Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

711.94/8–1046

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Emmerson)¹⁹

[Washington,] October 9, 1946.

The conclusion drawn by the Embassy’s memorandum²⁰ seems to be that Japan faces one of two political alternatives: domination by the United States or capture by the Soviet Union. Any assumption that Japan, as a neutral, self-sufficient nation, can enjoy friendly relations with both the United States and the USSR is called a delusion. Consequently our choice appears to be narrowed to that of building a “place d’armes” against the Soviet Union or facing one built against ourselves.

Before United States policy toward Japan is reduced to such simple terms, it would seem desirable to explore the implications of such a policy and the methods which we should have to use if it is to be carried to its logical conclusion.

From the signing of the Potsdam Declaration to the issuance of the draft treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, the United States Government has been consistent in advocating the complete destruction of Japan’s military potential. American security requirements in the Pacific will presumably be fulfilled by the removal of Japan as a threat to peace and through our naval power including strategic bases in former Japanese mandated territories. Arming Japan as a security measure would not only be contradictory to our enunciated policy but would be of dubious validity and effectiveness. Post-occupation military control in Japan, beyond that necessary for insuring compliance with the terms of a disarmament treaty, would be inconsistent with the principal objectives of the occupation and would destroy all faith of the Japanese in the sincerity of our motives.

If the Soviet Union is to construct a “place d’armes” against us in Japan, it must win the Japanese people to its support and it must succeed in building up in Japan military potential useful to it in war against the United States. Without doubt the Kremlin will intensify its propaganda effort in Japan and will hope that the Japanese Communist party will grow in power and influence. No one can predict the future of Communism in Japan. Against economic adversity which may encourage its development must be weighed the longstanding natural antipathy of the Japanese toward Soviet Russia, a long-conditioned fear of Communism, and the inept leadership of the present party (with one brilliant exception, Nosaka). The Soviets must first overcome the Japanese resentment at what they consider a stab in the back on the eve of Japanese capitulation and the ill will engendered by Soviet failure so far to repatriate Japanese troops captured in Russian territory. However, if the USSR is successful and the Japanese Communist party becomes a political force to be reckoned with, the military domination of Japan by the Soviet Union is yet a more difficult task. Should such a threat appear during the post-occupation period, the United States, through its participation in the control and inspection machinery operative in Japan at the time, could not fail to be aware of such a development and would be in a position to take the necessary action.

The long range objectives of American policy in the Far East will be best served by vigorous and unswerving pursuit in Japan of the objectives already set before us. Our acts in Japan should not be conditioned by a fear of Communism so strong that we lean toward the very elements we have set out to destroy. We shall assure ourselves of a “favored position” in Japan if we succeed in effecting lasting reforms, in giving impetus to a genuine liberal movement, and in starting the process of democratization in Japanese education. Then, perhaps, will Japan become neither a “place d’armes” for the Soviet Union nor a “place d’armes” for the United States.²¹

19. Addressed to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) and to the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton).
20. August 10 by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Davies), p. 285.
21. On November 20 Mr. Emmerson asked Mr. Vincent to “intimate to me whether I am all wet in my comments on John Davies’ memo?” (Revision of the policy statement on Japan was under consideration.) Mr. Vincent replied: “You are not—you are crisp, crystal clear, and right.” General Hilldring also commented as follows: “Emmerson is absolutely right. I recommend that we disregard the Moscow memorandum. J H H.” (711.94/8–1046)