Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/5–946: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

Beirut, May 9, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received 8:43 p.m.]

213. Regarding Department’s circular telegram April 25, 10 a.m. [p.m.], I have delayed reporting Syrian and Lebanese reaction to Palestine Commission Report to end that all essential factors might be covered. Some of these were slow in developing, and it was only yesterday that occasion could be made for effective discussion with Prime Minister Jabri in Damascus.

2. In general, reaction in press, public and official circles has been disillusionment, hardening into determination to resist implementation of Commission’s recommendations. This was clearly foreseen by Emir Faisal³² who one week before publication of report said to me, “I am afraid we Arabs will have to resist, by force if necessary, though that I should greatly regret because of our countries’ otherwise truly friendly relations.”

3. Disillusionment is particularly bitter as regards American Government attitude as voiced in Mr. Truman’s statement of April 30th.^32a Local Arabs argue substantially as follows:

That from mountain of documentation and testimony commission, like its predecessors, should produce only ineffectual mouse was not unexpected. That Britain should again let Arabs down was not surprising per se although surprisingly shortsighted in sight Soviet pressures in Middle East. But that United States, by voice of its President, should take so unreservedly pro-Zionist attitude was shocking to all those who had long counted on its erstwhile seeming ardor to implement principles of international justice in postwar world.

4. Elaboration of this theme stresses Roosevelt promises (id est in letter of April 12, 1945, to Syrian President³³) that American Government would take no decision regarding basic situation in Palestine without full prior consultation with Arabs, as well as our recent assurances that Commission’s inquiry did not constitute such “consultations” and that by “Arabs” we specifically meant Arab Governments.

5. It is then argued that nothing could affect Palestine situation more basically than imposition of 100,000 Jewish refugees and abrogation of White Paper guarantees regarding land transfers and future immigration. Consequently, Mr. Truman’s statement is read as clear promise to Zionists that such imposition and abrogation will be major elements of America’s Palestine policy.

6. I have been so much impressed by intensity of resulting anti-American feeling in official circles and among informed public that I venture to suggest Department consider issuing official statement reiterating assurances mentioned above and/or directing me to reiterate them formally, preferably in writing, to Syrian and Lebanese Governments prior to scheduled Arab League Council meeting at Bludan³⁴ May 18.

[Here follows statement made by the Syrian Prime Minister on May 4, concluding with his question as to whether the United States wished the Arabs to take their case to the Security Council as one endangering international peace.]

8. As Jabri’s concluding query may be indication of policy to be proposed to Arab League, Department may wish to give me indication of its reaction thereto. I replied that, while Palestine problem was of such international importance that final word might perhaps well be left with UNO, it would seem wiser for time being to consider Commission’s findings as simple recommendation, however unpalatable to Arabs, with respect to which consultations on intergovernmental plane appear to be next logical step.³⁵

9. In Lebanon, Prime Minister Solh issued brief statement May 3 declaring Commission’s recommendations unacceptable and undertaking to support Palestine Arab position and to cooperate with Arab states in safeguarding Arab rights. Following day Council of Ministers decided to request early extraordinary convocation Arab League Council. Yesterday Parliament devoted 2 hours to members’ protest and ministerial declarations. Highlights of latter were:

[Here follow these highlights and further Lebanese and Syrian reaction.]

14. It may be appropriate to end this review by drawing special attention to suggestion ventured in paragraph 6 above. President Dodge of American University and other leading Americans here support it.

Paraphrases to London, Moscow and Arab capitals.

Wadsworth

32. Presumably the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister.
33. See telegram 1970, dated April 30, p. 588.
33. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, p. 704.
34. In Syria.
35. In telegram 215, May 22, 1946, 7 p.m., the Secretary of State “in general” approved the position taken by Minister Wadsworth. He added, for the Minister’s background information, that “high officials of UN Secretariat including Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs Sobolev have indicated their belief that it is unlikely that Palestine question will be lodged at this time before the Security Council, or for that matter, any other organ of UN. We share this view.” (867N.01/5–946)