Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of General Chou En-lai’s Interview With General Marshall90
To the measures with regard to the Northeast which you have conveyed to me yesterday,91 I have given careful considerations, and duly reported to Yenan. I am of the opinion that the big problem lies in the separation of military and political aspects of the matter. This makes it difficult for us to accept, and particularly difficult in convincing our armed forces in the Northeast. Since the truce, our party has made many decisive concessions in the military field, so as to assure the government that it may have a firm hold on the Northeast, the purpose of making these concessions is to expect in return political [Page 536] democracy in the Northeast. If now the political problems are not solved along with the military problems or simply put aside, then it would again set the entire Northeastern people under the one-party rule.
Therefore I am inclined to think that these questions should be brought up in the Conference of Three. Because, on our part, there is perfect confidence in General Marshall, and any person he trusts. Such a way of solution (i. e. to solve the political and military matters simultaneously) would decidedly stabilize the situation in China. In advocating this, we have full confidence that American participation in this matter would stabilize the situation in the Northeast, and consequently would stabilize the whole nation.
And secondly, in regard to the military problem, if we can solve the political and military matters simultaneously, with the participation of US representative, General Marshall, then in the problem of cessation of hostilities and movement of troops, we will certainly try our best to achieve a settlement for the reasonable demands raised by the government, just as we have done with our endeavour in the Basic Agreement of Military Reorganization and the Truce Agreement. However for the sake of making everything desirably done, I think it would be necessary for me to go to the Northeast personally to consult and work out some concrete measures with the local people on our side, and I hope that our American friends could go together. What I am striving for is the cessation of hostilities and the stability in the Northeast so that the whole nation will not be affected.
Thirdly, since hostilities have not been ceased in past months, a state of war has been resulted, in which both sides were preparing for fight. But now new circumstances may change such state: (1) Generalissimo Chiang has agreed to send field teams to the Northeast; (2) It is reported that the Soviet troops have withdrawn from South Manchuria. We should as a first step take this chance to stabilize the areas from which the Soviet troops withdrew, and then to extend the work northward. We agree with General Marshall’s opinion, that is, that clear distinction between domestic problems and problems of Sino-Soviet relations should be made in solving the matters and then it will be easier to achieve a settlement. It will also be convenient for U. S. to take part. And make Generalissimo believe that his formula of a solution will be fair to all.
Now what the government is practicing in the Northeast is still military control; the Administrative Commission and other government organs are under Generalissimo’s Headquarters there. In order to find a solution, the administration portion of the problem must also be discussed clearly and solved simultaneously. For instance, the reorganization of the Administrative Commission and various provincial [Page 537] government[s]. This will make the people from all quarters have a chance to cooperate, especially for Northeastern people to participate in the administration, in order that the Joint Platform and county (hsien) self-government can also be carried out in Northeast.
General Marshall has repeatedly said that U. S. hopes for China’s peace and stability which will make possible for the American loan to and investment in China. Then it will benefit both China and America. We are in favor of cooperation between China and America. It is for this very reason that we feel this is the way to solve the Northeast problem and to make the Northeast stabilized. If we only solve the problem of the cessation of hostilities without touching upon other problems, then wherever the government troops go, all possibilities for the people’s participation in governmental administration through election will be checked and removed. And then even if the Chinese Communist troops withdraw from certain places, the people there will still be resisting and not at rest. This is no good. Now I am talking about this problem with responsible attitude. I have anxiety over this matter and I hope to see the Northeast become stabilized.
Another question that I did not answer you yesterday is the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. I think what you said is quite true that there are some similarities in theoretical aspects between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, but these two are definitely of two nations. During this war Soviet Union did make great sacrifices in Europe, and played an important role in the victory of anti-Fascist war. We ought to be thankful to it just as in the Far East we ought to be thankful for the tremendous effort exerted by America. Therefore we cannot share with the anti-Soviet sentiment of some of the Kuomintang people, which even went so far as to insult the leader of the Soviet Union. We believe that our American friends, likewise dislike that sort of happenings. As to diplomacy direct negotiation between the National Government and the Soviet Union is under way, and we have never expressed our own opinion about it. Therefore, in solving the Northeastern problem, we have tried our utmost best to avoid touching upon diplomatic problem. As to the domestic problem of the Northeast, we welcome our American friends to assist us for a solution. Our attitude has been very clear: The whole policy of the Chinese Communist Party is for the interest of the people and the nation.
However, today I like to point out the gravity of the present situation. I hope, before you leave this evening, specific measures can be worked out so that General Gillem following your footsteps will assist us to achieve a settlement for the Northeast. We believe that only you have the capacity to promote the fulfillment of this matter. We have worked together for more than two months, and I appreciate your [Page 538] ability and prestige very much. So before you leave, I would like to present my views, and beg you to give a prudent consideration to it. If it cannot be solved today, I hope you will still render a great help to it from afar after your leaving. The coming month is indeed the critical period as you have said. During this period, the resolutions of PCC will have to be carried out, the Northeastern problem will have to be solved. There are so many cruxes in the problems of China, so we want your greatest assistance to solve them.
I agree too, if, in priority to all, we can despatch the field teams to Northeast, to attain cessation of fire, and consult about the problems of the areas where the Government troops are to be stationed. If we cannot solve the problem today, I hope we can work out some measures to let the field teams to proceed work there above all, and at the meantime, we ourselves can likewise go there, in order to stop the conflict, to consult about the entire measures of taking-over and reorganization of armies. Thus, it will be of good influence towards the governments and people there.