Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting Augmenting the Scheduled Meeting at Taiyuan, March 4, 1946, 8:30 a.m.
Gen. Marshall: “We don’t want to lose any time because of General Chang’s early departure. Nevertheless, I think that we should hear from him first. Have you any further comments to make regarding the situation?”
Gen. Chang Chih Chung: “May I reiterate that the field teams should carry out the E. HQ. orders and instructions. If there is any different interpretations, then we can sit down and make a careful study. I mean that the team in the field should make a careful study [Page 498] and if they cannot [agree?] then, they may refer it to Executive Headquarters to get an interpretation.”
Gen. Marshall: “Is it General Chang’s proposal that in the event of unanimous agreement the team members report individually to the Commissioners? I am making a distinction between the report of a team member to his own superior among the Commissioners and the report to the Commissioners as a whole. At the present time, if there is a disagreement, there is no report. The basis of our agreement in Chungking was that everything had to be done on a complete agreement—field teams, commissioners, and ourselves in Chungking. Of course, individual members, just as individual commissioners, I presume, make reports direct to their own superior and those did not become general property and therefore could not be the basis for a discussion. In brief, is General Chang’s proposal that when there is a disagreement should the team members report as a whole to the Commissioners? I assume that in most instances two members would agree and one would disagree. It is quite possible that they all might disagree.”
Gen. Chang Chih Chung: “I brought up the difference of interpretation this morning because last night General Yeh said that on the withdrawal of 60 li from the besieged town is a different interpretation so I brought this point up because of the difference in interpretation so the state of siege and the restoration of communications will not be delayed. That is a fact. I feel that the problem today is that mutual confidence and mutual understanding has not been cultivated. So both sides still remain suspicious to each other. General Yen will carry out the instructions and orders sent from Executive Headquarters without reservation. He is honest and sincere to have peace. I think, of course, under present conditions, whoever stopped the restoration of communications is to be blamed and if we can cultivate the spirit of confidence many matters can be solved very easily. We will make personal contact with commanders and their subordinates. HO–2 dealt with separation. From the Government side, the interpretation is all those troops surrounded by the opposite troops would not withdraw, but for those troops which surround the city should withdraw 30 kilometers. If that instruction could be carried out, then the state of siege will no longer exist, but evidently this has not been carried out. I think that the besieged towns should be settled as soon as possible because it is not so much of the interest of the troops but of the civilians. They are starving. They cannot get food, water or medical supplies. They are suffering tremendously. We should not care so much about the interests of the troops but of the welfare of the people. Even if we cannot get an interpretation of HO–2, something [Page 499] must be done to lift the siege. We must make mutual concessions on both sides in order that the state of siege will be lifted.
“The last statement I made is that taken from the standpoint of the Communists, I think the state of siege would be lifted as soon as possible because in a besieged town the troops are in smaller numbers than the civilian population. The Communist side always claim that in a besieged town those are puppet troops so that they want to surround the city and disarm the puppet troops. In many cases, we have found this to be the opposite. They may be militia or Government guerrillas. Those people in the town don’t hate the people in the town so much but those troops that surround the city and will not let in the food and water. That will bring a hostile feeling between the people and the Communist troops. The Communists pay such a cost that I do not think it worthwhile.
Gen. Marshall: “I assume the Commissioners have had many discussions regarding this fact. I would like Mr. Robertson if he will give us an outline of the discussions from the various points of view and also his own.”
Mr. Robertson: “Gentlemen, this has been a very complicated situation particularly from the American standpoint. Our team here got off to a bad start due to the fact that Colonel Holly and the National Government representative stayed here for 12 days without the Communist representative on the team, and for some reason [of] which we are not aware, the Communist team did not send a representative for 12 days. According to our information there also have been difficulties in getting Nationalist commanders to carrying out the directives. In other words, in providing the establishment of liaison between the two factions. This situation, like many others where there are violently different points of view, it is impossible for us to know what is the proper course of action because we have not been able to determine the situation from all different views. In regard to the directive providing for the withdrawal of troops, we have been informed and we have no reason to doubt that often if they try to interpret that directive literally, you create more problems than you solve. The question of puppet troops has been probably the greatest obstacle in our being able to reach an agreement in this area. I had a very frank and free talk with General Yeh concerning reports that his commanders were not cooperating in this area and he said he did not approve of that and he was sending out directives to them to cooperate with the teams and to raise the siege and let food go in and out of these besieged cities and we could stipulate [stabilize?] the situation until we could decide what to do about the puppet troops. The Commissioners have been unable to reach unanimous agreement [Page 500] about what should be done just as the teams have been unable to reach unanimous agreement. We have been getting in food and keeping present positions stabilized so that there was no fighting and to await a decision from Chungking. One sentence and then I am through. This is a situation here apparently [where] the commanders of both sides have not fully recognized the authority of either the Chungking agreements or the Executive Headquarters directives. Each side has apparently taken the position that his is sort of a special situation and does not come wholly under those directives.”
Gen. Marshall: “Thank you very much, Mr. Robertson. I would like to hear General Chou’s recommendation regarding these encircled cities or towns. I mean by that, I would like to confine ourselves to trying to settle that one issue and see if we cannot reach a decision this morning.”
Gen. Chou En-Lai: “The situation is like Mr. Robertson has just stated. It has many complications, but in other teams, I have made some suggestions and those suggestions have been accepted. I think in line with that acception [acceptance], we can also solve the problem here. My suggestion was that communication between towns and rural areas should be restored regardless of whether the town itself was garrisoned by Nationalist troops, puppet troops, or others. People should be allowed to move freely to the outside or to go in. Food should also be allowed, to have free transportation, and the antagonistic attitude should be wiped out so that we may have freedom of transportation, of food, and freedom of trade. We should have liaison officers by the two parties regardless of whether they are puppet troops in the town, the same liaison system should be established.”
Gen. Marshall: “Is that acceptable to General Chang? It is so ordered. I ask you to personally tell the local people and the Commissioners [to] see that those instructions go to all teams in the simplest language you can phrase. I am very much relieved to get that difficulty out of the way and I believe that solves many others along with it.
“Now as to General Chou’s comment yesterday regarding the teams and the necessity of developing a more harmonious relationship and also the desire of having the teams make more contacts with the side other than where they have their Headquarters, I am in entire agreement. I want to intervene to say General Chang has to leave and I would like everyone after this meeting has adjourned, [to] arrange to have completed their goodbyes and be in the plane at 10 o’clock. I presume that we will proceed independently to the airfield so that we will have up to the time of the departure to talk to our own people. General Chang is leaving and the Committee will continue its discussion.”
[Page 501]Gen. Chou En-Lai: “I am going to be engaged in discussions with my people here.”
Gen. Marshall: “I do not think it advisable as I did think it was yesterday to bring in the members of the team here at this conference but I will speak to Colonel Holly and make plain to him about our desires and I am sure General Chou will do the same with his representative and so will General Chang do the same with the Nationalist representative.
“As we have to leave very shortly for the airfield, unless General Chou has some other point he wishes to discuss now, we will adjourn our debate.”