740.00119 PW/12–1346

The British Embassy to the Department of State59

G299/—/46

Aide-Mémoire

A member of the House of Commons has given notice that he intends to ask the following question on the 19th December:—

“To ask the Prime Minister on what date overtures for peace were made by Japan before the offer of peace to Japan by the Potsdam Declaration of 26th July or whether any overtures were received before the first atomic bomb was dropped on 6th August.”

2. In view of the fact that Generalissimo Stalin communicated certain information on Japanese peace feelers jointly to President Truman and to Mr. Attlee, His Majesty’s Government would be grateful [Page 374] to learn whether the State Department concurs in the terms of an answer in the following language:—60

Proposed reply by the Prime Minister:—

“No overtures for peace were made by Japan to the countries with which she was at war prior to her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which she did not communicate to us until August 10th, 1945, fifteen days after the Declaration had been made and four days after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. It was known however that the Japanese leaders had previously been considering means of reaching a settlement more favourable to themselves than unconditional surrender. At Potsdam, on July 28th, 1945, Generalissimo Stalin informed President Truman and me in strict confidence that the Soviet Government, who had not at that time joined in the Far Eastern war, had received from the Japanese Government a proposal that they should act as mediators between the Japanese Government and the British and United States Governments. According to Generalissimo Stalin, the Soviet Government interpreted this move as an attempt to obtain the collaboration of the Soviet Government in the furtherance of Japanese policy and they had therefore returned an unhesitating negative.61 The information thus furnished by Generalissimo Stalin offered no new opportunity for hastening the conclusion of the war since the Japanese Government had already, by the Potsdam Declaration of 26th July, been invited in the most formal manner to surrender.”

[Annex]

Addendum to British Aide-Mémoire of December 13

In the event of supplementary questions, answers along the following lines will be given:—

1.
This reply shows that the responsibility for the delay and for neglecting the opportunity to save themselves further bloodshed lies with the Japanese Government alone. It is the greater in view of the fact that the Japanese leaders were not blind to the hopelessness of their war situation.
2.
If it is asked whether this approach to the Soviet Government could not be construed as an overture for peace, the reply could be made that the Soviet Government was not a belligerent. The Allied [Page 375] Governments could not in any case do more than invite the Japanese to lay down their arms, which had already been done in the Declaration. The fact remains that the dropping of the atomic bomb followed by eleven days the issue of the Declaration and that during this period the Japanese made no peace move whatsoever.

  1. Handed on December 13 by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent).
  2. In a memorandum of December 14, 1946, the Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton) stated that, in view of the request by Mr. Graves for an oral reply at as early a date as possible, he had telephoned Mr. Graves “that there would seem to be no objection, from the Department’s point of view, to the proposed reply by the Prime Minister.” On December 19, 1946, the Department replied in writing that it “concurs in the terms of the proposed reply by the Prime Minister to the question to be put to him in the House of Commons on December 19 regarding alleged overtures of peace by Japan prior to its qualified acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 10, 1945.” (740.00119 PW/12–1346)
  3. See Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 460.