Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, January 14, 1946, 8:30 p.m.

January 14, 1946, 8:30 p.m.

Also present:	Col. Caughey
	Chou En-lai’s Interpreter.

1. General Chou opened the meeting by making the following allegations:

a. That the Nationalist Government issued instructions on the evening of 9 January 1946 to the effect that its field forces should attempt to capture strategic points especially in Jehol such as Chengteh and Chihfeng prior to issuance of the order to cease hostilities.

b. That the Ministry of Operations issued secret orders on the evening of 10 January 1946 stipulating that the cessation order would become effective on 16 January 1946 on all fronts.

c. That General Tu Li-ming issued orders to the 54th Division of the 13th Army to the effect that after occupation of Kienping and Heishui, 40 kilos SE of Chihfeng, this force would then without further orders try to seize Chihfeng prior to the 15th and cease fighting on the 16th and that planes would be furnished to replenish supplies.

2. General Chou En-lai then informed General Marshall of following specific actions on the part of the Nationalist troops:

a. On the 13th of January at 1500, the 52nd Army occupied Pingchuan, due east of Chengteh.

b. The 92nd Army and the 16th Army are still attacking Kupehkow, on the great wall east of [apparent omission] yesterday (13 January) and that General Hu Ching-jou, Peiping garrison commander is personally at the front supervising the operations.

c. National Government troops are still fighting in Kwangshan in Southeast Honan with destination not certain.

3. General Marshall informed General Chou En-lai that he would do two things:

a. Get this information quickly to Peiping (accordingly, 50⁷⁶ was dispatched immediately after the meeting).

b. Take these matters up with the National Government representatives in Chungking.

4. General Marshall then informed General Chou En-lai that he had been assured by the Generalissimo that hostilities would cease, that if difficulties were being experienced he would assume that actions on the part of both sides by local commanders probably are causing the difficulty. General Marshall then informed General Chou that he could assure him that the Generalissimo feels thoroughly that he (the Generalissimo) would be in an impossible position if activities on the part of the Nationalist troops were not in conformity with the agreements already reached. General Marshall then pointed out that if, and he stated he did not believe it, one side is taking unfair advantage of the other, it would be a completely preposterous action since the action would come to light, a fact of which the leaders of both parties are aware. General Marshall then told General Chou En-lai that he hoped these reports were exaggerated and that he could assure that he would use his every influence to insure that actions in the field are in conformance with the agreements; that he (General Marshall) did not doubt that he could enforce adjustments in view of the evidenced good faith by the American Government, the National Government and the Communist Party; that minor actions on a low level could be straightened out by the Executive Headquarters; that his great hope was that equitable arrangements would hold forth for the period of the next three days. General Marshall then pointed out that he would probably have sufficient officers at Peiping to permit the Executive Headquarters to dispatch three-man teams to all focal points and that that was the reason he had insisted on establishing the Executive Headquarters immediately and as rapidly as possible with sufficient personnel. General Marshall then assured General Chou that he felt that these difficulties cropped up on a low level and that the Executive Headquarters could smooth over the matter very rapidly.

5. General Chou agreed that the “accidents” (incidents) were caused on a low level, but he wished to call General Marshall’s attention to the fact that if Chihfeng was taken by the Nationalist troops that this action could not be interpreted as “action on a low level”. General Chou then suggested the possibility of sending parties to Chihfeng and Chengteh and that if the plane could not land, it could observe from the air and drop leaflets. General Chou En-lai also expressed the hope that no major action would occur in the next three days since serious action could destroy the initial efforts and interfere with the successful continuance of the PCC and the study for the reorganization of the armies of China.

6. Action taken as a result of this message included the dispatch of 50 to Colonel Byroade stating General Chou En-lai’s allegations and citing the incidents referred to by him, and stating, as suggested by Chou En-lai that the Executive Headquarters should observe activity from the air and to drop leaflets. In this connection a message was also sent to the CO Nanking Liaison Group (see 51⁷⁷), stating that leaflets at Nanking, if not already distributed to Peiping, should be sent there immediately. A similar message was proposed to present these allegations to Chang Chun for the purpose of determining the true facts. A memorandum⁷⁷ was also addressed to General Shang Chen setting forth the allegations and indicating the action taken. Colonel Caughey presented the memorandum to General Shang and submitted a report⁷⁷ on the results of this conference (copy in Truce Incident file).

76. January 14, not printed; it requested Colonel Byroade to send a team from Peiping to Chengteh, there to contact hostile units and to inform them of the cease-fire order.
77. Not printed.
77. Not printed.
77. Not printed.