Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 10, 1946, 5:15 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
General Yu Ta-wei opened the meeting by producing a map showing situation with respect to the railroads in Northern China. General Yu pointed out that the Communists had interfered with, and very seriously interrupted rail traffic in Shansi province.
General Yu then asked General Marshall if he had as yet taken up with General Chou En-lai the Communist attack on Tatung. General Marshall informed General Yu Ta-wei that he had, by reading to General Chou a part of the statement contained in General Hsu Yung-chang’s memorandum73 on this subject; however, General Chou made no reply at that time.
General Yu asked General Marshall what the results were of his conference with General Chou En-lai. General Marshall stated that nothing definite had been accomplished, and he told General Yu that the Communists felt, as a result of the Generalissimo’s recent terms, that they were being pressed into a corner because of the additional severity of the terms. General Marshall then stated that the Communists felt that the Government did not want an agreement but instead negotiated only to gain time for progressive military operations; that the Government intends to abandon the PCC agreements and that each Government move is in an effort to discount further considerations of PCC agreements and procedure.
General Marshall told General Yu Ta-wei that in discussing these terms with Dr. Stuart, General Chou said that the Communists had already made great concessions such as agreement for garrisoning Government troops in Harbin; evacuation of the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad; receded from their demand for two additional divisions in Manchuria; etc. Every time General Chou discusses these matters, however, he brings up the question of civil administration and points out that giving up of administrative control in areas evacuated by their troops is in effect abandonment of the PCC agreements. Also, in General Chou’s talks he freely discusses the proposition of United States assistance. General Chou points out that ships, arms, munitions and planes have all been turned over by the United States to [Page 1506] National Government, with which the National Government is now fighting the Communists. At the same time the Communists get no equipment or support from the United States and are therefore quite resentful over the fact that the means whereby the Nationalist Forces wage war with the Communists are products of the United States. General Chou states that this is one of the big factors in the An Ping incident.
General Marshall then stressed to General Yu that it appeared to him that the principal concern of the Communists stems from their anxiety to fully implement PCC agreements, or conversely that their feeling that the National Government is not only not interested in implementing the PCC agreement but seeks to bury such implications.
General Yu Ta-wei admitted that there was a general deterioration in the situation and blamed this deterioration on the fact that the Communist theory with regard to the implementation of the PCC agreements was fine but that their actions did not correspond to this theory. General Marshall differed with General Yu Ta-wei in that he attributed the deterioration of the situation more to the fact that both sides entered into retaliatory military operations with reference to the acts or omissions of the other side. General Marshall added that the trouble with the Government was that they had completely failed to evaluate the effect of Government actions on the Communists and that instead the Government only evaluated its own fear of the Communists’ activities. In this connection General Marshall stated he felt that the Generalissimo did not hear of the gross misconduct on the part of Military Commanders, but instead only hears of the same sort of conduct on the part of Communist Commanders; thus his approach to most of the Military aspects is unrealistic.
General Yu stated that General Chou was an extremely able and liberal-minded man with high integrity but he expressed the opinion that General Chou did not represent the true mentality of the Communist people as a group. General Marshall agreed that he was a liberal and said he believed that if General Chou occupied the key position in the new Coalition government he, because of his liberal ideas, would not necessarily adhere strictly to the Communist platform.
General Marshall stated that the Generalissimo did not want Communism in his Government and then he asked General Yu what the alternative might be. General Marshall continued by stating that the present tactics of the Kuomintang were such that its obstruction of Communism in the government, in the long run, would create conditions favorable for a communistic regime. For instance, a continuation of the present scale of military operations undoubtedly will cause [Page 1507] a financial crash, most likely a party dissolution, dissension among party members, and strife and civil war on a large scale. He added that all these factors were fruitful breeding grounds for Communism.
- No. 1049, August 9, not printed.↩