Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Yu Ta-wei and General Marshall at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 8, 1946, 3 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
General Yu Ta Wei opened the meeting by stating that he had had a conference with the Generalissimo regarding the letter which General Marshall said he had received from General Chou.46 General Yu Ta Wei asked whether this letter was a request that General Marshall reenter mediations for peace in Manchuria. General Marshall [Page 821] replied in the negative indicating that the letter merely requested that he use his influence to solve the problem. General Yu then said that the Generalissimo was of the opinion that the time was not propitious for General Marshall to reenter mediation. General Marshall then pointed out to General Yu Ta Wei that if the basis of the Generalissimo’s request was to afford National Forces time to attack Changchun, then the Generalissimo’s action was ill-advised and definitely in the wrong. General Marshall further pointed out that an attack on Changchun was a great hazard in that its success or failure would preclude further negotiation for peace.
General Yu Ta Wei stated that the Generalissimo was interested in receiving from General Marshall his views on the conditions for peace in Manchuria and desired General Marshall to reduce to writing these thoughts. General Marshall indicated that he was at a handicap to express his views without first knowing the views of the Generalissimo and he was further handicapped in that he was not too familiar with the political aspects of the Manchurian situation. General Marshall stated, however, that militarily speaking he was of the opinion that Communist occupation west of Harbin toward Manchouli would probably be the best scheme, but this may not be concurred in by the Communists since they most likely would desire territory adjacent to Jehol and Chahar including Changchun or parts of the railroad. At this point, General Yu stressed the importance of placing small government forces in critical areas such as Harbin, Tsitsihar and along the railroads from Changchun toward the Northwest as symbolic of National Government occupation. General Marshall pointed out the precariousness of such a policy and stated that the National forces should concentrate in Southern Manchuria, balancing their aspirations as to zones of occupation with realistic considerations as to logistical support and probable Communist reaction to occupation elsewhere.
General Marshall told General Yu that it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to make concessions to the Communists regarding political appointees in Manchuria. General Marshall suggested appointment by the National Government of non-partisan representatives who, because of their non-partisanship, would not aggravate the Communists. The Communists should be permitted to appoint a few of these appointees to act as a counter-balance.
General Yu said he was of the opinion that the Government and the Communists were approaching a peaceful solution. He added that the most important consideration was relative strength and suggested a Government troop disposition as follows:
- Two armies in Mukden with detachments along the railroad;
- One army in Changchun;
- Two armies south [north] of the Great Wall including Hulutao.
He then stated that the one Communist army could be located in the vicinity of the railroads but not in any of the key towns along the railroads. At this point General Marshall indicated that General Yu’s symbolic visions for occupation north of Changchun would get the Government into serious trouble. General Marshall then outlined his concept of reaching a peaceful solution by causing Communist evacuation of Changchun and placing in Changchun an advance echelon of Executive Headquarters without permitting—say for six months—entry of Government forces. General Marshall then asked General Yu for his opinion on the political aspects of the Manchurian situation and stated that the reason for this request was based on the Generalissimo’s desire that the Committee of Three pick up political matters in addition to military affairs. General Yu replied that he was unable to offer any suggestions since he was a military, rather than a political, man.
In closing, General Marshall emphasized the necessity for an early resolution regarding the control of railroads and control of puppet troops since these two matters were of deep concern to the Communists.