Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/10–2846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

secret
us urgent

Washington, October 30, 1946—8 p.m.

909. After studying urtel 1415 Oct 28¹⁰ and your previous telegrams and reports on same subject we still are inclined to view expressed our 858 Oct 11 that any Iranian Govt willing resist Soviet pressure would be in stronger position if it would insist no elections be held until law and order restored throughout country.

We can understand your feeling re continuation of Govt by Cabinet decree but are wondering if such Govt would be less representative of desires of Iranian people than one formed by Majlis composed of Deputies selected in part by Soviet puppet govt. of Azerbaijan and in part by Qavam in conjunction with Tudeh party leaders and other Iranian politicians. You will recall that in urtel 1358 Oct 14¹¹ you referred to reported hope of Qavam that settlement would be reached on basis 60 percent members Majlis from his party and 40 percent from other parties. It seems to us if coming elections merely represent method by which Qavam in connivance with Azerbaijanis, Tudeh and others is to select members of Majlis, Shah may have some justification in what appears to be his fear that Qavam with hand-picked Majlis will be so strong lie can pursue whatever policy he desires.

Have recent actions or attitude of Qavam caused you revise your feelings with regard to him indicated in urtels 1359 Oct 14¹² and 1371 Oct 15? Has confidence of Shah in Qavam been restored to any extent since Cabinet reshuffle? We had obtained impression reshuffle was made only because of pressure on part of Shah with backing of army rather than because of any change of heart by Qavam. In urtel 1358 you stated preparations for elections were going forward on assumption that both Azerbaijan and Fars matters will be settled. Fars matter has been settled but according MA Tehran tel Oct 21 Azerbaijanis have broken off negotiations with central govt and returned Tabriz. Do you not consider likely that holding of elections in Azerbaijan in such circumstances would be regarded as decision on Qavam’s part to abandon efforts to reassert Iranian authority in that province and to permit it to remain indefinitely under Soviet control?

Dept would appreciate your further views on subject.

Byrnes

10. Not printed; in it Ambassador Allen stated: “I am being pressed by various factions to aid in efforts to have elections postponed but have refrained from taking any position in matter. While convening of Majlis involves risk of concessions being granted, on demands of USSR, which may be detrimental to Iranian independence, I am inclined to think it is a risk we cannot avoid. In principle Embassy should not assume responsibility for continuation of Government by Cabinet decree …” (891.00/10–2846)
11. Not printed.
12. Not printed.