501.BB Palestine/10–2146
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)85
Dear Dean: In accordance with our various conversations on the subject, we have been preparing a number of suggestions as to the course of action which this Government might follow regarding Palestine in the light of the President’s statement of October 4. The matter, [Page 711] as you know, is of particular importance at this time because of the necessity for instructing our Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.86
At the moment our Delegation has no instructions on Palestine, a situation which should be remedied because the question may arise in some manner during the sessions. Congressman Bloom, who is one of our Delegates, has discussed with the President the advisability of our raising the question in the Assembly and the Congressman will probably make some proposal to Senator Austin.87
We have prepared three alternative position papers for our Delegation which are attached as Exhibits A, B and C.88 The portion of each paper marked “Recommendations” gives the essence of each proposal.
The first paper directs the American Delegation not to raise the Palestine problem but, if the problem is raised by another delegation, to state our policy: entry of the 100,000 now, liberal immigration and unrestricted land sales, and support of a workable solution as suggested in the President’s statement.
Our lack of a detailed program for a solution and our present unwillingness to assume military and administrative responsibility in Palestine make it necessary for us seriously to consider the advisability of refraining from raising the problem in the General Assembly. Such a course, however, might be criticized as being contrary to this Government’s expressed interest in the settlement of the problem.
The second paper directs the Delegation to introduce a strong resolution calling for entry of the 100,000, early partition of the country with a resulting independent Jewish state along the general lines of the Jewish Agency plan, and a high degree of provincial autonomy under trusteeship in the interim. This course of action would be a demonstration of our determination to press vigorously for a settlement along the lines of the present Zionist program.
[Page 712]On the other hand, if our Delegation introduces a resolution of this type, there is serious doubt as to whether we would be successful in obtaining its passage by the General Assembly, in the face of almost certain opposition of the British and of the Arab and Moslem states, and of the possible opposition of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, vigorous advocacy of this extreme program will cause a serious deterioration in our over-all relations with the British and with the Arab and Moslem World. Accomplishment of the objectives of the program, which could only be achieved in collaboration with the British, would have these repercussions in the Near East:
Our cultural position, built up with painstaking effort over the past 100 years, as well as our commercial and economic interests, including oil concessions and aviation and telecommunications rights, would be seriously threatened. Already the almost childlike confidence which these people have hitherto displayed toward the United States is giving way to suspicion and dislike, a development which may lead the Arab and Moslem World to look elsewhere than toward the West for support. The growing hostility toward us among the Arabs may result in acts of violence against American property and persons. It will be recalled that already Arab terrorists have bombed our Legation in Lebanon and attempted the bombing of the American University of Beirut. The Arab States might well withdraw from the United Nations and sever diplomatic relations with us.
The third position paper directs the Delegation to introduce a resolution calling not for partition specifically, but for a solution which would seek to bridge the gap between the British plan for provincial autonomy and the Jewish Agency’s proposal of partition. We believe that the President had such a solution in mind when he issued his statement of October 4. This resolution would also provide for the immediate entry of the 100,000. While this is a modification in the plan put forward by the Zionists, it might still appeal to them as something which possibly could be achieved. Implementation of this more moderate plan might be administratively practicable; it points toward the early independence desired by both Jews and Arabs; and in taking the emphasis off partition, it becomes more acceptable to Great Britain and somewhat less objectionable to the Arabs. In our opinion, however, an attempt to implement the plan outlined in this resolution will have effects almost as adverse upon our standing and interests in the Arab and Moslem World as those resulting from the execution of the plan set forth in Exhibit B.
We believe that if either of the alternatives proposed in Exhibits B or C is decided upon we should first outline the substance of the two [Page 713] resolutions to the British Ambassador and tell him in a friendly way that in view of the failure of the various interested parties to come to an agreement and of the extreme urgency of the matter, our Government is considering the advisability of taking the problem without delay to the United Nations.
After giving the British Government an opportunity to comment on these proposed courses of action, we should then discuss the matter with representative Zionist leaders such as Rabbis Wise and Silver and Dr. Goldmann. We could advise them of the nature of the resolutions and stress our desire to assist in working out some kind of a solution which would be in line with the views expressed by the President. They should be given a clear understanding that though this Government is prepared to do all that it properly can to persuade the British and Arabs to agree to a settlement, it believes that it would not be in the interest of any of the parties concerned, including the Zionists themselves, for us unilaterally to exert political or economic pressure in order to attain our objectives, such as for instance to refuse to implement the British loan. We should state that we are willing, however, to demonstrate our conviction of the justice of our position by placing it before the highest international authority, the United Nations.
The Zionist leaders may feel that it would be preferable for us not to introduce either resolution at the General Assembly. On the other hand, they may decide that the presentation of the more moderate resolution would yield the best results in the circumstances.
If such a conversation with the Zionists is held, it should be made plain to them that we must, of course, take into consideration all the factors of the international situation of the moment in making decisions as to what action we might be able to take with regard to Palestine and associated problems, and that they should not construe anything said to them now as in any way binding upon the policies and actions of this Government in the future.
In view of the urgency of this matter I would appreciate learning your reaction to the foregoing as soon as possible. In case it is decided that it would be unwise at this time to resort to any means other than persuasion in order to prevail upon the British to cooperate with us in finding a solution acceptable to this Government, we feel that in the not distant future we should tell the Zionists frankly the extent to which this Government is prepared to go. Otherwise the President, the Secretary and the Department will continue to be charged with lack of sincerity or “doublecrossing”.
- Marginal notation by Mr. Acheson: “Hold”.↩
- The Department had concerned itself with the possible reference of the Palestine question to the United Nations at least as far back as December 1945. On the 13th of that month., William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs had prepared three memoranda setting forth the following proposed positions: “The position of the United States should be that it neither seeks, nor seeks to prevent, discussion of Palestine by the Assembly”; “The United States should not propose that the Palestine problem be specifically placed within the terms of reference of a temporary trusteeship body”; and “No plan for settlement of the Palestine problem should be offered by the United States in the forthcoming General Assembly” (USGA/Gen/21, 21b, 21c, 501.BB Palestine/12–1345). A 12-page draft paper on possible courses of action by the United States in the General Assembly on the Palestine problem was prepared on September 26, 1946, by working group consisting of officers of NEA, SPA and CCP and George Wadsworth, then detailed to the Department as NEA liaison officer to the American delegation (501.BB Palestine/9–2746).↩
- Warren R. Austin, Chairman of the United States delegation to the General Assembly.↩
- None printed.↩