Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting at Hankow, March 5, 1946
Gen. Marshall: “Gentlemen, if it is agreeable, we will proceed with the meeting. I took the liberty of arranging that the press release would be made at 4 o’clock. I don’t think that we should hold a press conference. It is rather difficult in view of the multitude of questions they will ask. Anything of that sort you wish to hold yourselves, do it on a personal basis. I don’t think it would be a wise thing for the three of us to coordinate a press conference. Then it is so agreed.”
Col. Graves: “General Marshall, General Chang and General Chou. On 12 February I replaced Colonel Donald H. Ford as chairman of Team #9. I will discuss briefly the agreements entered into with the Government and Communist Party military leaders by Colonel Ford, and the remainder of my information will be the happenings since 12 February and will be more detailed.
“On 23 January 1946 the Loshan Agreement was signed by Maj. [Page 504] Gen. Wang Chen, Chief of Staff of Central Area Headquarters of the 8th Route Army and the new 4th Army, Lt. Gen. Cheng Tai-hsun, Vice Commanding General of the 22nd Army Group and Commanding General of the 47th Army, Lt. Gen. Sung Jui-ko, Commanding General 66th Army, and Lt. Gen. Koh Tsai, Vice Commander in Chief of the 6th War Zone and Commander in Chief of the Hankow Garrison Command. The signatures of these officers were witnessed by the three representatives of Team #9, who also affixed their signatures to the Agreement.
“Briefly, the Loshan Agreement provided that Government and Communist troops would remain where they were as of 23 January until the solution of political problems had been agreed upon. The Communist Party troops[,] with previous liaison with the Government Commanders, would be permitted to move food by unarmed food parties from one area to another of their areas without interference from Government troops.
“This agreement applied to regular troops, irregular troops, and people’s armies.
“In the meantime, Directive #272 from the Executive Council at Peiping was published. But as Directive #2 would be difficult to comply with in the areas under the jurisdiction of Team #9, due to the complicated positions of both Government and Communist Party troops, another agreement was entered into on 29 January and was known as the Luwangcheng Agreement.
“This agreement provided that all commanders concerned would follow the terms of the Loshan Agreement rather than Directive #2 until the Team could personally report the situation to the Executive Council. This agreement was signed by Lt. Gen. Li Hsien-Nien, Commanding General Central Area Headquarters of 8th Route Army and new 4th Army and Lt. Gen. Koh Tsai, vice commander in chief 6th War Zone.
“After a visit to the Executive Council at Peiping, at which time the reason for the unfeasible application of Directive #2 to the situation in this area was given, the Executive Council issued an interim directive on 4 February, which authorized the Team to follow the Loshan Agreement until further decision had been reached by the Executive Council.
“On 7 February, shortly before the departure of Colonel Ford from this area, the Communist Party member requested that the Team seek authorization from the Executive Council to move 25,000 Communist party troops to Wuho, in Eastern Anhwei Province. However, through error in the preparation of the radiogram, the name of the town was misspelled as Wuhu. No decision from the Executive [Page 505] Council has as yet been received, but a subsequent radiogram was sent correcting the area to which the movement was desired, and requesting that the number of troops be increased from 25,000 to 40,000. This was to relieve the food situation in the Central Area. Under existing Directives and Agreements, Team #9 had no authority to act itself on such a proposal.
“On 11 February Gen. Koh Tsai and Lt. Gen. Li Hsien-Nien entered a verbal agreement which permitted the movement of 6,000 Communist party troops from the area south of Kwangshan to Chiulikwan and Sekwantien. In arriving at this agreement, Gen. Koh wanted it understood that the purpose of the movement was to relieve the food situation and to make supply easier and that in consenting to the movement, he considered the area to be neutral and that the Government did not waive its rights as to the future status of the area.
“On 18 February, Headquarters 6th War Zone reported that on 7 February over 400 Communist troops had moved into Sunchiatien, approximately eight miles east of Sinyang, and feared that the Communist party troops would attempt to cross the Sze-ho River and the Sinyang Hwang-shuen Highway. General Wang, Chief of Staff of the Central Area Headquarters, was in Hankow at the time and knew nothing of such a move, but said that he would contact his headquarters for verification and proper action. Also on 18 February the Communist party reported movements of two regiments of the 13th Division of the 66th Army from Yingcheng. One regiment passed through An-lu and ultimately arrived at Tapongtien on 14 February. The other regiment moved to Sui-hsien on 10 February. Headquarters 6th War Zone admitted having ordered the move, but did not notify the Communist Party Commanders within the area as the headquarters considered such a movement not a violation of the Loshan Agreement, as the 6th War Zone had no information of Communist Party positions south of An-lu, and the 13th Division had been cautioned to remain at least 10 li from reported Communist positions enroute to the town of Sui-hsien. The 6th War Zone Headquarters further stated that these movements were in connection with the reorganization of the 66th Army and were not made for the betterment of the military strategic positions of the 66th Army.
“No action could be taken by the Team at that time as the Team was preparing to depart on a trip through Communist party and Government areas to the north of Hankow. An-lu was included in the itinerary and the Team decided to study the problem first-hand. The team agreed that if upon study the Loshan Agreement had been violated, a report would be made to the Executive Council.
“At this time General Wang recommended to the Team that in the future all contemplated movements of troops by either Government [Page 506] or Communist Party should be cleared through Team #9. The Team decided to accept Gen. Wang’s recommendation, and the 6th War Zone Headquarters and the Central Area Headquarters were notified that in the future all movements of armed troops, regardless of whether the commanders concerned considered they were moving within their areas or not, would be cleared through Team#9.
“On 20 February the Team departed on an inspection trip through the territory to the north. The tour was to take us by highway to Suanwotien, the headquarters of the Central Area, Loshan, Sinyang, Kwangshui, Hsiao-kan, and An-lu. The journey to Sinyang would be made by highway. From Sinyang to Hsiao-kan would be via rail, and the remainder of the trip from Hsiao-kan to An-lu and back to Hankow would be by road. The reason for travelling by rail from Sinyang to Hsiao-kan was to give the Team an opportunity to study the application of Directive #4, [4–A?]73 along the Pin Han Railway. The journey was made at a poor time, it later developed, as all Army and Division Commanders had not returned from the Nanking Conference.
“The Team arrived at Suanwotien the evening of 20 February. Conferences with Gen. Li were held on 21 February and 22 February. Gen. Li stated that he had received Directive #4 and was carrying out the provisions of the Directive. He further stated that all lines of communication within his area were open.
“When asked about the reported movement of 400 troops to Sunchiatien, Gen. Li disclaimed any knowledge of the movement and declared that he would move the troops back if the report was found to be true.
“To aid Team #9 in executing its decision to authorize all movements of armed troops, it was agreed while at Suanwotien that maps and information showing positions of troops should be furnished the Team by the Government and Communist Party military headquarters. It was decided that immediately upon our return to Hankow a master map would be prepared showing the positions of all units. This is our master map.
“Gen. Li requested that some action be taken to move 40,000 rather than 25,000, of his troops out of the Central Area and up to Wuho. The Team assured Gen. Li that a radiogram requesting information would be sent as soon as the Team reached Hankow, which was the nearest radio installation. On 23 February the Team proceeded to Loshan where it conferred that evening with Maj. Gen. Ho Chang-Chung, Chief of Staff of the 47th Army, and Maj. Gen. Chen Lin, vice commander of the 125th Division; both organizations in the 5th War Zone. General Ho stated that 20,000 Communist Party troops had moved from Chiulikwan and Sekwantien to the east and that the [Page 507] Communist Party lines had moved to a position just south of the river at Lungchenchen. Gen. Ho had not received any information on the agreement reached by the Generals Koh and Li to move 6,000 Communist Party troops from south of Kwangshan to the Chiulik-wan–Sekwantien area. It was pointed out at this time, however, that the agreement only permitted the troops to move from south of Kwangshan to the Chiulikwan–Sekwantien area and that they were to remain in position after completing the move. Gen. Wang stated that he would verify the movement and have the information soon after the return of the Team to Hankow.
“Gen. Wang admitted that Communist Party troops occupied the area just south of the river at Lungchengchen, but stated that that had been the Communist Party position at the time of the signing of the Loshan Agreement. Gen. Ho claimed that the Communist Party troops had moved into this position on 18 February. Gen. Ho agreed to furnish the Team documentary proof that the Communist Party troops had taken up this line on 18 February and would present it to the Team before its departure. Gen. Wang also claimed to have documentary proof that the line had been taken up prior to the signing of the Loshan Agreement. Gen. Wang promised to dispatch a courier to Gen. Li’s headquarters the following day with the request that the information be forwarded to Hankow immediately, where the Team would meet to decide the position.
“The following day, 24 February, the Team arrived at Sinyang where it was met by Maj. Gen. Chou Tien-chien, vice commanding general of the 66th Army and Maj. Gen. Wang Shih-chiao, vice commanding General 185th Division. Neither of these generals had any reports regarding violations of the Loshan Agreement, but the Team pointed out that Directive #4 had not been complied with as there were block houses just east of Sinyang, one of which was in process of construction. Gen. Chou promised that these block houses would be destroyed. On 25 February the Team proceeded to Kwangshui where it conferred with Maj. Gen. Siao Ping-yin, vice Commanding General 185th Division. Gen. Siao reported three violations of the Loshan Agreement, the first being a movement of forty men on 17 February that attempted to pass the Government lines east of Cheng-chiakai, but were refused passage by the Government, so returned to their lines. The second, that more than 100 Communist Party troops on 20 February attempted to move west across the railway between Pengchiachae and Wangchiatien. These troops were also refused passage, and they turned back. The third related to a reported movement of Communist Party troops across the Pin-Han Railway northeast from Ta Miao Fan. Gen. Wang promised to advise Gen. Li that the first two reports indicated improper movements under the terms of [Page 508] the Loshan Agreement. Regarding the third case, Gen. Wang declared that he had ordered the troops to assemble at Tamiofan to wait his further orders to move northeast. In Gen. Wang’s opinion, the troops misunderstood the assembly order and thought it was a march order. Gen. Wang assured the Team that he would inform Gen. Li that the commander responsible for the move should be punished. The team agreed that as this was undoubtedly part of the previously reported movement from the Chiulikwan–Sekwantien area, that the entire matter should wait until the Team’s return to Hankow so that all reported movements could be settled at one time.
“The following day the Team departed from Kwanghui at 1800, arriving at Hankow the following morning at 0400.
“The reason for not visiting Hsiao-kan and An-lu as scheduled was because of two unfortunate incidents that had arisen at Loshan and Sinyang that strained the heretofore amicable relations and cooperative spirit of Team #9. At Loshan the Team was invited to attend a tea party, given by local senators and elders from the surrounding villages. The people assembled, took advantage of the presence of the team, and expressed grievances against the Communist Party and the meeting developed into an anti-Communist meeting. The Team cut the meeting short by saying that we were only interested in the carrying out of Cease-Fire agreements, and not political discussions.
“At Sinyang, poster stating ‘Make the Communist stop their atrocities’, were observed. These were signed by the Middle School, Local Court, and District Peace Preservation Corps. The Communist Party member nearly staged a walk-out upon seeing these, but was mollified when he was assured by the priests of the Catholic Mission at which we were staying, that the posters were not in evidence when the priests had been on the street an hour before. After lunch, the Team met to discuss how the incident should be handled. It was agreed by the Team that the posters were put up by Minority Groups and were not reflections of the general attitude of the area. We decided that the incident should be reported to the Executive Council and that Gen. Chou, the Magistrate, and the Head of the Education Department, should be admonished of the gravity of such occurrences. Gen. Chou was informed, but the Magistrate and the head of the Education Department were out of town. The Team then transmitted the admonition to their assistants. These officials were quite concerned and expressed their regrets.
“These unfortunate occurrences created such animosity that I felt that it was mandatory that the Team return to Hankow, so that the former good will that existed in the Team could be restored. The Team agreed that this suggestion was wise and that we would visit Hsiao-kan and An-lu within a few days.
[Page 509]“On the subject of the compliance of Directive #4, it was noted on the trip that many block houses were to be seen in the Government territory along the highway, as well as along the railway, and a few block houses were observed within Communist Party-controlled territory. It should be stated here in defense of the local commanders, that in some cases, they had just received copies of the radiogram, in some cases they did not understand that the radiogram as such was authority for them to act, and in one instance, the 47th Army, 5th War Zone, at Sinyang, had not received any kind of Directive. A copy of the Radiogram outlining Directive #4 was left with the Acting-Commander. All commanders advised that the lines of communications as well as postal facilities, were open in their areas.
“That, Sir, is the report of everything up to date.”
Gen. Marshall: “It seems to me that, with the exception of the one issue of the movement of troops, that the issues that have arisen here are of a minor nature and are well within the control power of the team. The team seems to have been functioning in a businesslike manner and with the necessary cooperation, and so far as I can ascertain in this brief presentation, the commanders in the area have also cooperated. I congratulate the team on the manner in which they have carried out their mission. We recognize the difficulties and it makes a tremendous difference when you really have cooperation in judgment and action. So I know I speak for General Chang and General Chou when I express our thanks to the team. I have suggestion to make: that before we have a discussion regarding the movement of troops that General Chang have an opportunity to discuss the matter with his own people if he hasn’t already done so. General Chang will remain in this room, General Chou in the other room, and the Americans will vacate, and when you are ready to meet, just notify General Byroade and I will be on hand. I suggest that nobody be present at that meeting but the Committee of Three and the Commissioners with the interpreters only of the Committee of Three. Is that agreeable to General Chang?”
Gen. Chang Chih Chung: “It is agreeable to have a talk to our representatives first and then the meeting later.”
Gen. Chou En-lai: “I wish to state that this field team, under the leadership of Colonel Ford and Colonel Graves has been very successful and I would like to commend the field commanders in this area. I think that their efforts of this team can set an example in this respect to the other field teams and also that they have investigated all the places on the spot. This complies with the suggestion I have made before that the teams should go to the hot spots and settle it on the spot. I am very impressed and feel grateful to the spirit of this team. Therefore, I fully agree with General Marshall’s estimate of this team. I feel sure that General Chang also concurs.”
[Page 510]Gen. Chang Chih-Chung: “I fully concur with General Marshall and General Chou’s remarks and I wish to express my thanks to the members of the team and thank Col. Ford as well as Col. Graves for their efforts.”