Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, Chungking, April 29, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

Chungking, April 29, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Mr. Chang

General Marshall opened the meeting by informing General Chou that he would assist him in moving 50 key Communists to Nanking within the next few days and also offered the use of U. S. signal communications (using Chinese code) during the period necessary to establish Communist radio communication. He then asked General Chou if he had anything to take up. General Chou stated he had wired Yenan regarding the main points of General Marshall’s proposal and also those of the Democratic League. He added that after thinking over the latest Democratic League proposal he was inclined to accept the idea of a joint commission being sent to investigate the situation after general cease fire orders had been issued. The Commission to take up problems of:

1. Separating the armies.

2. Control of communications.

3. Political and economic reorganization.

4. Consideration of various provincial governments.

General Marshall informed General Chou that he had been in conference with the Generalissimo the afternoon and evening before and had presented the Democratic League’s new proposal³⁵ for cessation of hostilities. The Generalissimo would not accept that proposal. General Marshall said that it was his view that the fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Chou relates to the matter of “what constitutes sovereignty”. The fact remains that sovereignty implies control and control could not be had by the Government without its possession of Changchun. General Marshall continued that Communist opposition to further movement has no foundation in any agreement; that Communist opposition is based probably on two considerations: (1) resentment over action by Government troops against scattered Communist forces; (2) the seizing of the opportunity to force desired negotiations in Manchuria (military) and in Chungking (political). General Marshall stated that the Generalissimo would concur in a proposal which provided:

“That cessation of hostilities be dependent upon evacuation of Changchun and its occupation by Government troops.”

Thereafter the Government would be willing to have the various aspects, military and political, considered by the Committee of Three. General Marshall recalled that General Chou had made a similar proposition during his absence. General Marshall stated that he had discussed with the Generalissimo at great length the newest proposal introduced by the Democratic League, but the Generalissimo declined acceptance. General Marshall pointed out, however, that in effect the Generalissimo had compromised over his previous view by agreeing to negotiate for settlement of matters in Manchuria to the North of Changchun.

General Marshall then informed General Chou that he had given deep thought to his (General Marshall’s) final discussion with the Generalissimo and to his (General Marshall’s) reply to General Chou. He notified General Chou that he regretted having to make the following statement but it was necessary at this time:

“I have done the best I can in an effort to negotiate this critical situation. The matter, with this statement, virtually passes out of my hands. I do not see anything more I can do in the way of mediation and I think it best this be understood. I’ve exhausted my resources in an effort to compromise the various positions and views and I cannot see how I could gain any more by further discussion of this particular issue with the Generalissimo. As I told you, before, my position is greatly changed because in all previous agreements I was continually confronted by the statement of the Government that whatever agreement I brought about would not be carried out by the Communists. At the present time my position in endeavoring to persuade various lines of action by the Government have been heavily compromised by the Communist action in Manchuria. I repeat again, I am intimately familiar with your résumé of actions of the Government not in accordance with agreements. For instance: the Canton situation; the question of jurisdiction of Executive Headquarters in Manchuria; the action by Government troops in fighting in Manchuria without recourse to the presence of teams to stop fighting. But the fact remains I’ve exhausted my resources and I have tried to give you the basis of what I think could be a Government agreement.”

General Chou stated that he was aware of General Marshall’s concern over the catastrophe confronting the Chinese people. He added that it has been General Marshall’s concern over this matter which has led him to consider possible means to resolve the difficulties. General Chou stated that it has been the Generalissimo’s attitude of fighting for Changchun that has caused the difficulty, but he is not at all surprised over the Generalissimo’s course of action. The reason for the attitude taken by the Generalissimo is that he is a difficult man to convince: in the first place he will not recognize Communist forces and refers to them as bandits; second, he desires to use military force when he fails at negotiations; third, the Generalissimo desires to exercise authority of the Central Government and he makes concessions only when forced to do so. In this connection, he added that even the past agreements were accepted by the Generalissimo with reluctance. General Chou alleged that the Generalissimo’s position was no different than the “irreconcilables and renovationists” referred to frequently by General Marshall. General Chou felt that this view seemed reasonable to him since the Generalissimo never censored or rectified their actions but instead gave them a free hand.

Speaking of the Manchurian problem General Chou reminded General Marshall that he had said on many occasions that the Government could have the railroads of Manchuria. Instead the Government chose to fight the Communists. General Chou continued by stating that even as of 27th of March he had said that if hostilities would cease the Government could be assured of the status of Changchun, Harbin and others, but the Government continued to violate the 10 January and 27 March agreements thus permitting the situation to build up.

General Chou asserted that that never was contemplated by the Communists; in fact they had tried to prevent the development of this situation. Regarding the Communist position with respect to United States, General Chou stated that after careful study he had determined the Communists have never attacked the United States in propaganda; that Communist action with respect to the United States loan to the National Government was made in good faith and based on their firm belief that a temporary suspension of the loan is one of the surest means of averting civil war in China. General Chou added that the continued movement of the Government troops and the obtaining of the loan is destined to create the opposite effect from the effect hoped for by the United States. General Chou concluded from this that the Communist attitude was not in opposition to the United States but rather an effort to assist in the proper application of United States objectives in China. As the situation now stands, General Chou stated, loans from the United States would be administered by the New Banking Corporation of National Reconstruction under Dr. T. V. Soong which in effect would promote economic monopolies under bureaucratic application.

General Chou reiterated to General Marshall that the Communists had been doing everything possible to avert civil war; that the Generalissimo’s attitude with respect to taking Changchun by force will, if accomplished, create additional problems, the outcome of which General Chou could not predict. For instance, an easy conquest of Changchun would tempt the Government to drive for Harbin. General Chou stated that the complexion of the problem of taking over sovereignty in Manchuria has changed considerably in that, when conceived, consideration[s] were based only on taking over from the Japanese and Soviets; that the Japanese and Soviets no longer present opposition; and that since Communists have occupied some of the places thus far evacuated, the basic considerations regarding establishing of sovereignty are no longer applicable.

General Chou stated that the Communists did not wish to monopolize Manchuria, they wished only to assist in administering Manchurian affairs as part of the new National Government. He added that if this were kept in mind, together with the new situation as presently found in Manchuria, a solution of the present difficult situation could easily be found.

General Marshall stated that his difficulty throughout was dealing with the lack of confidence on both sides. General Marshall stated that it was his opinion that the Generalissimo had made a great concession to the Communists through his willingness, providing Communists evacuated Changchun, to hold open for negotiation problems with respect to the rest of Manchuria. General Marshall stated that he understood the difficulty General Chou was having in handling his victorious field commanders in Manchuria.

General Marshall stated that he was attempting to bring both parties together in order to avoid further hardships on these millions of Chinese people. General Marshall again stated that he had exhausted his means and was leaving for Nanking the following day.

General Chou stated that he was moved by General Marshall efforts, that he had wired to Yenan the various proposals in hope for an early reply; that he would come to Nanking as soon as possible.

35. Not found in Department files.