Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

WH 460 [406]. My Dear General Marshall: The Secretary of State and I have received and read with great interest and appreciation your most recent telegram42 in regard to Manchuria. I approve the tentative course of action you outlined.

With regard to a Military Advisory Group for China,43 a revised J. C. S. paper on the subject is expected soon and their recommendations will be sent to you for comment.

I am much interested in your suggestion with respect to deactivation of the China Theater and should be glad to have your views as to the timing of such deactivation.44 General Wedemeyer’s recent reports indicate that under his present plans movement of Chinese armies to Manchuria will not be completed until September 1, 1946, and that logistical support for these Chinese forces will not be discontinued until October 31, 1946.

Inasmuch as the movement of Chinese forces into North China is dependent on the development of your mission, I realize that no information on possible timing of this phase of theater activity is yet available and am hopeful that the success of your mission will render this activity unnecessary. I shall await with interest your further recommendations with regard to the withdrawal of the Marines from North China.

Current developments in connection with the presence of British troops in Indonesia and Greece, to which you refer, increase my anxiety to get American armed forces out of China just as soon as they are no longer essential to implement our policy in China.

With regard to your references to the Far Eastern Commission in relation to the Manchurian issue, I believe that the only practicable consideration that the Commission could give to the situation in Manchuria [Page 435] would be in connection with repatriations [reparations?]; that is, disposition of Japanese external assets in Manchuria. I assume that you have the same idea. It is our idea that the Far Eastern Commission shall limit itself to consideration of problems and policies directly connected with the surrender, disarmament and control of Japan and that its scope of activity should not be extended to consideration of Far Eastern problems of a more general character.

With renewed assurance of my confidence and high regard,

Harry S. Truman
  1. No. 170, February 9, p. 426.
  2. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 810 ff.
  3. General Marshall proposed a timetable in his telegram No. 231, February 23, to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff; for text of telegram, see vol. x, p. 848.