Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 13, 1946, 3:30 p.m.
| Also present: | General Byroade |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Lt. Col. Hutchin | |
| Captain Soong | |
| Mr. Chang |
General Chou stated that he had not yet found any solution for the Manchurian problem but wished to put a stop to any further expansion [Page 844] of the ever-increasing difficult problem in North China. He cited numerous instances where the Communists were accused of violating the truce agreement. He further stated that the Kuomintang was trying its utmost to stir up trouble and eventual civil war and lay the blame on the Communists. General Chou then expressed the Communists’ wish to minimize all the difficulties in China and to remove all problems confronting Executive Headquarters. With respect to the situation in North China, General Chou stated: (1) the six point counter proposal (See incl 2)62 he made regarding the free movement of the field teams would be effective and practical. (2) Hostilities must be effectively stopped and he requested a field team be sent to Nantung area. (3) Hostilities in the Peiping and Tientsin area should be investigated. (4) He was willing to accept the Government’s proposal in the increased monetary allowance for the Canton evacuation. (5) Regarding all other matters, such as the situations existing in Potou and Liaochen areas, he said he had already requested held teams to be sent to Potou to investigate the situation.
General Marshall explained that he and General Hsu signed General Byroade’s original proposal (See incl 1)63 without meeting or discussion because it was a reasonable solution. He then said General Chou’s six point counter proposal was too complicated to be carried out. For instance, the third point, which permits inspections of troop movements of a certain size only, may prevent inspections of critical situations. He also stated that possible difficulty might arise in connection with the punishment system suggested by General Chou. Regarding the Canton situation, General Marshall said he was glad to hear of General Chou’s willingness to accept the Government’s proposal. He stated that the deadline on shipping would be May 20 and the work in evacuating all Communists should begin without delay. If it would be agreeable to General Chou, General Marshall would like to consider the matter closed. In regard to the Nantung situation, General Marshall was willing to send a team there to find out the true situation. He also would be willing to dispatch a field team to Potou. In this connection, however, General Marshall expressed concern over the diminishing effectiveness of the field teams caused by various disagreements. General Marshall said he had hoped to obviate further difficulties by the agreement previously referred to which General Chou would not sign.
At this point, General Marshall excused General Byroade, Colonel Caughey and Colonel Hutchin.
General Marshall continued by saying the diminishing prestige of the Executive Headquarters and the field teams was most serious. All [Page 845] trusums64 of the past 3 or 4 weeks showed the complete opposition of the Communist members toward any common sense action which should be taken by the teams. Many matters have been agreed to by the Committee of Three and the Commissioners but blocked by the next lower echelon—meaning the chiefs of staff. Even if the matter got through the chiefs of staff, it would be further blocked by the field teams, either by the members’ absence or unwillingness to carry out instructions. The present situation is actively promoting suspicion and the resulting mutual distrust is causing the situation to become almost hopeless.
In regard to the problem in Manchuria, General Marshall stated that he had exhausted his resources in dealing with the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo was convinced that the intention of the Communists in Manchuria was totally different from the original agreement. General Marshall believed that the Generalissimo was wrong in not agreeing to the dispatch of the field teams to Manchuria in the beginning and at the same time allowing General Tu Li-ming to proceed with fighting which led to the chaotic situation today.
General Marshall then said that he is trying to get the Americans out of China as quickly as he could, leaving only those necessary to help in reorganization and other necessary work. General Marshall further stated that if his impartiality is in doubt, then we should terminate his role of mediator.
General Marshall then mentioned the possibility of solving the Manchurian problem by the Communists’ withdrawal from Changchun and establishment of an advance echelon of the Executive Headquarters therein. The Nationalist troops would remain where they were. Further negotiations as to military disposition and political problems could then begin. General Marshall then said that even if General Chou would agree to such a proposal, he would not take it to the Generalissimo unless he knew in advance what the Communists’ demands would be in connection with necessary adjustments of the military and political situation in Manchuria. He would not be placed in the position of mediator where a stalemate was in prospect.
General Chou expressed his appreciation of General Marshall’s frankness in this matter. He agreed that the situation in North China is closely tied up with the problem in Manchuria. He stated he was very much distressed over the possibility of a civil war.
General Marshall interrupted by saying that whatever agreement could be reached in solving the Manchuria problem, a parallel solution must be found for the destruction of fortifications along the communication [Page 846] lines in North China and for the free movement of field teams. In other words, it required an overall solution.
General Chou said that he had worked hard and that his efforts had been in vain in trying to find a solution for the Manchurian problem. He said he would transmit General Marshall’s view regarding the Manchurian problem to Yenan. He agreed that the situation in North China must be prevented from worsening and the prestige of the Executive Headquarters and the field teams must be restored. He further stated that the Communists would not relax their effort in finding a peaceful solution in spite of the Kuomintang’s insincerity and efforts to stir up civil strife in China. The Kuomintang’s scheme in sabotaging the peaceful effort appears to be promoted by such Generals as Ho Ying Chin and Pei Chung Hsi. Even the Generalissimo had said in his speech to army officers in Sian that the Communists must be destroyed by force. He then expressed his view that the problem in North China must be solved first as a beginning point in solving the Manchurian problem. General Chou further stated that he would not want General Marshall to resign his effort.
General Marshall then said he hoped that General Chou would take definite steps to meet the dilemma in North China to restore the confidence in American officers. In the recent past, the Communists had a very favorable press in the U. S.—more favorable than the Kuomintang. General Marshall believed that American officers certainly were impartial and they were very impressed by Communist cooperation in their earlier career in the Executive Headquarters. But the Communists’ present policy of blocking progress had caused the Americans’ confidence in them to diminish materially. General Marshall said that he found radicals on both sides—Nationalist radicals are in the higher echelon and the Communist radicals are in lower echelons. It was comparatively easy to deal with Communist higher officials of whom he had knowledge, but their lower echelon blocked the execution of agreements by various delaying methods. This was particularly the case on the operation level in Peiping and with field teams.