Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/10–446: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)⁸⁰

top secret
us urgent

Washington, October 10, 1946—4 p.m.

If my statement of October 4, 1946, was embarrassing to you, I very much regret it. My feeling was that the announcement of the adjournment until December 16 of the discussions with the Arabs had brought such depression to the Jewish displaced persons in Europe and to millions of American citizens concerned with the fate of these unfortunate people that I could not even for a single day postpone making clear the continued interest of this Government in their welfare.

It is now well over a year since I first brought to your attention the recommendations of Mr. Earl Harrison in regard to the European displaced Jews. Since that time, this Government has steadfastly adhered to the view that nothing would contribute more to the alleviation of the plight of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution than the immediate transfer of a substantial number of them from Europe to Palestine. It was in line with this attitude that, following the unanimous recommendation made by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that the entry into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced Jews be authorized at the earliest possible moment, I made it clear that the American Government would finance the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine. In the succeeding months, this matter was the subject of frequent communications between our Governments, but no decision was reached.

During the course of the recent discussions which your Government was conducting with the representatives of the Arab States, this Government had followed a policy of refraining from public statements with respect to Palestine which might complicate the negotiations. We did so in spite of recurring requests from many quarters that we make known unequivocally our attitude toward the matters under discussion in London. When, however, it was learned that the conference with the Arabs had been postponed until the month of December without a decision as to concrete steps which might be taken either to alleviate the situation of the Jewish survivors in Europe or to resolve the pressing problems of Palestine itself, I considered that it was incumbent on me to express regret at this outcome and again to call attention to the urgency of this matter.

The failure to reach an agreement which would permit their entry to Palestine has had a most distressing effect upon the morale of the European displaced Jews, who have seen nearly a year and a half pass since their liberation with no decision as to their future. Their feeling of depression and frustration was, of course, intensified by the approach of their annual Day of Atonement, when they are accustomed to give contemplation to the lot of the Jewish people. I am sure that you will agree that it would be most unfair to these unfortunate persons to let them enter upon still another winter without any definite word as to what disposition is to be made of them and specifically as to whether they are to be allowed to proceed to Palestine, where so many of them wish ardently to go. I felt that this Government owed it to these people to leave them in no doubt, at this particular season with all its traditional associations, as to its continuing interest in their future and its desire that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate their plight.

We realize that Great Britain is responsible for the administration of Palestine under the terms of the Mandate which your Government received after the end of the first World War. We believe, however, that one of the primary purposes of the Mandate was to foster the development of the Jewish National Home, a development which has commanded international sympathy and in which the Government of the United States has traditionally maintained a deep and abiding interest. In our view the development of the Jewish National Home has no meaning in the absence of Jewish immigration and settlement on the land as contemplated in the Mandate. We therefore feel that the implementation of the Mandate, as well as the humanitarian considerations mentioned above, call for immediate and substantial immigration into Palestine.

In stating these views we, of course, are fully appreciative of the many difficult problems which Great Britain faces in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities under the Mandate. It was a matter of considerable regret to us to observe that the recent conversations in London did not apparently result in a situation in which some, at least, of these difficulties might have been lessened. We felt, however, that the matter of the transfer of the displaced Jews was so urgent that it could not await the outcome of negotiations which promised to be of a protracted character.

This Government, as has already been made clear, stands ready to do all in its power to initiate immediate measures for the transfer of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to Palestine. Believe me, Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the difficulty of the situation of your Government in the matter of opening Palestine to increased Jewish immigration. I am concerned, however, that further postponement of decisions which would permit displaced European Jews to begin entering Palestine in substantial numbers is sure to render still more difficult the solution of a problem in which my Government as well as your Government has so deep an interest.

80. Sent to London as Department’s telegram 7109, with the instruction: “President desires you to arrange for immediate delivery to PriMin Attlee of following reply to latter’s personal and Topsec message of Oct. 4 re Palestine.” The message was repeated to the Secretary of State in Paris as telegram 5438 (Secdel 1092).