893.00/8–746
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 25.]
Sir: On my return from Kuling on presenting my credentials, which I reported in my first despatch;56 I became so concerned about the news brought to me of developments within China—economic, fiscal, military and psychological, et cetera—and the reports reaching me of public opinion in the United States that instead of following my original plan to go to Peiping to wind up my affairs there, after consulting with General Marshall, I made another trip to Kuling on July 27 to bring these impressions as earnestly as I could to the attention of President Chiang Kai-shek and to urge him more strongly than I had before to adopt a modification of policy as soon as possible.
Unfortunately I was taken ill the morning after my arrival in Kuling and had to spend the next few days in bed. It was possible, however, to keep in touch with him through two trusted young Chinese, one of whom is his personal secretary and a former student of mine. In fact, it proved possible thus to go into greater detail in these matters and into a proposal that I had formulated than would have been the case in an initial personal visit. It also gave him time to think over what he knew I would myself state.
The opportunity to talk frankly with him came on the afternoon of August 1. After telling him why I had felt constrained to make this trip, I went on to say that it seemed to me that the continuation of the conferences between the Government and the Communist Party, which had been going on for months, did not apparently hold out much hope of reaching an adequate solution, and in any case would tend in the future as in the past to futile delays. I drew upon such [Page 1466] arguments as I thought would prove most effective and presented them so as to accord with President Chiang’s psychology. I stressed that he was losing more than he could hope to gain by permitting a continuation of fighting in what had come to be tantamount to an undeclared civil war. I called attention to the great assets that were now his, but indicated that by senseless dissipation they were dwindling away. I expatiated on these two advantages, namely his own personal popularity and truly national position which gave him the ability to rally the vast majority of his fellow countrymen, including the Communists, under a banner of enlightenment and reform held by him and inspired by him with something of the patriotic fervor and sacrificial devotion which the Kuomintang originally had; and secondly, the fact that the United States Government and American people wanted precisely those things for China which nearly all Chinese desired and were still willing to do their utmost to help in their realization.
Then as to concrete suggestions I proposed that there be set up an informal committee of two or more members of the two parties, the Government representatives to be appointed, of course, by himself. I indicated that I would be willing, if he wished, to sit with such a group in an effort to reach agreements to break the present deadlock. If such an understanding could be achieved between the two principal political units, the Steering Committee of ten, representing five political units, could almost certainly give a formal character to such arrangements, and steps could be taken promptly for the calling of the State Council of forty members, which would be one important element in forming the proposed coalition government. Meanwhile, the cease-fire order might be given by himself and would in that case certainly be followed by one from Yenan. I told him that I had gone over this whole proposal with General Marshall, who had given his full approval. President Chiang agreed to all that I had said but expressed the opinion that in view of the attack on the United States Marines near Peiping, we had better do nothing until General Marshall could return to Kuling and bring more information about the developments growing out of that occurrence. I told him that the doctor would not allow me to leave the mountain before that time, and he humorously added that he would not either.
General Marshall arrived on August 3, and he and I went over the whole situation carefully the following morning. It was then possible following the clarification of the attack on the Marines and the recession of this incident to obtain a definitive authorization from President Chiang to proceed with my proposal.
At the risk of seeming repetitious, I should like to summarize President Chiang’s attitude towards the Communists, since so much centers [Page 1467] in the personality and psychology of this one man. He has no faith in the aims of the Communist Party, and he points out in great detail and with many illustrations how he has been dealing with them for over twenty years and has tried unsuccessfully by what he regards as every practicable method to come to some sort of workable basis with them. He is convinced that this problem of bringing unity to China is very much aggravated by the help which in subtle ways the Chinese Communists derive from Soviet Russia. His own instinct and his realistic appraisal of actual conditions in the country prevent him from acceding to his closest advisers, who would undoubtedly like to exterminate or at least attempt to suppress the Communists by armed force, although he must at times feel keenly in sympathy with them. He seems to have an impression that by not becoming too impatient they will soon be in a predicament where they themselves will seek American aid and that we can then be in a much stronger position to effect a settlement. That he has been taking advantage of the failure in negotiations to press his military advantage in various strategic areas must be assumed. He would argue that this has always been because of violations of agreements on the other side and could make a fair case; and General Chou En-lai argues and acts similarly.
President Chiang is perhaps slightly bothered to know just how to deal with me. He has been genuinely solicitous about my health and urged me to lengthen my stay at Kuling until I had had more rest as well as a complete recovery, but he would also like to have me inactive a while longer.
On the evening of my return to Nanking, General Chou En-lai and one of his associates came here for dinner and stayed until after midnight. He discussed the Anping ambushed attack on the Marines at some length but gave no convincing explanation of what had happened. He strenuously denied that this was ordered from Communist headquarters or had behind it the intention of creating public opinion in America designed to lead to the withdrawal of our Marines from that area. Yet, he made it very clear that Chinese Communists strongly objected to the aid thus given to the Nationalist forces.
I gave him the conditions which President Chiang regarded as prerequisite to the creation of the informal committee which he and I had discussed before my departure for Kuling. In substance these conditions are:
- 1.
- The withdrawal of Communist forces from North Kiangsu to north of the Lung-Hai Railway.
- 2.
- Their withdrawal from the Tsingtao–Tsinan Railway line.
- 3.
- Their withdrawal from the city of Chengte and from the province of Jehol, south of that city.
- 4.
- Their withdrawal from Manchuria into an area comprising two and one-half provinces lying roughly to the northwest.
- 5.
- The evacuation of towns entered by them subsequent to June 7.
- 6.
- The relinquishment of civil administration, especially in North Kiangsu, although Communist Party headquarters would be allowed in each city previously occupied by them.
General Chou En-lai said that it would be impossible to consider this proposal which he characterized as a high-handed and dictatorial unilateral action. I reminded him that President Chiang was, after all, the head of the recognized government of the country and that in any case, these terms could be regarded as final as far as he was concerned. If rejected, I did not see how a widespread civil war could be averted and reminded him of the disastrous consequences to the population and to the nation. He argued strenuously that the responsibility would not be with the Communists in that case but with the Government. He insisted also that there was nothing in these conditions which had not been discussed in General Marshall’s conferences and that they really belonged there as unfinished items. He attempted to maintain that the demands have been increased since the previous summary on June 29,57 the day before the termination of the truce, but, of course, he really meant that the difficulty lay in the unwillingness of the Communists to meet in full condition number 6, the consequence of which they genuinely seem to fear.
I tried to avoid the impression of being too much of an advocate of the Government point of view, while making very clear my distress at the apparent inevitability of continued and long drawn-out hostilities. We are waiting until the return of General Marshall from Kuling in a day or two to discuss further procedure.
The net result of my conversations with President Chiang and with the Communist spokesman is that we at least know how irreconcilable are the attitudes of the two parties. Otherwise, I have not yet succeeded in improving the situation.
I shall report again promptly after discussing the matter with General Marshall in the light of these latest efforts.
Respectfully yours,