien. Around the first of July, reports from National Government sources claimed that Communist forces in this area were attempting to enlarge the territory under their control and were threatening points on the Lunghai Railway to the west and in Anhwei province to the east. To counter these alleged threats, Government forces, reported to consist of five armies, moved against the Communists in this area, which later came to be known as the “Hankow pocket”, although it lay a considerable distance to the north of Hankow and east of the Peiping–Hankow Railway, with Hsuan-huatien in which town Li Hsieh-nien had his headquarters, as it is center of strategic importance.
Around 9 July, 1946, Li Hsien-nien’s forces succeeded in breaking out of the encircling National Government troops and moved northwest to Tsaoyang. At Tsaoyang, the Communists separated into two columns. One, under Li Hsien-nien, moved northwest to Tenghsien, and thence to Shanyang. The other column, under Wang Chen, Li Hsien-nien’s second-in-command, moved in a general westerly direction into the mountains.
Subsequent movements of the columns are not clear, but during the first week in September, both Li Hsien-nien and Wang Chen, with at least a part of their original forces, made their way back into the part of Shensi province which is controlled by the Communists. Reliable Communist sources admit that these forces had suffered untold hardships and heavy losses, but claim that both generals got home with approximately the same number of troops as they had led out.
The National Government operations in the “Hankow pocket” were successful in that the Communists were driven out of the area concerned. They failed, however, in that the main force of the Communists was not destroyed or captured.
The next phase of the National Government offensive got under way about 13 July, subsequent to reports circulated in the Kmt press that three columns of Communist troops were converging on Hsuchow, Kiangsu, from the north, south and east, with the objective of capturing or isolating this strategically important city at the junction of the Tientsin–Pukow [and] Lunghai Railway lines. At the same time, the Communists were reported to be planning attacks against the Shanghai–Nanking Railway from the north bank of the Yangtse River.
To counter these alleged threatening moves, the National Government employed a force estimated at 11 armies in operations which had the objectives of securing the south flank of units stationed along the Lunghai Railway in Honan; clearing the area east of the Tientsin–Pukow Railway in Anhwei province; and driving the Communists back from the north bank of the Yangtse River to Yiangsu.
[Page 233]In the first phase of these operations, National Government forces [from?] Hsuchow struck deep into southern Shantung and took Hsien [Yihsien?] and Tancheng. Simultaneously columns moved east and west from Hsuchow and Tunghai in order to clear the Hsuchow–Tunghai section of the Lunghai. The two columns met at a point about 38 miles west of Tunghai on 27 July.
During the second phase of the operations, National Government forces operating in northern Kiangsu exerted pressure on the Communists from north, east and west and gradually forced them northeast of Hweiyi [Hwaiyin?], the Communist stronghold in Supei (northern Kiangsu). While the Government armies have not been able to destroy the Communist forces in northern Kiangsu, they dealt them a severe blow by taking Hwaian on 17 September.
In August, Communist forces, reported as numbering 80,000, attacked various points on the Lunghai Railway between Kaifeng, Honan, and Lichuan. Kaifeng, Lichuan, and Kaocheng were threatened, while Lanfeng, Yehchikang, Liuho, Yangchow, and Tangshan were taken. National Government forces, however, staged a counter-offensive between 19 August and 31 August and retook all the points which had been lost to the Communists.
In July, National Government forces crossed the Yellow River into southern Shansi and began a push to the north along the Tungpei Railway. By the first of August, they had reached and taken Linfen. In eastern Shansi, however, the Communists succeeded in cutting the Chengtai (Shihchiaohuang–Taiyuan) Railroad. According to press reports, the line was seriously damaged between Taiyuan and Showing.
The important mining and communications center of Tatung, in northern Shansi, was attacked by Communist forces mid-July. Although the newspapers have repeatedly reported that the town was in danger of capture, it is still in the hands of the Government. Units from the forces of Fu Tso-yi, chairman of the Suiyuan provincial government, are reported to have relieved the Communist pressure on Tatung on 25 September.
A drive to open the Kiaotsi (Tsingtao–Tsinan) Railway was undertaken by Government forces in July and the line was reported cleared of Communist forces on 17 July. Official reports from U. S. Marine units stationed in Tsingtao, however, state that the Communists subsequently reoccupied parts of the line. No trains are running between Tsingtao and Tsinan, and there appears little likelihood that traffic will be resumed in the near future.
The military situation in Manchuria (except in Jehol province) has been generally quiet since the Gimo ordered the cessation of operations against the Communists 7 June. There have been many reports [Page 234] of moves and countermoves on both sides, but only minor skirmishes have taken place. The National Govt new First Army moved from Anshan to Changchun on 20 Aug. The new Sixth Army was moved first to Szupingchieh from Changchun and thence to Anshan.
During the first week in Aug. the National Govt began a campaign to clear Jehol province of Communist forces, using the 13th Army and elements of the 53rd and 93rd Armies. Moving from Chaoyang, Chinhsien, Suichung, Chinwangtao area, Govt troops took Chengte on 30 Aug. The National Govt reported the capture of Chifeng, northeast of Chengte, on 4 Sept and claimed by the occupation of this city the campaign in Jehol had been virtually brought to a conclusion. A report from an Executive Headquarters field team in Chifeng, however, establishes that it was still in Communist hands on 28 Sept. The ultimate fall of the city to the National Govt, however, may be taken as a foregone conclusion.
The loss of Jehol province was a severe blow to the Communists, as it resulted in the cutting of their line of communications between Kalgan and Manchuria. On the other hand, by taking Jehol the National Govt has virtually removed the Communist threat to a large part of the railway from Shanhaikuan to Changchun and has greatly strengthened their hold on the deep salient which they have driven into Manchuria.
After taking Jehol, the Govt moved against the Communists in eastern Hopei. Columns advanced south from Chengte, east from Peiping, north from Tientsin, and west from Chinwangtao. By the 15th of September Communist strongholds in Tsunhua and Chihsien had been taken, and all passes on the Great Wall from Kupeikou to Iyusoko were in Govt hands.
National Govt forces are now moving on Kalgan, the largest and most important city in the hands of the Communists south of the Great Wall. Columns are reported converging on Kalgan from Lung-hua, Peiping, and Kueisui. The troops composing the last named column are part of the forces of Fu Tso-yi, chairman of Suiyuan province, who is considered one of the Gimo’s ablest generals. Feng-chen, 27 miles north of Tatung, was taken on 18 Sept and Chining was occupied on 11 Sept by these troops. The natural defenses of Kalgan are strong. Even so, it is doubted if the Communists will fight hard for the place, although its loss will be a bitter pill for the Reds to swallow.
From the above it appears clear that the National Govt is now on the offensive against the principal Communist forces south of the Great Wall. Thus far Govt forces have been generally successful. In Manchuria, except in Jehol, the Govt is apparently waiting for the Gimo to give the signal for an attack on Harbin. National Govt [Page 235] military leaders are straining at the leash; eager to strike at the Communists while they are weak. The Communists are not expected to fight for Harbin or Tsitsihar, and Lin Piao, commanding Communist forces in Manchuria, is reported to have already moved its headquarters from Harbin to Chiamussu.
Observers who have followed the course of the recent fighting between the National Govt and the Communists are generally agreed that the Communists cannot win either in attack or defense in a toe-to-toe slugging match with National Govt forces. On the average, the equipment and training of Communist forces are inferior to those of the National Govt. The morale, physical condition, and clothing of the Communist forces in existence at the time the Japs surrendered were generally good, but these troops have been heavily diluted with recruits, and veteran organizations have been broken up into cadres to organize and train new units. Furthermore, although the Communists undoubtedly acquired considerable equipment from the Jap and puppet forces in Manchuria, much of this has been expended in recent operations throughout China, and from all indications they have been having difficulties with supply. No definite proof has been brought to light that the Communists are receiving Soviet equipment.
Favoring the Communists are the facts that they have had long experience in guerilla warfare and have almost unlimited room in which to maneuver. Consequently, while they cannot risk a decisive engagement with the National Govt forces, the latter have never been able to fix the former into position and administer an annihilating blow.
It appears a foregone conclusion that the National Government will take Harbin as soon as the Generalissimo gives the nod. Also, as the new 6th Army, one of the corps d’élite of Chinese forces, is now stationed in and around Anshan, a move on Antung appears likely and may have already begun. The capture of Antung would greatly strengthen the Government hold on Manchuria and would push the Communists farther away from vitally important lines of communication.
The resumption of full-scale operations in Manchuria, now held in abeyance, would be the last step toward all-out civil war. When this stage is reached, it is considered unlikely that the National Government will attempt operations south of the Wall on a much larger scale than at present.
The present Government offensive south of the Wall could continue successfully for from 3 to 6 months. If and when fighting again breaks out in Manchuria, the National Government should be able to push the Communists around almost at will for a similar period.
Eventually, however, probably at the latest about 6 months after [Page 236] the outbreak of full-scale civil war, it is believed that the Government offensive would bog down. The advance of Government forces beyond their present positions would lengthen lines of communication and require more forces to protect them. Supplies would become increasingly difficult to obtain and to deliver to the forces at the front. During a successful period of the National Government offensive, it is believed the Communists will concentrate their efforts on avoiding attacks with as small losses as possible, at the same time attempting to wear their adversaries down by harrassing and nibbling tactics.
After a Nationalist offensive has spent itself, the Communists will have the opportunity to exploit their strongest potentiality, which is to attack the lines of communication by which National Government forces are supplied, and trade, the lifeblood of China, is carried on. Thus the general situation is expected eventually to resolve itself into a stalemate. In this the National Government will hold the coast, the principal centers of population, and most of the lines of communication. The Communists will be driven into the hinterland, from whence they will have more or less favorable opportunities to strike at lines of communication.
In such a stalemate, the National Government, if it can maintain lines of communication as well as the Japanese did, will have won the war, for even with fighting going on in many parts of the country China will not suffer too much if the main arteries of communication can be kept fairly well open. If, however, as some qualified observers believe the Communists are able to paralyze communications on a large scale, China can very easily be brought to a state of economic chaos in which the people, except for small groups of the well to do living in the largest cities will suffer untold misery. Such a state, assuming there is no interference from outside China, might continue for many years.
In view of recent changes in the organization of the Chinese Army, it is difficult to estimate its strength, but it is believed that the National Government still has about 1,700,000 troops, of which an estimated 300,000 are in Manchuria. Communist forces in Manchuria are believed to number around 300,000 of which only 60,000 [apparent omission] are 8th Route and New 4th Army veterans. The remainder are composed partly of recruits raised in Manchuria and partly of a heterogeneous collection of old Manchurian forces, former puppets, bandits, and other elements. The veterans as noted above, have not been retained as tactical units, but have been split into cadres in an attempt to have them assist the inferior forces.
The principal areas which are now held by the Communist forces are as follows:
[Here follows list of areas.]
[Page 237]There are other Communist pockets scattered throughout China, but they are of minor importance and whether or not these pockets are ever cleared will not materially affect the immediate future of this country. [”]