Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall
My Dear General Marshall: The Government’s rejection of the various proposals of the Democratic League and the Chinese Communist Party for an immediate truce in Manchuria as well as the statement that the Government would not confer on anything else until the occupation of Changchun by Government troops is completed disclose the Government’s intention to further and enlarge the armed conflicts in Manchuria. Meanwhile the battle of Szepingkai is reaching its height, and additional Government forces are sent up from China proper to Manchuria for causing more bloodshed. In addition to the 60th Army which has by now completed its movement, and the 93rd Army whose movement is nearing completion, the Government is planning to move eight other army units from South and Middle China, and two army units from North China to Manchuria, [Page 812] the movement of which will largely depend upon the assistance of the U. S. Navy and Air Forces. With the entry of these forces into Manchuria, not only the offensive of Government troops in that area will be intensified, but there is an increasing danger of having the war spread to China proper. As the matter now stands, offensive around the Communist area to the north of Hankow is being launched. Should these circumstances be furthered, the Chinese people, no doubt, will be thrown into a most tragic disaster.
During the two weeks since your return here your anxiety and efforts reinforced my belief that you have a firm desire to see the hostilities in Manchuria brought to an early end. Notwithstanding the fact, that on account of Government’s stubbornness, you find great difficulty to convince the Government representative of the highest level with your words, we highly appreciate your efforts toward bringing about truce and wish to take this opportunity to assure you that we will continue to cooperate with you toward that end. Being too eager to see your mission crowned with an early success, I hope that you would not mind, if I venture to remind you that you still have other resources at your hand which would add immense weight to your talk with the Government. As we are all aware, it is almost unthinkable how the Government could have launched such a big-scale offensive in Manchuria, were there no transportation facilities provided by the U. S. Navy and Air Force. In this respect, the U. S. transportation assistance constitutes a decisive factor to the present situation in Manchuria. Having this in mind, Yenan asked me to formally make this suggestion to you, that the U. S. Navy and Air Forces will immediately withdraw their assistance of transporting Government troops and ammunitions to Manchuria.
Seeing that President Truman has declared that “United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife”,42 and that the Moscow communiqué,43 on which the United States Government has put its signature, has stressed “the need for a cessation of civil strife”, I feel confident that you will pay full consideration to this suggestion and decide as to what are the most effective measures toward the implementation of those statements.
Faithfully yours,
(
- United States Relations With China, pp. 607, 608.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 815 and 821.↩