Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

711.91/10–1246

Memorandum by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to Major General John H. Hilldring ⁹⁷

top secret
SWN–4818

Washington, 12 October 1946.

Reference is made to the State Department memorandum dated 26 September 1946 which transmitted a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these questions and have advised the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

“It is apparent that the questions propounded by the Department of State are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

• “1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez–Cairo Area, in the first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus–Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean–Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counteroffensive action from any area.
• “2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

  “Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia’s geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR. It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.

• “3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:
  • “a. A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their ‘security’ ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.
  • “b. Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.
  • “c. The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kirkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies. Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.
  • “d. Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in a, b and c above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.
• “4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.
• “The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946.”^*

For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. Reid

Secretary

97. This memorandum was directed to General Hilldring in his capacity as Department of State member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee.
98. Note: Copy forwarded to State Department in letter to Acting Secretary of State from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 31 August 1946. [Footnote in the original; for memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated August 23, 1946, see p. 857.]