891.002/10–2046: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:01 p.m.]
1391. Embs 1390. Shah gave me last night his version of events which brought about changes in Cabinet which differs somewhat from that previously reported. Shah said that following his conversations with me on Oct 14 (Embs 13655) he determined to force Qavam out and had decided to take action today (Oct. 20). Rumors that Shah planned to arrest Qavam became current and on Oct 16 [Page 538] Qavam called on Minister War to find what true situation was. Minister of War told Qavam he was not aware of Shah’s plans but knew that Shah was disgusted with continual pro-Soviet orientation of Govt and that Army was entirely loyal to Shah and would do whatever he ordered.
Qavam asked for audience with Shah next morning (Oct 17) and declared his willingness to follow any instructions. Shah says Qavam was “trembling with fright”. Shah said his first requirement was that both Firuzes and three Tudeh members must be dismissed from Cabinet and Qavam’s party must fight Tudeh with all its strength during coming election. Nothing further must be heard of coalition with Tudeh or collaboration agreement [regarding?] election. Qavam promptly agreed to everything except dismissal of Muzzafar Firuz, pleading to keep him on at least for short while. Shah says he became furious, banged tables, and told Qavam that mention of Firuz again would end any cooperation between himself and Qavam forever. Shah said he wanted Firuz either in prison or out of country immediately. Qavam suggested sending him to Moscow and Shah agreed provided it was done immediately. Before Qavam left palace he and Shah drew up new Cabinet list.
They agreed to keep matter entirely secret for 24 hours to avoid Tudeh demonstrations but Qavam promptly told Firuz, who told Soviet Ambassador. Latter demanded to see Qavam immediately and did so that night (Oct 17). Sadchikov used abusive language and succeeded in weakening Qavam’s nerve. Next morning Qavam called again on Shah in much agitation and expressed fear that Soviet troops might enter country if change of Cabinet went through. Shah says he expressed disbelief that USSR would invade Iran but that even so he was determined to go through with change and immediately call on UN for help in case of attack. They then agreed to announce new Cabinet without further delay.
Principal difference between foregoing account and my telegram yesterday (number 1390) is that Shah does not consider Qavam deserves any credit for initiative in changing Cabinet, although he admits that Qavam has become angry against Tudeh and is glad to be rid of them.
Shah told me he spent three sleepless nights trying to decide whether it was best to give Qavam another chance. He finally concluded that since Qavam had brought Tudeh into Govt Qavam should assume responsibility for ousting them. In response to his question I said I thought he had acted wisely and that manner in which change had [Page 539] come about was most fortunate. Dept’s 880, October 186 has [omission] Dept’s assumptions are entirely correct and telegram appreciated.
Repeated London 174 and Moscow 296.