Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and General Marshall at General Marshall’s Residence, Nanking, May 17, 1946, 10 a.m.

Nanking, May 17, 1946, 10 a.m.

General Chou stated that he would like first to discuss a few points and then come to the Manchurian problem separately. The first problem is the one in North Kiangsu. General Chou learned from Colonel Caughey day before yesterday that the Government seems not enthusiastic about going now and they would go if General Marshall insists. Yesterday he read the message from Peiping which said that the field team was in Nantung and everything is quiet, but no details have been given. However, the newspapers are still making a lot of propaganda about that area saying that the Communists are going to attack the Kuomintang, but actually from the information General Chou has received there are to the north of the Yangtze River five National Armies and that there are also troops north of Hsuchow. General Ku Tu Tung [Chu-tung?] who came down a few days ago returned yesterday and General Pai also left for Manchuria. As far as General Chou has learned they are planning their schemes of attack. At this moment General Chou is not informed as to the Government’s intention toward North Kiangsu, whether the situation can be stabilized at this time when we are working toward the settlement of the Manchurian problem. General Chou hopes that no more confusion will arise in North Kiangsu.

General Marshall asked for identification of North Kiangsu.

General Chou stated it was the Nantung area up to a point south of the Lunghai railroad. The whole area. General Chou suggested that a special committee fly to Huai-an the afternoon of 17 May and have a briefing by the field team. He stated that he thought the Government side have a lot of information about their own side, but he could learn the information about his side. General Chou stated that it might be possible to reach some sort of an agreement, or we can bring all the problems back for discussion in Nanking, but in any event, a true picture of the situation in North Kiangsu would be obtained. General Chou stated that he thought that sort of an arrangement would not delay the discussion about the Manchurian problem, about which General Chou would discuss with General Marshall individually.

General Marshall asked Colonel Caughey’s opinion on flying to Huai-an.

Colonel Caughey stated that he believed Executive Headquarters would think they were being circumvented when the Committee of Three would send a special committee to this area, however the importance may warrant the dispatch of the committee. However, a full report should be in today from the Executive Headquarters. It may be very difficult to set up an airplane for a trip this afternoon.

General Marshall told Colonel Caughey to inquire as to the availability of the plane and then find out from General Hsu if he is agreeable to flying up there today, probably to be there about two hours.

General Chou stated that he had learned that the airfield at Huai-an has been strafed by the Kuomintang planes recently and the field team went out on hearing the roaring of the planes and they collected one or two American bullets from the ground. At the same time, about one or two days previous, another plane strafed a point south of Huai-an. General Chou stated he was afraid that the field team may not be able to terminate fighting and the papers are still making propaganda and the situation actually is getting more and more serious.

General Marshall stated he was a little confused as to General Chou’s presentation. The field is within the Communist-controlled area. General Marshall asked if that was correct and General Chou replied in the affirmative. General Marshall stated that if a plane was sent in without careful preliminary arrangements, fire might be received from the field. He asked General Chou if that was a possibility.

General Chou felt certain that no incident will occur from the ground like firing because it would be an American transport plane and that can be easily determined. Also General Chou had sent wires through Peiping to Huai-an saying that probably he may come in the near future.

General Marshall stated that he was having Colonel Caughey inquire about the plane and to inquire about the Central Government individual. He inquired as to whether General Chou felt the matter so urgent that it should be this afternoon rather than tomorrow.

General Chou stated that it was immaterial to him, but he was thinking if we could go today he could have a talk with General Marshall tomorrow evening, therefore he would prefer to go today. However, if it is a physical impossibility to go today, of course, we should go tomorrow.

General Marshall stated that Col. Caughey feels that the team has not got back from Nantung by jeep. It would possibly take 24 hours to get a report from the team because we would have to go through Peiping and down to the team and back through Peiping.

General Chou stated that in that case it might be better to wait for a message from Peiping.

General Marshall told Colonel Hutchins to tell Colonel Caughey to make inquiry about the plane but not to contact the Central Government people yet, also to get off immediately a rush message to Peiping to find out where that team is.

General Marshall asked General Chou if his delegates arrived and General Chou replied affirmatively indicating that they had an unusual experience for when the plane came down all the engines were dead. The plane was a CNAC plane with an American pilot who was able to bring the plane in safely. General Marshall stated that it was his opinion that the American pilot would be rather dubious about his position and that the Americans were having a lot of difficulty with the servicing of planes due to the demobilization and that it would not be until June that trained men would be coming back in.

Coming to the Manchurian problem, General Chou stated he had conveyed General Marshall’s idea to Yenan and Yenan is still contemplating his idea, but at the same time they have to ask the opinion of the Communist leaders in Manchuria. General Chou stated he would like to use this interval to hear more of General Marshall’s opinions in order that he may feel more assured in his discussions with Yenan. For example, General Marshall mentioned that troops of both parties should keep away from Changchun and that the Executive Headquarters should send certain persons into Changchun. Regarding this matter, General Chou wanted to clarify his understanding that after cessation of hostilities, a branch headquarters of the Executive Headquarters will be set up in Changchun to deal with the matters there. However, the withdrawal of the Communist troops may take some time and it will be a little while before Executive Headquarters will work. In the meantime field teams will be sent into Manchuria to stop fighting.

Regarding the administration of Changchun General Chou learned from the Democratic League their three points:

1. Regarding the reorganization of Political and Economic Council in Manchuria, a ratio of 3–3–3 should be adopted and a suitable man should be selected as the chairman. The Democratic League have suggest[ed] Mo Tuh-hui or Chang Kung Chuan. The office of the reorganized council will be set up in Changchun.

2. Regarding the magistrate of Changchun, the mayor should be neither Kuomintang or Communist Party, but a middle man. However, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will participate in the magistrate council.

3. Regarding the social security the Democratic League suggest that the security will be handled by the police organized by the magistrate and to be essentially neutral in character. No secret police will be absorbed into this organization.

The Democratic League has conveyed these three points to General Chou, but he has not contacted them again and he would like to know what comments you may have on these points which refer to Changchun itself.

General Chou stated that General Marshall in their last meeting had stated that the cessation of firing in Manchuria will be dealt with in connection with all the problems in Manchuria. General Chou requested General Marshall’s further views regarding these matters. General Chou stated that his own ideas were stated in Chungking, which in the main were: regarding the political council of Manchuria and various provinces, they should be reorganized. Right now the Kuomintang has appointed their own Governments and the Communist Party has also conducted elections of provincial governments and now remains the problem of how to reorganize those governments. Regarding the different tsiens [hsiens] or counties, General Chou stated that self-government can be introduced according to the joint platform adopted by the PCC.

Regarding communications, all kinds of communications should be restored and the communications should be put under interim administrative council of Manchuria.

Regarding the military aspects, General Chou thought that discussion of the army reorganization plan for Manchuria had to be based on the actual conditions in Manchuria. However, it would be necessary to discuss the adjustment of the ratio of strengths of garrison troops in Manchuria.

In the economic aspect the interim administrative council will distinguish between what should be run by the people and what by the Government, which again may be divided into state council or provincially operated. Regarding the above General Chou would like to continue to discuss with General Marshall as well as with the Democratic League.

The third subject General Chou brought up was the situation in China proper. General Chou stated that he understood that General Marshall the other day mentioned that the solution of Manchurian problem will be taken up in connection with the cease fire agreement, the PCC decisions, the army reorganization plan, the draft constitution and the freedom of rights. All these problems should be solved as a whole and that as soon as the Manchurian problem is solved, all the other problems should be solved at the same time. General Chou stated he would like to know how it can be arranged that while the Manchurian problem was being discussed, the steering committee of the PCC can also solve all the other problems relating to China as a whole. General Chou said the above was his understanding of General Marshall’s statement and desired General Marshall’s comment as to whether it was a correct interpretation.

General Marshall stated that in the first place, what he endeavored to explain to General Chou the other day was in regard to his withdrawal from the position of a mediator in connection with the Manchurian problem. General Marshall had told General Chou that he would, or had, thought of possible compromises, but that his position, particularly with regard to the Government had been made so difficult through the Communist attack on Changchun that General Marshall had felt it was no longer possible, or politically desirable with relation to the U. S. Government for him to remain in the public eye as the mediator on the Manchurian question. General Marshall stated that perhaps the expression, “public eye” is not just what he meant. He had reference, really to the eye of the officials concerned in the Communist side and the Central Government. He stated that in further explanation of his position he endeavored to point out that it would be impossible for him to resume the role of an attempted mediator unless he was sure in a very definite manner what the position of the Communist Party would be regarding both military and political issues. In other words, General Marshall could never again place himself in the position of being a party to an agreement which included in its provisions an arrangement for the negotiations regarding vital matters unless he knew at the time what actually were the prospects of reaching an agreement in these negotiations rather than the almost certainty of the development of a stalemate. It was in explanation of that point of view that he referred to the various issues—Changchun, the future military strength of the Government and the Communist Party in Manchuria, the dispositions of forces later on, the political arrangements for the interim period and possibly in the future. Now in the interest of peace, General Marshall did not mind discussing these various details with General Chou, but General Marshall stated he must reserve his right in doing so to refrain from stepping again into the role of mediator.

At this point Colonel Caughey reported that a message had been received from Peiping.

General Marshall said that the radio stated that the Huai-an people are not in contact with the team. The National people in Nantung report that the team went out on the 13th to a point 32 miles north west of Nantung and that is the last they have heard. They also report that the team was fired on and the interpreter was hit in the shoulder. Hence, the team’s location is not known right now. General Marshall asked for General Chou’s opinion in the circumstances.

General Chou asked Colonel Caughey the filing time of the message which was sent to him and Colonel Caughey stated that the message said that team 17 left Huai-an for Nantung on the 10th and arrived on the 11th. This other message said they left on the 13th.

General Chou stated that it looked like we would have to await a report from the team until we learned their whereabouts.

General Marshall told Colonel Caughey that it would be best for a reconnaissance to be made and also to call up Admiral Cooke, as General Marshall was talking to him about sending out a picket boat.

General Marshall stated that with regard to Changchun, what was in his mind was, that once a state of oral agreement had been arrived at by the Central Government and the Communists, arrangements should be made by General Chou for the immediate reception in Changchun of the various elements of the headquarters to be set up by the Executive Headquarters in Changchun. At the same time, the Central Government and the Communist Party should issue orders for their field commanders that an arrangement was about to be reached for the termination of hostilities and that in the interim there would be no advances, attacks or pursuits. In other words, we would not endeavor to issue a cease firing instruction without having a very careful arrangement for its execution, but all aggressive action would be stopped. Now, the Executive Headquarters being set up in Changchun the procedure of the withdrawal of the Communist troops would be initiated and as they withdrew the Executive Headquarters in Changchun would take the necessary steps to secure an orderly government in the city. At the same time the various teams, of which there should certainly be at least three or four, would be deployed from Changchun to carry into effect at an agreed time the complete cessation of hostilities and the necessary readjustments of troops to secure such cessation. It would also be the duty of that advance section of the Executive Headquarters to direct the action of the teams throughout Manchuria to bring about a cessation of hostilities and necessary readjustment of troops.

General Marshall continued by stating as to the character of government to be either continued or installed in Changchun, he had not gone into that in his own mind except that it should be an impartial government and that it should be either confirmed or installed by Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall stated that his next thoughts were related to the military agreements that would have to be reached in the subsequent negotiations. General Chou had spoken of the reconsideration of the eventual strengths and had said that from General Marshall’s point of view he would have to know what they had in mind beyond a mere general statement. General Marshall stated he would have to know what the Communist Party would insist upon in relation to future dispositions of troops. How would this new strength of the Communist troops be disposed, in what areas, under what conditions. There are two phases one of which is the interim arrangement during which a demobilization on the Communist side as well as reduction of troops on the Government side would have to be carried out simultaneously. There would not only have to be an agreement as to this, but so far as General Marshall was concerned there would have to be a very precise agreement as to supervision because neither side would trust the other. Therefore, neither side would reduce unless they had positive evidence that at the same time the other side was making a corresponding reduction. In order to bring about such a new situation, it would apparently be necessary to expedite action beyond the original demobilization and reorganization schedule, in order to reach a troop disposition in the near future rather than 18 months later. In relation to troop dispositions, General Marshall would have to know in considerable detail what would be the insistent demands of the Communists, both as to the gradual development of the new dispositions and what those dispositions were to be in the end.

Now as to the political aspects, there the necessity for a detailed understanding of the Communist demands would not only be necessary, but there would be the further difficulty of General Marshall’s own ignorance as to the points of view in the matter. The proposal of the Democratic League for the reorganization of the political council and economic council was reduced to writing⁶⁹ by Gen. Marshall at Chungking after Mr. Lu and Carson Chang presented it and he handed it to the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo would not commit himself for the reason that he would not consider any matters until the Changchun issue was settled, but General Marshall gathered a rather definite impression that either the Generalissimo did not welcome the general proposal or it may have been the names proposed. General Marshall stated he did not know which.

General Marshall stated that so far as he was concerned he had no basis at that time or has none today for discussing the above, except to say this. General Marshall understood General Chou to suggest that the reorganized political council would in turn handle the reorganization of the local governments. General Marshall asked General Chou if the last impression was correct and General Chou stated that the political council would in turn handle the reorganization of the various provincial governments.

General Marshall stated it was his opinion that at the moment the above would theoretically look good, but he would be fearful of it as a practical proposition, except for mere details. He stated that by that he meant there would have to be a detailed understanding on the highest level as to, in general, what would be the nature of the reorganization. General Marshall stated that he spoke, the other day, of the fact that General Chou had referred to the fact that the Government has appointed 9 governors and the Communist Party has elected 8. General Marshall asked what their firm intentions were. General Marshall stated that with the suspicions, fears and animosities, the general procedure of the negotiations by a reorganized political council, there would be, General Marshall thought, little chance of either reaching a satisfactory agreement in these matters or providing one which the two parties would confirm. In other words, going back to General Marshall’s first statement, as far as he was concerned, he would not enter into this with the probability of a stalemate following the cessation of hostilities. There is nothing which General Marshall more urgently desires, at the present time than a cessation of hostilities, but General Marshall stated he was forced to refrain from aggressive action to bring about such a cessation unless he had good reason to feel that the subsequent negotiations could be successfully concluded. The present difficulties being met on a much lower level in Peiping regarding where the teams will go and when they will go is the best evidence of the extraordinary difficulty in conducting negotiations regarding such vital matters as those to be handled in Manchuria, on a basis of unanimous agreement. General Marshall stated he was even doubtful about the practical aspect of an advance section of Executive Headquarters being able to carry out its functions in Changchun on a unanimous agreement basis. The distrust is so great, the suspicions are so far-reaching regarding even the most trivial matters, the propaganda on both sides is so intense that a solution on an ordinary basis is almost impossible, unless somebody could be found who would be trusted. General Marshall stated he was talking then about Changchun. He asked General Chou in conclusion if he had made his position and thoughts clear.

General Chou stated that regarding the first subject, General Marshall intimated that he would withdraw from the role as a mediator and General Chou wished to be cleared on that point. Does that mean that General Marshall would not mediate unless some way has been reached to solve the Changchun problem or does it mean that he must have an over-all solution of all the problems relating to Manchuria.

General Marshall stated he meant that he did not feel that he could place his Government in the position of again becoming involved in a stalemate. He felt that it was not only useless for him to attempt to influence the Generalissimo to abandon his fixed idea regarding Changchun, but that it was probably a bad thing for the continuation of a hope that General Marshall was still in the position of possibly bringing about a solution. General Marshall stated that he also meant that regarding the over-all problem in Manchuria that he would not involve himself in the matter unless he had a fair hope of a practical basis of solution without a stalemate because he felt that another stalemate would not only still more depreciate any influence he might have but it would also inevitably result in the resumption of hostilities. General Marshall stated that he felt that if he were to go into the matter in Manchuria in a definite way he would have to be assured in his own mind that there was a reasonable hope of a successful negotiation rather than to find a basis for the termination of hostilities by merely establishing the principle that there would be a negotiation. General Chou kindly outlined at General Marshall’s request in Chungking, four points that would be covered in special negotiations. What General Marshall was talking about would be the stand of the Communist Party in regard to these several issues. The only definite thing General Marshall had at the present time was the basis for the reorganization of the economic and political council and there General Chou has been quite definite, at least in representing the views of the Democratic League, but when it comes to a new proposition of the troop strengths in Manchuria, General Marshall would not put himself in the position of being involved, unless he knew pretty well what the demands of the Communist Party would be, so that he could have the opportunity of debating the matter with General Chou before he ever got himself involved with the Generalissimo, which would be approximately the procedure he had followed in connection with the military reorganization.

When it comes to the provincial governors, that is a hard nut to crack, with, I imagine [said General Marshall], each side taking a very decided stand. Possibly so decided that it could not be resolved by negotiation. Therefore, General Marshall would not involve himself in that unless he had a pretty good understanding of whether there was a possibility of reaching an agreement without a stalemate. He stated that possibly his position had not been clearly understood by General Chou because he may have failed to tell General Chou in discussing his proposal that there be a negotiation after the cessation of hostilities and in presenting the proposal of the Democratic League as to the creation of a special committee of three, the Generalissimo’s comment to that was that he didn’t think he could accept such a committee arrangement, that he would want the Committee of Three, which of course would not only involve me [him], but would put me [him] in as chairman. That, in the region of Manchuria and in the nature of the existing situation, immediately caused General Marshall to feel that he would have to be very careful of the position in which he placed the U. S. Government and he could not lead them, through his presence, into the unfortunate predicament of another stalemate.

General Marshall stated that that may explain his position a little better to General Chou, but he wished to add another point. General Marshall felt that in settling the Manchurian problem, we would have to go, as was said the other day, clear across the board, which involves the steering committee of the Kuomintang, involves railroad fortifications, involves what we tried to cure the other day,⁷⁰ but General Marshall doubted whether the cure was effective, the handling of teams, and would certainly involve the problem of continued troop movements in North China. Now, to what degree he could successfully exert an influence on the steering committee he did not know. General Marshall stated that frankly, he thought the political leaders in the Kuomintang feel that he had lead them into the present situation and that they certainly do not look on him with favor. He stated he did not see it that way, but the hostility evidently remains.

General Chou asked if General Marshall meant the steering committee of the Kuomintang.

General Marshall stated he meant the controlling members of the Kuomintang. He stated that he might add this regarding the steering committee of the Kuomintang. He was not certain that he even knew who the members are and that he had never talked to them. He has been told their feelings, that General Marshall’s advice to the Chinese Government has been proven wrong and, of course the implication to that is don’t take any more of his advice. Further, the consequence of that feeling is that General Marshall must be very certain that he doesn’t land in another stalemate. Pie stated in conclusion that he wanted General Chou to understand that he was perfectly willing, glad as a matter of fact, to discuss all these various details with him to see if within his own mind he could feel he had a basis of possible mediation and negotiation which would work out successfully. If so, General Marshall stated he would be glad to do his part. So far as Manchuria is concerned, the discussions would have to be with General Chou because the Communist Party has taken the aggressive role and are in a position of bringing to a halt the Central Government’s efforts. In the present situation, General Marshall would be unwilling to discuss these matters in the Committee of Three. He would confine his action on the Committee to North China, to try to keep that quiet while efforts were being made to see whether anything could be done in Manchuria to terminate the fighting.

General Marshall stated he had thought of discussing with the Government and with General Chou the question of suppressing this propaganda campaign. However, he decided he must not do that at the present time. He deplored it, but unless some basis for stopping the fighting could be reached, he did not feel that he could take any measures in regard to that. For example, the Chinese Government has secured the services of a Mr. Beal as an advisor in relation to their public relations. They did that largely at my [his] suggestion, but General Marshall felt that since Mr. Beal’s arrival that he could not even discuss these things with him because of his, Beal’s, status with the Central Government and General Marshall’s peculiar position at the present time.

General Chou stated that after listening to General Marshall he realized his difficulty and he guessed that certain people in the Government do not look upon him with favor because they are not willing to work out measures on a genuine basis for the peace and democracy in China. General Chou stated that not only some political leaders, but some military leaders as well, have the same idea. General Pai has now departed for Manchuria and General Chou stated he is sure his mission is not toward the end we are working for here. Certain troops are trying to provoke war in China proper, such as in North Kiangsu, in Shantung, in Hopeh. General Chou stated he shares the same feelings that there is not enough protection for the field teams right now and General Chou stated he was afraid that there are plots to injure the field teams and therefore to provoke war.

Regarding the press, General Chou understood when you [General Marshall] told him the other day that you [he] could not step out to correct the comment of the Sian spokesman. However, yesterday the Central Daily News editorial again emphasized this point, that General Marshall offered that proposal. General Chou is sure their design is simply to place General Marshall in a difficult position and to cause dissension. That is the tactics they use for propaganda, but General Chou stated he would like to call attention to the fact that the Chinese people are still looking hopefully toward peace and he hoped that General Marshall could find comfort in their sincere desire for peace. At least, General Chou stated, we are trying to improve the situation, to find some way of settlement in spite of the difference of views. General Chou stated they would try their best to correct the propaganda situation. General Chou stated that while we are trying to solve the Manchurian problem, efforts would be made to try to localize the war in North China and China Proper so that it will not flare up. In the meantime, views will be exchanged on the Manchurian situation with an end to find a solution and to make the proposal to the Generalissimo.

General Chou said that what General Marshall has said to him today had given him quite a clear picture, but he wished to make another study and then to see if he could bring some detailed points for discussion. All efforts will be made for an over-all settlement, but General Chou expressed his fear that while discussions are in progress, the situation will become deteriorated because he knew and he could tell General Marshall confidentially that while General Pai was still here and General Ku was coming here they discussed action to be taken to prolong the war in Manchuria. The plan is that the Government troops would assemble in South Manchuria and then make an over-all attack on Changchun. That will also provoke war in North China along the Tientsin–Pukow railway. Outwardly they would make it appear that the Communists were attacking and they were meeting the attack. There has been a meeting attended by Gen. Pai at which Mr. Chen and T. V. Soong attended and they discussed measures that would be taken if no financial assistance from the U. S. were forthcoming—how they would overcome the financial difficulties in the three or four months for supporting the civil war. They are contemplating how to procure money which will be a further strain on the Chinese people. Since General Ho was criticized by all sides he is replaced by General Pai, but General Pai is only a scapegoat in this arrangement. If he fares well, he will be used but if he does not meet success, he will be kicked out at any time.

General Chou stated that no matter what happens, he will do his best because that is his mission. Regarding the point referred to he would like an opportunity to study it. At the same time, we must try to get the best efforts to stop the fighting in Manchuria before it conflagrates into China proper.

General Marshall stated he would like to add one thing. Several times he has talked of what, to his mind, is one of the greatest difficulties in finding a solution. That is the lack of appreciation of each side of the fears of the other. Instead of evaluating the fears, he stated he thought each side consulted its own fears and then estimated the other man’s intentions. General Marshall stated he said this apropos of what General Chou had just told him regarding the Government plans of action, and also in relation to the conference that T. V. Soong and Chen Li Fu attended. Gen. Marshall stated he heard the Government side of these things. He didn’t hear all they were doing, but he did hear all their fears and what they thought the Communists are doing. Then General Marshall hears General Chou, but he didn’t hear all his people are doing, but he does hear all their fears as to what the Government is doing. He stated General Chou would recall the Communists’ estimates on the troop situation in Manchuria. There, General Marshall happened to be in a position to know very accurately what had happened. General Marshall stated that he assumed that as a practical proposition in North China, that each side is very fearful of what the other is going to do and in any event proceeds to take measures to offset that possible action or at least be prepared for it. General Marshall said he would assume, for example, that the commander of the Government troops in Hupeh north of Hankow would certainly have a plan of action against that Communist army—that would be the natural military procedure, but it would only be a plan. Now when the Communist fears as to what the Government may do are considered it is very easy to reach the feeling that it is a “will do” rather than a “may do”. The difficulty is to separate the wheat from the chaff. General Marshall said he thought that there was almost a perfect equal distribution of fears at the present time in North China. When he hears both sides, he is constantly impressed with that and I lack [he lacks] an X-Ray to photograph what each side is doing. General Marshall’s only hope was in scattering enough Americans around to see, so I [he] can keep the ship trim, that is about all.

Col. Caughey reported to General Marshall at this point on the availability of the picket boat.

General Marshall stated that he agreed completely with General Chou in his desire for a speedy solution, and on his part, he would do everything to expedite a solution.

General Marshall in closing asked General Chou when he would next like to meet and General Chou said he would desire to telephone General Marshall.

69. Not found in Department files.
70. See the directive of May 14 regarding movements of field teams, p. 848.