740.00119 PW/10–746
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)
In sharp contrast to the Far Eastern Commission, which has contributed positively to the occupation of Japan, the Allied Council has become little more than a forum for the exchange of mutual recrimination between the Chairman and the Soviet and British Commonwealth members respectively. The Allied Council has failed to perform a constructive role in the occupation. Differences among the Allies have been highlighted and the Japanese and the world have been treated to a series of public demonstrations of name calling ill befitting an international body set up to advise and consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers regarding the implementation of occupation policies.
It is clear that Soviet policy is directed toward criticizing unfavorably American conduct of the occupation and toward extending Soviet influence within Japan. To the extent that the occupation is hindered and obstructed by such Soviet activities it is obviously the duty of General MacArthur and of the American member of the Allied Council to defend American policy and American interests. However, it is questionable whether this defense is achieved by the tactics used in the Council meetings up to the present.
If there is to be in practice the give and take of advice and consultation as envisaged in the Moscow Agreement, it is essential that the spirit of the Moscow Agreement as well as its letter, be observed. The occupation should be defended on the basis of fact and accomplishment and it should not be necessary to use the sessions of the Council for ideological diatribe.
On one occasion Gen. Derevyanko, the Soviet member, presented to the Council a document critical of SCAP’s labor policy. In answer, the Chairman stated that he saw in the Soviet document “the familiar signmarks of propaganda”. Without objectively discussing the points raised by the Soviet member, Mr. Atcheson confined his remarks to a [Page 333] discussion of Communism and labor practices within the Soviet Union.
A few days after the meeting of the Council, SCAP’s Labor Section issued a carefully prepared concise statement answering one by one the propositions put forward by Gen. Derevyanko. The Labor Section’s report showed that a great many of the suggestions made by the Soviets had in fact already been put into practice by SCAP. It took pains to refute by argument certain other points advanced in the Soviet document but did not discuss Communism as an ideology. It is submitted that this document would have been a more effective answer to Gen. Derevyanko had it been introduced into the Council in place of the somewhat emotional reply made by the Chairman which, of course, because of its sensational nature, received far more publicity than the sober SCAP report.
Council sessions have been characterized more by heated exchanges of opinion than by a sober approach to the problems of the occupation. While the Soviet and British Commonwealth members must bear their share of responsibility for developments within the Council, the Chairman has frequently gone out of his way to make statements denouncing Russian policy and Communist ideology rather than presenting factual replies to questions raised by other members.
In the meeting on October 2, Mr. Atcheson made what the press called a “sharp attack” upon the Soviet member for his expressed doubts concerning the activities of the Demobilization Ministries. The Chairman called Gen. Derevyanko’s charges “fantastic” although the press on the following day reported that SCAP had been investigating the activities of the Demobilization Ministries for a number of months on the basis of reports of underground activities. In addition to some insinuations regarding the 400 members of the Soviet member’s staff in Tokyo and the 800,000 Japanese soldiers still in Soviet hands, the latter particularly inappropriate in view of the Soviet Government’s recent agreement to undertake their repatriation, Mr. Atcheson is reported by the press to have remarked to the British member “I still continue to hope that the British Commonwealth member and I will see eye to eye on some subject on some occasion.”
If it is SCAP’s policy to counteract the ever more aggressive and penetrating activities of the Soviet representatives in Tokyo and to check the extension of Soviet influence in the Far East, the tactics of public discussion in the Allied Council do not appear to be the best means of accomplishing these ends. Instead the result may be that the Communist minority in Japan becomes even more solidified while supporters of the status quo ante, who are likewise enemies of true democracy, become strengthened and confident of the tacit backing of the occupation. In such a situation, those liberal elements to whom [Page 334] we should look for leadership in the regeneration of Japan either renounce all activities or turn to the extreme Left.
On the record there is complete agreement between the United States and the USSR on policy objectives in Japan. We play the dominant role but are committed to international cooperation in the Allied Council and in the Far Eastern Commission. Our acts in Japan vis-à-vis the Soviets cannot fail to produce repercussions to our disadvantage in other parts of the world where we face the Soviet Union. We stand only to lose if we fan a fire where no fire is necessary.
Our best policy to accomplish the stated objectives of the occupation in Japan, which we assume still remain those enunciated at Potsdam and in subsequent policy directives, should be to work unceasingly toward the building of lasting foundations for a peaceful, democratic form of government. The success of the occupation will depend upon the structure which we build. If our building is good, we need not fear the attacks of Communism. Our security considerations in the Pacific are very real and we should be constantly vigilant that Japan remains disarmed and that our defenses are not weakened. The Japanese at present are in large majority anti-Russian and anti-Communist. If, in these circumstances, our own form of democracy is not virile enough to succeed in Japan, and if the Japanese are captured by the ideology of the Soviet Union, then the responsibility for not supplying that virility and for losing Japan to Communism must rest squarely with ourselves.
Gen. McCoy and members of the US delegation at the FEC have expressed anxiety over the situation in the Allied Council and have emphasized points similar to those discussed above. Mr. Thompson, Chief of EE, has read the above memorandum and has expressed his accord with the views presented. He states that he prepared a memorandum to you along similar lines for Mr. Hickerson’s signature.
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